J.L. v. Bd. of Educ

1

J.L., a student, and S.L. and M.L., his parents, Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 3:23-cv-00516

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

July 12, 2023

MEMORANDUM

ALETA A. TRAUGER, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 5), to which the Williamson County Board of Education (“WCBE”) has filed a Response (Doc. No. 8), and the plaintiffs have filed a Reply (Doc. No. 9). For the reasons set out herein, the motion will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The IDEA and the Honig Process

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. “offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment: to furnish a ‘free appropriate public education'-more concisely known as a FAPE-to all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S.Ct. 743, 748 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3)(A)(i), 1412(a)(1)(A)). The IDEA “contemplates that such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools, with the child participating as much as possible in the same activities as [non-disabled] children,” but it also permits schooling to be provided in other settings, where necessary. Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.132, 300.227, 300.307(b), 300.347)).

The IDEA's definition of “disability” includes a wide array of conditions, from audiovisual impairments to orthopedic limitations to what the Act refers to as “serious emotional disturbance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i). Even students with superficially similar diagnoses, moreover, may have strikingly (or subtly) different needs. Accordingly, “[t]he IDEA establishes procedures by which school officials, parents, and the student can collaborate to create” an individualized education program, or “IEP,” that takes into account the unique considerations relevant to each child. Long v. Dawson Springs Indep. Sch. Dist., 197 Fed.Appx. 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(11), 1414(d); Town of Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368).

Ideally, those procedures are designed to result in an IEP that is acceptable to each member of the “IEP team,” as that collaborative group is known. Sometimes, however, members of the IEP team have irreconcilable differences that the collaborative process cannot resolve. For such cases, “[t]he IDEA . . . provides for administrative procedures to resolve disputes when the people involved in the creation of an IEP are not able to agree on its substance.” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)-(g), (k). If, at the end of the administrative process, the parties still disagree, then any party can seek review “in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also S.E. v. Grant Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633, 642-43 (6th Cir. 2008).

A child's education, however, cannot be put on pause for litigation. In recognition of that fact, the IDEA includes what has become known as a “stay-put” provision, which requires that, “during the pendency of any proceedings initiated under the Act, unless the state or local educational agency and the parents or guardian of a disabled child otherwise agree, ‘the child shall remain in the then current educational placement.'” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (quoting provision now at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)) (emphasis omitted); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518.^[1]

That requirement, “read literally,” is “unequivocal.” Id. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that an entirely unyielding application of the stay-put provision could lead to the “clearly unintended, and untenable, result that school districts must return violent or dangerous students to school while the often lengthy [IDEA] proceedings run their course.” Id. To avoid that result, the Court has read the IDEA to permit school officials to secure an exception to the stay-put provision “by showing that maintaining the child in his or her current placement is substantially likely to result in injury either to himself or herself, or to others.” Id. at 328. Such an order is typically referred to as a “Honig injunction,” after the case in which the Supreme Court first recognized such a rule. See id.

B. This Case

J.L. is a student in Williamson County, Tennessee. He was born in 2010, and S.L. and M.L are his parents. J.L. has been identified as in need of special education and related services in connection with diagnoses of Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder (“DMDD”) and Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 15.)

For the first few years of J.L.'s schooling, he was educated alongside his peers at Bethesda Elementary, in the Williamson County public school system. His most recent agreed-upon formal IEP-finalized on September 5, 2019-reflected this placement. During the 2019-20 school year, however, a dispute arose between J.L.'s parents and the rest of his IEP team regarding whether that placement could safely continue, in light of J.L.'s history of sometimes-violent outbursts. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20.)

The parties were unable to agree on a path forward, and J.L. and his parents filed a Due Process Complaint against WCBE on November 3, 2019. (Doc. No. 5-4.)

The plaintiffs' initiation of the IDEA dispute process gave automatic rise to stay-put rights in connection with J.L.'s placement at Bethesda Elementary. Those stay-put rights, however-just like all stay-put rights under the IDEA-was subject to a potential exception in order to ensure the safety of J.L.'s teachers and peers, and, on March 6, 2020, WCBE filed a seaparate Due Process Complaint and Request for Expedited Due Process Hearing for the purpose of seeking a Honig injunction. (Doc. No. 5-5.) The question of whether WCBE was entitled to an injunction, however, was never resolved, because, on June 26, 2020, the parties entered into a limited settlement agreement intended to represent a “full and complete resolution of the issues in the pending Honig Due Process hearing.” (Doc. No. 5-6 at 1 (“Honig Settlement”).) The parties agreed, pursuant to the Honig Settlement, that J.L. would be “place[d] . . . in a temporary homebound placement until a final order is issued, or until the parties enter into a settlement agreement resolving all disputes between them.” (Id. at 1.) WCBE agreed to provide three weekly homebound instruction sessions, as well as some additional homebound services. (Id.) The Honig Settlement did not resolve the underlying substantive dispute regarding J.L.'s education-only the stay-put issue. (Id.)

On October 14, 2020, however, the parties entered into a second settlement agreement that purported to provide a “full and complete resolution of all issues in” the still-pending IDEA dispute. (Doc. No. 8-6 at 1 (“Global Settlement”).) Pursuant to that resolution, WCBE agreed to pay “for the expenses arising from J.L.'s attendance at Robson Academy, a satellite school of Faith Christian Academy.” (Id. at 1.) That approach-whereby the local public education agency uses available special education funding to support the child's attendance at a private school-is not uncommon and is, in fact, expressly contemplated by the IDEA as a permissible approach. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.325(c); see also St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2001). The 2020 settlement agreement, however, complicated that course of action somewhat by including language stating that the parties “acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that this Confidential Settlement Agreement is a resolution of a dispute and not an educational placement under the” IDEA. (Id. at 4.) That provision continues:

The parties agree that this Confidential Settlement Agreement does not create a “stay-put” placement for the purposes of the IDEA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The parties agree that this settlement is solely for the purpose of resolving the dispute between them and in no way constitutes any representation on the part of [WCBE] regarding the educational appropriateness of Robson Academy.

(Id. at 4.)

J.L.'s parents enrolled him in Robson Academy, as contemplated by the agreement. J.L.'s disruptive behavior, however, continued. According to a draft IEP^[2] formulated in August of 2021, J.L.'s time at Robson Academy was marked by “consistent incidences of flipping tables, ripping paper, swearing, fleeing [the] classroom and hitting the teachers.” (Doc. No. 8-7 at 2.) The Academy reported that it had “made adjustments from being in a class with other students to working with [J.L.] one on one,” but that the school was ultimately “not being successful in seeing his overall behavior dissipate.” (Id.) In March of 2021, Robson Academy informed J.L.'s parents that J.L. would no longer be permitted to attend the school. Thereafter, J.L.'s parents enrolled him in an “online homeschool program.” (Doc. No. 8-3 at 408.)

J.L.'s IEP team held a meeting on August 3, 2021, to discuss his placement and education for the upcoming school year. J.L.'s parents and the other team members disagreed on a number of issues and were unable to agree on an approach. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 24.) Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, J.L.'s parents filled out the necessary paperwork to reenroll J.L. in the WCBE system- specifically, at Spring Station Middle School. (Doc. No. 8-9.)

On August 18, 2021, J.L. and his parents filed a new Due Process Complaint against WCBE. (Doc. No. 5-8.) The parties, however disagreed regarding which of J.L.'s prior placements was covered by his stay-put...