J.M. v. State

172 N.E.3d 690 (Table)

J.M., Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No. 21A-JV-29

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED July 13, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: Anna Onaitis Holden, Zionsville, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Sierra A. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] J.M. appeals his juvenile adjudication for an act which would constitute carrying a handgun without a license if committed by an adult, a Class A misdemeanor. J.M. challenges the admission of a firearm found on J.M.’s person after he was stopped and searched by a Speedway Police Department officer. We find that the search and seizure of J.M. was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's adjudication.

Issue

[2] J.M. raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the juvenile court properly admitted the handgun found on J.M.’s person as a result of the officer's pat down of J.M.

Facts

[3] On October 18, 2020, Officer Nicolas May of the Speedway Police Department responded to a report of a car crash on 10th Street in Marion County. The report stated that motorists were drag racing in Ford Mustangs and that one of the Mustangs crashed. The report further specified that two males were walking away from the crash and that one of the males was wearing a red garment.¹

[4] Officer May, who was alone, arrived at the scene of the crash around 7:18 p.m. Although it was dark outside, Officer May saw a Mustang "off the side of the road in the grass" and two males walking eastbound at the intersection of 10th and Polco Streets. Tr. Vol. II p. 8. Officer May testified that one of the males was wearing a red sweatshirt and jeans as described by the report, and his companion was wearing a white t-shirt. The male in the red sweatshirt was later identified as eighteen-year-old Christian Trujillo, and the male in the white t-shirt was identified as sixteen-year-old J.M.

[5] Officer May activated the lights on his fully marked patrol vehicle and stepped out of the vehicle. Trujillo and J.M. approached Officer May, and as they did, Officer May observed the grip and magazine of a firearm protruding from Trujillo's right pocket. As a result, Officer May ordered Trujillo and J.M. to put their hands in the air, and they complied. Officer May secured Trujillo's firearm and placed him in handcuffs for officer safety because Officer May was the only officer at the scene. Officer May then conducted an external pat down of J.M.’s person for weapons. During the pat down, Officer May felt what he immediately believed to be a firearm in J.M.’s pocket. Officer May secured the firearm and detained J.M. with handcuffs.

[6] On October 19, 2020, the State filed a petition alleging that J.M. was a delinquent child for acts committed which would constitute dangerous possession of a firearm and carrying a handgun without a license, if committed by an adult, Class A misdemeanors.

[7] On November 9, 2020, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing, and J.M. objected to the introduction of the firearm obtained during the pat down by Officer May. J.M. alleged that the stop and pat down violated his federal and state constitutional rights. After hearing arguments from both sides, the juvenile court overruled the objection. The juvenile court subsequently found the two alleged offenses to be true but "merge[d]" the offenses "for purposes of disposition." Tr. Vol. II p. 47.

[8] On November 18, 2020, the juvenile court dismissed the true finding for dangerous possession of a firearm in light of a recently decided Indiana Supreme Court case.² On December 8, 2020, the juvenile court ordered J.M. discharged to the custody of his father and placed him on probation. This appeal ensued.

Analysis

[9] J.M. argues his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution were violated by Officer May's detention of J.M., and therefore, the trial court erred by denying J.M.’s motion to suppress evidence discovered on J.M.’s person during the stop. Because J.M.’s case proceeded to a fact-finding hearing, his appeal is better framed as a request to review the juvenile court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Guilmette v. State , 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014).

"The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Ordinarily, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. But when a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is based "on the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo."

Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017) ).

I. Federal Constitutional Challenge

[10] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a warrant supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. " ‘The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings.’ " Thayer v. State, 144 N.E.3d 843, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006) ). These Fourth Amendment protections have been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). "As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is generally not admissible in a prosecution against the victim of the unlawful search or seizure absent evidence of a recognized exception." Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013).

[11] While generally, a warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, there are well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement; and the State bears the burden to show that one of them applies. Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 850 (Ind. 2017). One such exception is "derived from Terry v. Ohio , which permits a brief investigatory stop ‘where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot[.]’ " Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968) ). "A Terry stop, thus is permissible without a warrant or probable cause if the officer has reasonable suspicion to justify the stop." Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (Ind. 2013). "While this stop requires less than probable cause, an officer's reasonable suspicion demands more than just a hunch: ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.’ " Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1204 (quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 ), cert. denied.

[12] J.M. argues that Officer May did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him, and therefore, the firearm obtained as a result of the stop should not have been admitted into evidence. J.M. relies in part on our Supreme Court's opinion in Pinner v. State, 74 N.E.3d 226 (Ind. 2017). In Pinner , officers received a tip from a taxi driver that after he drove a man and a woman to their destination, the couple exited the taxi, and the male passenger, Pinner, dropped a handgun either in the taxi or on the ground. Pinner , 74 N.E.3d at 228 The taxi driver feared he would be robbed. Id. The taxi driver confirmed to police that he was neither robbed nor threatened with the weapon. Id. The officers proceeded to the establishment at which the taxi driver dropped off Pinner and his companion in order to confront Pinner. Id. One of the officers asked Pinner if he had a weapon, to which Pinner nervously answered in the negative. Id. The officer then instructed Pinner to stand up and keep his hands up so his hands could be seen, to which Pinner complied. Id. The officer observed the butt of a firearm in Pinner's front pocket, secured the firearm, and detained Pinner for further investigation. Id.

[13] Pinner was arrested and charged with carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, which was enhanced to a Level 5 felony due to a prior felony conviction. Id. Pinner filed a motion to suppress the admission of the handgun obtained on his person during the stop into evidence and alleged that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Id. The trial court, however, denied the motion.

[14] Our Supreme Court noted that the taxi driver's tip only identified a person who possessed a gun with no suggestion of any illegality. Id. at 232. Our Supreme Court further noted that, from the taxi driver's tip, the officers had no reason to suspect that Pinner was carrying the firearm without a license and, thus, had no reasonable suspicion to stop him. Id. Accordingly, our Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Pinner's motion to suppress.

[15] Pinner , however, is distinguishable from J.M.’s case. Here, as J.M. concedes, the report did allege criminal activity.³ Namely, the report alleged: (1) drag racing, which can be charged as criminal recklessness or as a speed contest; and (2) leaving the scene of an accident, all of which are criminal offenses in this State. See Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1 ; Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2 ; Ind. Code § 9-21-6-3. J.M. claims, however, that even though the report alleged a crime, Officer May lacked reasonable suspicion to stop J.M. and Trujillo because "the report was minimal and did not allege J.M. himself participated in those activities." J.M.’s Br....