J.A. v. Abreu

1

J. A. Plaintiff, v. STEVEN V. ABREU, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-02922-JRR

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 2, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JULIE R. RUBIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff J.A. filed this action against Defendants Steven V. Abreu and Wicomico County, Maryland (“the County”) asserting state and federal constitutional claims, as well as a state tort claim. (ECF No. 1; the “Complaint.”) Pending before the court is the County's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Bifurcate. (ECF No. 20; the “Motion.”) The court has reviewed all papers no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, by accompanying order, the County's Motion, construed as a motion to dismiss, will be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

Defendant Abreu was previously employed as a Wicomico County Deputy Sheriff. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 5.) On multiple occasions when Defendant Abreu was still a deputy sheriff, he “detained and assaulted Plaintiff while acting under color of law.” Id. On October 26, 2022, Defendant Abreu, driving a marked County Sheriff's Office vehicle, approached Plaintiff's parked vehicle as she sat in a parking lot. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant Abreu, dressed in his County Sheriff's Office uniform and armed with a gun, walked up to Plaintiff's vehicle and asked for her identification and phone number. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. He ordered Plaintiff to exit her vehicle and conducted a physical search of her body while grabbing her breasts and buttocks without her consent. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant Abreu then directed Plaintiff back into her vehicle whereupon he leaned through her window, penetrated her vagina with his fingers, and grabbed her breasts without her consent. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Following the assault on October 26, 2022, Defendant Abreu called Plaintiff's phone and sent her sexual text messages. Id. ¶ 14.

On October 28, 2022, Defendant Abreu, again driving a marked County Sheriff's Office vehicle, turned on his emergency lights to execute a traffic stop of Plaintiff's vehicle. Id. ¶ 15. After approaching her vehicle, Defendant Abreu grabbed and moved Plaintiff's face without her consent to check her neck for marks from the previous encounter. Id. ¶ 16. Defendant Abreu then told Plaintiff that “he would see her again,” and ordered her not to tell anyone about his interactions with her. Id. ¶ 18. The following day, Defendant Abreu was waiting in the parking lot of Plaintiff's employment but did not approach her because her fiance was driving her. Id. ¶ 21.

Defendant Abreu was subsequently arrested and criminally charged for his conduct toward Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 23. He was indicted on November 28, 2022, in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, Maryland (C-22-CR-22-000588), and charged with 50 offenses occurring from September 2 to October 29, 2022.^[2]

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 26, 2023, asserting four counts:

Count I: Constitutional Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Abreu in his Individual Capacity;

Count II: Violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against Defendant Abreu in his Individual Capacity;

Count III: Assault against Defendant Abreu in his Individual Capacity; and

Count IV: “Claims” against the County and Defendant Abreu in his Official Capacity.

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24-49.) The basis for Count IV is vicarious liability: Plaintiff alleges “in the alternative, that Defendant Abreu acted without actual malice while committing assault against Plaintiff as an employee, servant, and/or agent” of the County Sheriff's Office and the County, and that the County is “liable based on vicarious liability for each of the separate occurrences of assault committed by Defendant Abreu.” Id. ¶ 45. Although the claims asserted against the County in Count IV are unclear, the County construes Count IV to restate Counts I through III against it on the basis of vicarious liability. (ECF No. 20-1 at p. 2.) Plaintiff's response confirms this, stating that the County “is liable for the tortious acts committed by Defendant Abreu based on vicarious liability.” (ECF No. 21-1 at p. 2.)

Defendant Abreu answered Plaintiff's Complaint on December 22, 2023. (ECF No. 19.) The County now moves to dismiss all counts against it, or in the alternative, to bifurcate the claims against it for the purposes of discovery and trial. (ECF No. 20.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The County moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or alternatively, if the court does not dismiss the County as a Defendant, to bifurcate the claims against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). Because the court will dismiss Count IV against the County, thereby dismissing it as a Defendant in this action, the court does not reach the bifurcation argument.

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion asserted under Rule 12(b)(6) “test[s] the sufficiency of a complaint;” it does not “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244.

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “[A] complaint that provides no more than ‘labels and conclusions,' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,' is insufficient.” Bourgeois v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 3 F.Supp.3d 423, 434 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The [c]ourt must be able to deduce ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct'; the facts of the complaint, accepted as true, must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Evans v. 7520 Surratts Rd. Operations, LLC, No. 8:21-CV-01637-PX, 2021 WL 5326463, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2021) (quoting Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 126 F.Supp.3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Deputy Sheriffs as State Employees

The County contends that it cannot be vicariously liable for Defendant Abreu's actions, because at the relevant time, he was an employee of the State, not the County. (ECF No. 20-1 at p. 4-6.) Plaintiff counters that determination of whether a deputy sheriff is a county or State employee is a “fact-intensive inquiry” for the factfinder to resolve, and, therefore, is inappropriate for resolution on a 12(b)(6) motion. (ECF No. 21-1 at p. 3-4.)

“As a matter of Maryland State law, it is well settled that, as a general rule, county sheriffs and their deputies are ‘officials and/or employees of the State of Maryland,' rather than their county. Thus, for purposes of tort liability in Maryland, sheriffs and their deputies are generally considered State personnel.” Murphy-Taylor v. Hofmann, 968 F.Supp.2d 693, 726 (D. Md. 2013) (citing Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 281 (1989)); see Peacock v. Debley, 261 Md.App. 540, 556 (2024) (holding that “[u]nder Maryland law, Sheriff[s] and Deputy Sheriffs . . . are officials and/or employees of the State of Maryland rather than of [a local jurisdiction].” (citations omitted)); Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 321 F.Supp.2d 642, 651 (D. Md. 2004) (providing that “Maryland county sheriffs are also designated state constitutional officials for purposes of state law.” (citing MD. CONST. ART. IV § 44)).

In Rucker v. Harford County, the Supreme Court of Maryland (then the Court of Appeals of Maryland) concluded that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are State employees as a matter of law. 316 Md. at 281 (holding that “as a matter of Maryland law, the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs of Harford County are officials and/or employees of the State of Maryland rather than of Harford County”). “Indeed, this is confirmed by [the Maryland Tort Claims Act (‘MTCA')].” Peacock v. Debley, 261 Md.App. 540, 556 (2024) (citing MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-101) (identifying deputy sheriffs as “state personnel”). The State, and not the County, is therefore “answerable for [a deputy sheriff's] actions.” Brooks v. St. Charles Hotel Operating, LLC., No. CV DLB-23-0208, 2023 WL 6244612, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2023) (quoting Ledergerber v. Blubaugh, No. JKB-20-1208, 2020 WL 7029868, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2020)).

The Rucker holding did not, however, foreclose that “for some purposes and in some contexts,” a sheriff may be treated as a county employee, such as in matters related to the local funding and benefits of sheriffs' offices. 316 Md. at 289. The Rucker court further noted that its holding was limited to Maryland law only, and that “whether the Sheriff and Deputy Sheriffs are to be regarded as State or local government employees, for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are federal law issues which are not before this Court.” Id. at 280-81 (citations omitted).

Shortly thereafter, the Fourth Circuit in ...