J.P. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, DISTRICT JUDGE

This decision resolves a motion for attorneys' fees and costs in this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990 ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§1400 et seq.^[1] Plaintiff J.P. sued the New York City Department of Education ("DOE") after being awarded independent evaluations and related accommodations for her disabled child, J.J. (together with J.P., "plaintiffs"), in an administrative hearing before an independent hearing officer ("IHO"). Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees and costs, totaling $34,062.30, covering both the underlying administrative proceeding and this action, as well as pre- and post-judgment interest on that sum.

For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion for fees and costs with post-judgment interest, but in a sum below that sought.

I.Background^[2]

A. The IDEA Action and Proceedings Before the IHO

J.J. is a child with a disability covered by the IDEA. 56.1 ¶ 2. J.P. is JJ.'s parent. Id. ¶ 1. On July 17, 2020, J.P. filed a due process complaint ("DPC") with DOE. Id. ¶ 6; see Id. ¶¶ 7-10. It alleged that DOE had failed to provide J.J. with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") pursuant to the IDEA during the 2020-2021 school year. Id. ¶ 8. The DPC requested that DOE fund JJ.'s tuition at the Rebecca School for that school year, either by reimbursing JJ.'s tuition or directly paying the school for tuition and associated school costs. Id. ¶9.

On January 29, 2021, IHO Suzanne Carter, id. ¶ 10, presided over a due process hearing (the "administrative proceeding") on the merits of JJ.'s claims, id. ¶ 12. Prior to the hearing, DOE had not responded to plaintiffs' DPC. Id. ¶ 11. At the hearing, plaintiffs entered 14

documents into evidence and presented testimony. Id. ¶ 13. On February 22, 2021, plaintiffs submitted a six-page closing brief. Id. ¶14. DOE did not submit a closing brief. Id. ¶15.

On March 21, 2021, the IHO issued a final decision ordering DOE to fund or reimburse JJ.'s tuition, related services, and registration fee for J.J.'s attendance at the Rebecca School for the 2020-2021 academic year. Id. ¶¶16-17.

B. Procedural History of the Fees Action in this Court

On December 21, 2021, plaintiffs filed this action. Dkt. 1. They sought attorneys' fees and costs. Id. On February 16, 2022, DOE answered. Dkt. 8. On July 18, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 19, and, in support, a memorandum of law and supporting declarations, Dkts. 20-25. On August 16, 2022, DOE filed its opposition, Dkt. 34, along with supporting declarations, Dkts. 31-33, 35. On August 29, 2022, plaintiffs replied. Dkt. 37.

II. Applicable Legal Principles

A. IDEA Claims

"The IDEA aims 'to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.'" A.R. ex rel. R. V. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ, 407 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). States that receive certain federal funds must "offer parents of a disabled student an array of procedural safeguards designed to help ensure the education of their child." Polera v. Bd of Educ, 288 F.3d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 2002). Parents are entitled to bring complaints regarding the "provision of a free appropriate public education" to their child, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), and to have those heard by an IHO, id. § 1415(f)(1); N.Y. Educ. L. § 4404(1); see also A.R., 407 F.3d at 72.

"In the United States, parties are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees- the prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (citation omitted). However, under the IDEA, if a parent of the child with a disability is the "prevailing party" in the litigation, the district court has discretion to award the parent "reasonable attorneys' fees" and costs incurred. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); see also J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119,121 (2d Cir. 2002). The award may cover work performed before (1) the IHO, (2) the State Review Officer ("SRO"), (3) the district court, and (4) on appeal. See A.R., 407 F.3d at 84 (affirming award of fees incurred during IHO proceedings and before district court, and remanding to consider whether fees should be awarded for work during Second Circuit appeal); G.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 894 F.Supp.2d 415, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (awarding fees for work conducted in SRO proceeding). Prevailing parties are also entitled to reimbursement for the reasonable costs incurred in litigating an IDEA case. G.B., 894 F.Supp.2d at 443.

To determine the award and the amount of fees, the court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, it must determine whether the party seeking to enforce the fee-shifting provision is the "prevailing party." Mr. L. v. Sloan, 449 F.3d 405, 405-07 (2d Cir. 2006). Second, it must determine whether the party "should be awarded attorneys' fees." Id. In determining whether fees should be awarded, and in what amount, the court examines whether the fees are reasonable in light of the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The court has the discretion to reduce the award if the fees or hours reported are excessive or misleading. Id. at 437; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F) (requiring court to reduce attorneys' fees awarded upon findings of, inter alia, excessive reported or hourly rates); see also Id. § 1415(i)(3)(G) (exception

to subsection (F) where state or local agency unreasonably protracts final resolution of action or proceeding).

B. Prevailing Party

To be a prevailing party under the IDEA, a plaintiff must achieve (1) "some material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" that is (2) "judicially sanctioned." A.R., 407 F,3d at 67. The Second Circuit has held that a party who receives agency-ordered relief on the merits of their claim is a "prevailing party" for the purposes of IDEA. Id. at 75. A party need not recover on all claims to be considered the "prevailing party." K.L. v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. DisL, No. 12 Civ. 6313 (DLC), 2013 WL 4766339, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013), aff'd, 584 F, App'x 17 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order). But, she "must succeed on a significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Id.

C. Calculation of Fees

The starting point for determining the presumptively reasonable fee award is the "lodestar" amount, which is "the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case." Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154,166 (2d Cir. 2011). The lodestar is not "conclusive in all circumstances," and may be adjusted when it fails to "adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee." Id. at 167 (internal citation omitted).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

Under the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA, the court determines a reasonable hourly rate "based on rates prevailing in the community in which the action or proceeding arose for the kind and quality of services furnished." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). A reasonable rate is one a reasonable, paying-per-hour client would pay for the same services rendered. K.F. v. N.Y.C Dep'tof Educ.,

No. 10 Civ. 5465 (PKC), 2011 WL 3586142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011), adhered to as amended, 2011 WL 4684361 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2011) (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522F.3d 182,190 (2d Cir. 2008)). The community used for purposes of IDEA fee-shifting litigation is the district in which the issue arose-specifically, where the student was denied a FAPE, Id. at *2. However, in determining reasonable hourly rates, it is also important to look to the area of legal practice at issue. That is because legal markets are today so interconnected that it is no longer meaningful, in assessing a reasonable rate, to look at geographic location alone. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 192.

In determining a reasonable rate, district courts are also to consider case-specific variables known as the "Johnson factors." These include:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3. "A district court need not 'recite and make separate findings as to all twelve Johnson factors, provided that it takes each into account in setting the attorneys' fee award.'" E.F. Ex rel. N.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ, No. 11 Civ. 5243 (GBD) (FM), 2014 WL 1092847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (quoting Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 344 Fed.Appx. 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009)).

2. Reasonable Hours

Once a reasonable rate of pay has been calculated, it is multiplied by a reasonable number of hours expended to determine the award amount. The Court has the discretion to disregard hours viewed as "excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Bliven v. Hunt,

579 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at...