J.R.C. v. S.L.F.

686 S.W.3d 673

J.R.C., Petitioner/Respondent,

v.S.L.F., Respondent/Appellant.

No. ED 111715

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION THREE.

Filed: March 12, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, No. 23SL-PN01357, Honorable Julia Pusateri Lasater, Judge

Steven A. Waterkotte, 231 South Bemiston Ave, Suite 260, Clayton, Mo. 63105, for appellant.

J.R.C., Pro Se.

Angela T. Quigless, Judge

S.L.F. appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County granting a full order of protection under Missouri’s Adult Abuse Act, Sections 455.005 – 455.090 RSMo. (2016), against him and in favor of his former girlfriend, J.R.C. Because we conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, we reverse the trial court’s judgment entering the full order of protection and vacate the order.

Factual and Procedural History

J.R.C. and S.L.F. were romantically involved for about six months. J.R.C. filed a petition for an order of protection against S.L.F. on March 17, 2023, alleging that S.L.F. stalked and harassed her. The trial court entered an ex parte order of protection against S.L.F. on that date.

The trial court conducted a hearing on J.R.C.’s petition. During the hearing, the following evidence was adduced: J.R.C. testified that on one occasion after she lunged at S.L.F., he pushed her back against a wall. This "kind of startled" her. After that, they broke up and got back together. J.R.C. testified that after breaking up again, S.L.F. constantly contacted her through multiple phone numbers, Cash App, Chime, and different social media accounts that she believed to be his. The record before us contains neither the messages nor content of these messages.¹ J.R.C. testified that S.L.F. left items, including her jacket and a gift, on her doorstep on February 28, 2023 as they had mutually agreed. After this visit, J.R.C. testified that she bought cameras. During cross examination, J.R.C. testified that she also left items on S.L.F.’s doorstep. S.L.F. admitted to contacting J.R.C. via Cash App and leaving belongings that she wanted back on her doorstep.

J.R.C. further testified that S.L.F. sent her and her aunt a text message, along with a picture of J.R.C., her dog, and S.L.F, stating that J.R.C. was "digging a hole." No further details were given regarding the context of the text message. J.R.C. also testified that she sings and S.L.F. promoted one of her singing events on his social media page as "an intimidation thing," but he did not attend the event. J.R.C. testified that an unknown account on Twitter, that she believed to be S.L.F., responded to her post about allergies, stating that she should take allergy drops and named a medication that S.L.F. had previously bought her. J.R.C. described S.L.F.’s repeated communications as "harassment" and that she was "just sick of it."

On cross examination, S.L.F.’s attorney asked J.R.C. if she was alarmed by S.L.F. dropping off the items on her porch even though she knew he was planning on dropping them off. J.R.C. responded, "yes, it did alarm me." J.R.C. testified to no other encounters, nor did she testify to any threats or fear of physical harm.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court announced from the bench that "there is sufficient evidence to issue a full order of protection." In its judgment, which consisted of a check-the-box form, the court found that J.R.C. had "proven allegations of domestic violence, stalking, and/or sexual assault." On April 17, 2023, the trial court entered a full order of protection preventing S.L.F. from contacting J.R.C.; entering J.R.C.’s school, employment, or home; and coming within 500 feet of J.R.C for one year. S.L.F. appeals.

Standard of Review

[1–3] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on full orders of protection, this Court will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. L.M.M. v. J.L.G., 619 S.W.3d 593, 596 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). We view "the evidence and permissible inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment." Bateman v. Platte Cty., 363 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Mo. banc 2012). Substantial evidence is "competent evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably decide the case." H.R. v. Foley, 356 S.W.3d 210, 213 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011).

[4, 5] The trial courts must ensure that sufficient credible evidence exists to support all elements of the statute before entering a full order of protection "because of the potential stigma that may attach to an individual who is labeled a ‘stalker’ under the Missouri Adult Abuse Act" ("the Act"). K.LM. v. B.A.G., 532 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (quoting M.L.G. v. R.W., 406 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013)). To be entitled to relief under the Act, the "petitioner must prove allegations in a petition for an order of protection by a preponderance of the evidence." LAC. v. RA.P., 671 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).

