J.Q.R. v. Dist. of Columbia Gov't

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J.Q.R., by his parent and next friend NATIA ROGERS Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-02477 (CJN)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 17, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CARL J. NICHOLS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

J.Q.R a minor, alleges that he was falsely arrested while attending school at Democracy Prep Congress Heights. He asserts various tort and constitutional claims against the officer who arrested him, the District of Columbia, and Democracy Prep. The District moves to dismiss some of the claims against it while Congress Heights moves to dismiss all of the claims against it. The Court will grant both motions.

I. Background

At the time of the arrest, J.Q.R. was a fourteen-year-old student at Congress Heights with an “emotional disability.” Am. Compl., ECF No. 30, at ¶¶ 2, 15.^[1] One day, while school was ending, the school's principal, Jacqueline Walters, and two police officers approached him. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. The officers asked J.Q.R. about a mobile phone that was missing, and one of the officers grabbed J.Q.R.'s arm as he attempted to leave the area. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23, 27. J.Q.R. could not provide any information about the phone and, as he saw it, did not commit any crime. See id. at ¶ 23-33. J.Q.R. thus asked for someone to call his mother. Id. at ¶ 26. Although Principal Walters knew his mother's contact information, she did not call her. Id. at ¶ 30.

J.Q.R. attempted to leave for home, but before he did, one of the officers (Officer Williams) arrested him. Id. at ¶ 35. It was a violent arrest. Williams grabbed J.Q.R. and pressed him against a brick wall. Id. He then threw J.Q.R. face first to the ground, pressed his knee on J.Q.R.'s arms, and handcuffed him. Id. Williams exerted so much force that J.Q.R. suffered a compound, displaced fracture of his right arm, not to mention many bruises and scratches. Id. at ¶ 37. The injuries caused J.Q.R. to miss a significant amount of school, and his treating physician found he has suffered a “permanent injury” to his arm. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40.

Williams did not turn on his body camera. Id. at ¶ 36. The Metropolitan Police Division's Internal Affairs Division had previously investigated Williams for excessive force and for turning off his body camera on at least three prior occasions. Id. at ¶ 43.

This lawsuit followed. In his operative complaint, J.Q.R. names three defendants: the District of Columbia, Williams, and Democracy Prep. See id. at ¶¶ 16-18. (Williams has yet to be served.) He alleges four counts against some or all of these defendants. Count I alleges unreasonable seizure and excessive force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Williams. Id. at ¶¶ 44-51. Count II alleges “municipal liability” under § 1983 for “allowing the use of Knee-to-back and Knee-to-arm Techniques and Failure to Remove or Discipline Officers who frequently abuse citizens' Constitutional Rights.” Id. at 10 (capitalization in original); see id. at ¶¶ 52-60. Count III, in turn, broadly claims “gross negligence” by Democracy Prep, see id. at ¶¶ 61-66, and seems to base that “gross negligence” on claimed violations of the Constitution, Title IX, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, see id. at ¶ 64. Finally, Count IV alleges “municipal vicarious liability” for the “common law torts of false imprisonment, false arrest and assault and battery and excessive force, [and] intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id. at 13 (capitalization modified, punctuation in original); see also id. at ¶¶ 67-68.

II. Legal Standard

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” however, “will not do”; a complaint must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Put differently, a claim to relief must be “plausible on its face,” and the pleadings must “nudge [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 570.

III. Congress Heights's Motion to Dismiss-Count III

J.Q.R. asserts a single claim of “gross negligence” against Congress Heights. He appears to allege seven ways in which the school acted grossly negligently. In particular, J.Q.R. alleges that Congress Heights (1) failed to properly supervise the officers, (2) failed to take “corrective action,” and (3) failed to have a policy in place regarding the restraint of students. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 65. And while his briefs and Complaint are hard to follow, J.Q.R. appears also to allege that his gross-negligence claim can be sustained by four theories of deliberate indifference, as shown by violations of (4) Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)); (5) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; (6) the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; and (7) failing to implement a policy regarding the restraint of students. Am. Compl. ¶ 64.

Although J.Q.R. frames this claim as one for gross negligence, “[t]he law of the District of Columbia does not recognize degrees of negligence.” Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F.Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C. 1958); see also Wells v. Hence, 235 F.Supp.3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2017). Courts in the District of Columbia distinguish between and among degrees of negligence only when explicitly written into a statute. See Hernandez v. District of Columbia, 845 F.Supp.2d 112, 11516 (D.D.C. 2012). To establish a claim for negligence under District of Columbia law, and thus to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing: “(1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) injury to the plaintiff that was proximately caused by the breach.” Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 793 (D.C. 2011). Even under this framing, however, J.Q.R. has failed to adequately plead any of his seven theories.

Start with his first theory-negligent supervision. The tort of negligent supervision “recognizes that an employer owes specific duties to third persons based on the conduct of its employees.” Griffin v. Acacia Life Ins. Co., 925 A.2d 564, 575 (D.C. 2007). A mandatory element of a negligent-supervision claim is thus the ability to supervise. Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see Spicer v. District of Columbia, 916 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013). But J.Q.R. does not allege that Williams is an employee of Congress Heights, nor does he plead any facts suggesting that Congress Heights had supervisory power over Williams.

True, occasionally vicarious liability can attach for nonemployees, such as in a principalagent relationship. But establishing a principal-agent relationship requires its own showing. “First, the court must look for evidence of the parties' consent to establish a principal-agent relationship. Second, the court must look for evidence that the activities of the agent are subject to the principal's control.” Henderson v. Charles E. Smith Mgmt., Inc., 567 A.2d 59, 62 (D.C. 1989) (emphasis in original). Several factors help guide this analysis, such as whether the purported principal has control over “(1) the selection and engagement of the servant, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to discharge, (4) the power to control the servant's conduct, (5) and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer.” Saint-Jean v. District of Columbia, No. 08-1769, 2016 WL 10829005, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2016) (quoting Judah v. Reiner, 744 A.2d 1037, 1040 (D.C. 2000)). Of all the factors, the fourth-“the power to control the servant's conduct”-is the most decisive. Id.; see also LeGrand v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 241 A.2d 734, 735 (D.C. 1968).

But J.Q.R. does not plausibly allege that Congress Heights (whether through Principal Walters or otherwise) had any supervisory authority over Williams and the other officers, let alone any power to control their conduct.^[2] The Amended Complaint merely alleges that “Principal Jacqueline Walters was the policymaker for Democracy Prep Congress Heights and was responsible for supervising personnel like Defendant Officer Todd S. Williams[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 62. It provides no facts to support that wholly conclusory assertion.

J.Q.R. appears to advance a second theory of liability under the broad heading of gross negligence. In particular, he appears to claim that Congress Heights had a duty to take corrective action during the arrest and failed to do so. But the Amended Complaint includes no facts to support this conclusion. In any event, D.C. Code § 5-117.04 provides that “[a]ny willful interference with the Chief of Police, or with any member of the police force . . . while in official and due discharge of duty, shall be punishable as a misdemeanor.” No school representative could have intervened in the arrest without committing a crime, which is entirely inconsistent with the idea that a duty to intervene existed.

J.Q.R also claims that Congress Heights was deliberately indifferent by failing to follow Title IX. Title IX protects persons against being “excluded from participation in, [] denied the benefits of, or [] subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The statute grants relief only when that misconduct includes...