J.A. v. Madera Cnty.

1

J.A., Plaintiff, v. MADERA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-00252-ADA-EPG

United States District Court, E.D. California

January 26, 2023

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14) OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS

This case arises from the shooting death of Artemio Alfaro (“Alfaro” or “the Decedent”). Plaintiff J.A. (“Plaintiff' or “J.A.”) the Decedent's minor child, through Guardian Ad Litem Luz Ana Venegas, brings claims individually and on behalf of the Decedent's estate. Plaintiff brings the instant civil rights action against the County of Madera (“the County” or “Madera”), Deputy Brendan Johnson (“Johnson”), Deputy Logan Majeski (“Majeski”), Deputy Jose Iniguez (“Iniguez”), and Does 1 through 25 (collectively “Defendants”), alleging unlawful seizure excessive force, and deprivation of due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law causes of action for battery, negligence, wrongful death, and violation of the Bane Act.

The complaint commencing this action was filed on February 23 2021, (ECF No. 1), and a first amended complaint (“FAC”) was filed on May 21, 2021, (ECF No. 12). On June 4, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 17, 18.) On September 12, 2022, the assigned District Judge referred the motion to dismiss to the undersigned. (ECF No. 25.)

For the reasons described below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

The FAC alleges as follows: On April 29, 2020, officers of Madera County, including Defendants Johnson, Majeski, Iniguez, and Does (collectively, “Defendant Officers”), attempted to apprehend Alfaro, who was wanted for two warrants. The Defendant Officers had prior knowledge that Alfaro had a reputation of running from law enforcement when confronted.

The Defendant Officers formulated a plan to apprehend Alfaro, but Alfaro was able to get into his truck and drive away. The Defendant Officers chased after Alfaro, who was eventually located by Defendant Majeski on foot near a rural farmhouse. Alfaro was able to get back into his truck. Majeski got the driver-side door open and used his K-9 and Taser on Alfaro. Simultaneously, Defendant Iniguez attempted to restrain Alfaro from the passenger-side door. However, Alfaro was able to start the truck and put it in motion as Majeski and Iniguez moved away from the vehicle. Without ascertaining the location of the other officers, Defendant Johnson began shooting into the truck, firing seven times, pausing, and then firing three more times. Alfaro, having been hit with seven bullets, including one to the head, was handcuffed and pronounced dead at the scene.

The FAC raises the following claims: (1) unlawful seizure, use of excessive force, and deprivation of due process, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) battery; (3) negligence and wrongful death; and (4) violation of the Bane Act.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). In addition,pro se pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(1). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236.

The first step in testing the sufficiency of the complaint is to identify any conclusory allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

After assuming the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations, the second step is for the court to determine whether the complaint pleads “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard for plausibility is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court generally may not consider materials outside the complaint and pleadings. Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998); Gumataotao v. Dir. of Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 236 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Leave to Amend

Courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “[P]ublic policy strongly encourages courts to permit amendments,” and “[t]he policy of allowing amendments ‘is to be applied with extreme liberality.'” Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). “However, ‘liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations.'” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)). A court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., [and] futility of amendment.” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

“Not all of the factors merit equal weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). “Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend,” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995), but “[u]ndue delay by itself is insufficient to justify denying leave to amend,” United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016). “[I]t is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

“Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining [ ] factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Cause of Action Against Defendants Iniguez and Majeski

The FAC's First Cause of Action alleges unlawful seizure, use of excessive force, and deprivation of due process, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 12 at 4-5.)^[1] In light of the FAC's “repeated use of the term ‘Defendant Officers,' . . . within the[] first cause of action, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims as alleged or inferred to Deputies Iniguez and Majeski.” (ECF No. 14 at 9.) The opposition clarifies that the “reference to ‘Defendant Officers' using excessive force in paragraphs thirteen and seventeen was an oversight” and that the “clear intent . . . is to state an excessive force claim solely against Deputy Johnson.” (ECF No. 17 at 6.)

In light of Plaintiff's clarification, to the extent the First Cause of Action can be construed as asserting an excessive force claim against Defendants Iniguez and/or Majeski, it should be dismissed without leave to amend. The undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted on this ground.

B. ...