Discussion

In his sole point on appeal, S.L.F. challenges the trial court’s entry of the full order of protection against him. He contends no substantial evidence supported the court’s determination that J.R.C. had proven domestic violence and stalking under the Act.

During the hearing, the trial court announced from the bench that "there is sufficient evidence to issue a full order of protection." In its judgment, which consisted of a check-the-box form, the court found that J.R.C. had "proven allegations of domestic violence, stalking, and/or sexual assault." Because J.R.C. did not allege sexual assault, no evidence of sexual assault was adduced at the hearing, and the trial court did not expressly find that sexual assault occurred, we do not consider it. We instead address the trial court’s determination regarding domestic violence and stalking.

"Domestic violence" is "abuse or stalking committed by a family or household member, as such terms are defined in this section." Section 455.010(5) (emphasis added). Among others, a "household member" can be "any person who is or has been in a continuing social relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim." Section 455.010(7). The parties do not dispute that S.L.F. qualifies as a "household member" because the parties were at one time in a romantic relationship.

I. Domestic Violence - Abuse

"Abuse" constitutes one form of "domestic violence," and includes "assault," "battery," and "harassment." Section 455.010(1).² Because the trial court’s judgment implicates these three forms of abuse, we examine each and the supporting evidence in turn.

A. Battery

[6] "Battery" means "purposely or knowingly causing physical harm to another with or without a deadly weapon." Section 455.010(1)(c). J.R.C. testified that on one occasion S.L.F. pushed her back against a wall after she had lunged at him. This "kind of startled" J.R.C. However, she admitted in her testimony that she lunged at him first, making her the initial aggressor. J.R.C.’s testimony lacked any allegations of pain, injury or physical harm caused by S.L.F. from that one occasion. J.R.C. did not testify to any sort of threat or physical altercation between her and S.L.F. that warranted her to lunge at S.L.F. Nor does the record support that any threats of physical harm were made or caused by S.L.F. Without any testimony whatsoever alleging physical harm, there was no substantial evidence to support a conclusion that S.L.F. committed battery as defined by Section 455.010(1)(c) by purposely and knowingly causing J.R.C. physical harm.

B. Assault

[7, 8] Under the Act, "assault" means "purposely or knowingly placing or attempting to place another in fear of physical harm." Section 455.010(1)(b). In her petition, J.R.C. stated she was "afraid" because S.L.F. texted her "I know where you live already, idk why you’re acting scared now," J.R.C. also stated in the petition that she was "in fear because he will not let go … I am having a hard time sleeping and it makes it worse that I work from home and feel like a sitting duck." Finally, J.R.C. also stated in the petition that she was "afraid to be at home because he knows the entry code and has left items." Indeed, J.R.C.’s petition alleged facts that warranted an ex parte order of protection and hearing. However, J.R.C. did not testify during the hearing regarding any of these alleged facts. The petition is not self-proving. In order to be entitled to relief, J.R.C. must prove allegations in a petition by a preponderance of the evidence. L.A.C., 671 S.W.3d at 423. The record lacks any evidence that S.L.F. placed or attempted to place J.R.C. in fear of physical harm or that he ever threatened or attempted to threaten her physical safety.

Even viewed in a light most favorable to the judgment, there is no substantial evidence in the record that S.L.F.’s conduct purposefully or knowingly placed or attempted to place J.R.C. in fear of physical harm. In cases where our Appellate Courts have supported a finding that the appellant purposefully or knowingly placed or attempted to place the respondent in fear of physical harm, there are, at a minimum, allegations of either threats of physical harm or actions of physical violence. See Cuda v. Keller, 236 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (holding that "calling Cuda derogatory names while standing within inches of him, bumping into him, and repeatedly challenging him to a fight during a heated discussion could reasonably be construed as a knowing attempt to place Cuda in fear of physical harm"); see also M.D.L. v. S.C.E., 391 S.W.3d 525, 531 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (holding that testimony alleging appellant drugged respondent, drove erratically around her, slashed tires of a car parked in her driveway, and committed many instances of past violence were sufficient to support a finding of assault); L.A.C., 671 S.W.3d at 425 (holding that evidence of appellant placing a...