Federal and state cases have consistently rejected arguments that the right to confrontation should be recognized in a range of nontrial criminal proceedings.308 A criminal defendant has no right to confrontation during a preliminary hearing.309 A defendant also has no right to confrontation during a probation revocation proceeding,310 transfer of custody hearing,311 or a sentencing hearing.312
The courts have also refused to recognize a right to confrontation in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings that may result in punitive consequences. For example, there is no right to confront government witnesses during a Transportation Security Administration hearing.313 Detainees also may not confront government witnesses during immigration proceedings, regardless of the potential deportation or custodial consequences.314 Similarly, courts have refused to recognize a right to confrontation of witnesses for the state right during involuntary commitment proceedings.315
Although the clear trend is for courts to refuse to recognize the right to confrontation outside the trial courtroom, one federal trial court has held that a defendant has a right to confrontation during both phases of federal capital sentencing.316 In this case, the judge concluded that recent Supreme Court death penalty doctrine "strongly suggest[s] that a defendant's Sixth Amendment expansive trial rights extend into the eligibility and selection phases" of the capital sentencing process.317 In light of these recent cases, because "all of the alleged aggravating factors—statutory or nonstatutory—are of constitutional significance[,]. . . . the jury's factfinding [in all phases of capital sentencing] . . . should be accompanied by the same constitutional protections as those which accompany the trial of elements."318 One state court has extended this reasoning to noncapital sentencing hearings if they are held before a jury.319 The state judge found this reasoning "noteworthy" even though the federal case was a death penalty prosecution.320 According to this court, the same protections should inure in noncapital cases whenever defendants are sentenced by a jury. Constitutional protections apply and should not be limited by the available punishment; a sentencing body's need for evidence "does not sanction the admission of unconstitutional evidence against the defendant."321
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Notes:
[308] . In addition to the proceedings discussed...