Jackson v. Birkey

JOEL JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD BIRKEY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01108-MMM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PEORIA DIVISION

May 30, 2019

ORDER

Now before the Court are the Plaintiff, Joel Jackson's, Amended Petition for Attorney Fees and Costs (D. 156),¹ the Defendants', Richard Birkey, Richard Mautino, and Curtis Wilkey, Response (D. 173), and the Plaintiff's Reply (D. 176). The parties also filed an Agreed Response regarding the calculated rate of attorney fees. (D. 177). For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiff's Amended Petition is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

While incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") at the Illinois River Correctional Center, the Plaintiff was employed as an inmate worker in the Illinois River Correctional Center Bakery. On May 17, 2011, the Plaintiff severed four fingers on his right hand while cleaning a machine known as a bun hopper. He claimed the Defendants were deliberately indifferent, in violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, because they knew there was a significant risk of danger to inmates working on the bun hopper and they failed to train him properly. (D. 58). In October 2018, this Court presided over a jury trial in this matter. At the time, there was an additional Defendant still in the case, Tim Gleason. At the close of thePlaintiff's evidence, Gleason was dismissed from the case with prejudice by agreement of the parties. (See the Court's October 11, 2018 Minute Entry.) The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against each of the remaining Defendants—Birkey, Mautino, and Wilkey. (D. 137). They awarded the Plaintiff $350,000.00 in compensatory damages and a total of $100,000.00 in punitive damages. Id.

After trial, the Plaintiff filed the instant Amended Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs. (D. 156). He first argued he was entitled to a full reimbursement of legal fees in the amount of $253,373.50 and $54,966.22 in costs. Id. The Defendants asserted that these amounts were excessive for several reasons. (D. 173). Specifically, they argued the attorneys' fees should be reduced because: (1) the rates awarded must correspond with the rates in effect at the time services were rendered (id. at pp. 2-5); (2) attorney Katie Roche's billable hours are not compensable (id. at pp. 5-7); (3) attorney Vince Field's billable hours are too vague (id. at pp. 7-8); (4) the trial team was overstaffed (id. at pp. 8-9); (5) the Plaintiff did not submit evidence to support the fees for attorneys Jon Loevy, Arthur Loevy, and Mike Kanovitz (id. at pp. 9-10); (6) three paralegals performed work that is not traditionally done by attorneys (id. at pp. 10-11); and (7) 25% of the Plaintiff's judgment must be applied to Plaintiff's awarded fees.

The Plaintiff, in turn, identified areas where they agreed with the Defendants as it pertained to fees, submitted additional evidence regarding Roche's work, and identified evidence in the record supporting their request for fees for the services of Jon Loevy, Arthur Loevy, and Kanovitz. (D. 176). The Plaintiff does not oppose the Defendants' requests to apply the rates in effect at the time services were rendered, to reduce Field's fees by 15%, or that 25% of the judgment must be applied to any award he receives. Id. at pg. 2. At the direction of the Court, the parties filed an Agreed Response. (D. 177). Therein, the parties identified precisely which fees they agree aboutand which fees are in dispute. Id. What remains in dispute as to fees is whether: (1) Roche's billable hours are recoverable; (2) the trial team was overstaffed—i.e. Pierce's billable hours are recoverable; (3) the Plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to support a claim for reimbursement of the fees for Jon Loevy, Arthur Loevy, and Kanovitz; and (4) the fees for the work done by paralegals are recoverable.

The Defendants further object to the Plaintiff's requests for costs on multiple grounds. (D. 173 at pp. 12-13). Specifically, they claim: (1) meal costs for attorneys are not recoverable; (2) mailing expenses are not recoverable; (3) the requested costs for deposition transcripts are excessive; and (4) the Plaintiff's expert's fees are limited to $40 per day. The Plaintiff did not address the Defendants' arguments regarding costs in his Reply. (D. 176).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A prevailing party in a civil rights action may be awarded reasonable attorney fees, subject to the Court's discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Baker v. Lindgren, 856 F. 3d 498, 503 (7th Cir. 2017). "District courts have wide discretion in determining the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees and costs... [.]" Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F. 3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). The party seeking reimbursement bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of their fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). With suits involving prisoners, "a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2); Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. Ct. 784, 787 (2018).

Generally, "costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). The presumption is in favor of the prevailing party recovering the cost; the losing party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that a cost is inappropriate. Beamon v. Marshall & Ilsley Tr. Co., 411 F. 3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2005). Courts are required todetermine: "(1) whether the cost imposed on the losing party is [statutorily] recoverable and (2) if so, whether the amount assessed for that item was reasonable[]" before awarding costs. Hillmann v. City of Chicago, 2017 WL 3521098, *2 (N.D. Ill.) (citing Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F. 3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000)). "[D]istrict courts enjoy wide discretion in determining and awarding reasonable costs." Id. (citing Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Procter &Gamble Co., 924 F. 2d 633, 642 (7th Cir. 1991)).

ANALYSIS

I. ATTORNEY FEES

The Plaintiff initially argued he was entitled to $253,373.50 in fees. (D. 156 at pg. 17). The Defendants' first assert that these fees should be reduced to $166,915.74, applying the rates in effect at the time of service. (D. 173 at pp. 3-4). The Plaintiff does not dispute the rate adjustment. (D. 176 at pg. 2). In the wake of the parties' Agreed Response, it is undisputed that the Plaintiff is entitled to $175,973.65 in fees. (D. 177-1 at pg. 2). The Defendants do dispute, however, whether the Plaintiff is entitled to an additional $59,321.25 in fees. Id. at pg. 3. The disputed fees amount is comprised of: (1) attorney fees from Jon Loevy, Arthur Loevy, Kanovitz, Roche, and Pierce, totaling $34,571.25; and (2) paralegal fees from Samantha Asofsky, Melinda Elk, and Andrew Garden, totaling $24,750.00. Id.

The Plaintiff successfully obtained a jury verdict against each of the Defendants. The allegations center around a timeline of events that transpired in one location. The evidence the Plaintiff presented at trial entitled him to a verdict on his claims. Thus, as a general matter, he is entitled to the full amount of his attorney fees.

Of the remaining disputed fees, the Defendants first claim is that Roche's billable hours are not recoverable because the corresponding descriptions are vague, redundant, and constituteblock billing. (D. 173 at pp. 5-7). Roche billed 142.5 hours for a total of $27,573.75 in fees. (D. 178 at pg. 15). The Defendants stress the inadequacy of her billing descriptions and claim the Plaintiff is entitled to none of her fees, in part because other attorneys performed the same work. In his Reply, the Plaintiff argues Roche's fees should not be reduced to zero because she did not bill for any duplicative work. (D. 176 at pp. 2-3). He also acknowledges, however, that Roche's timesheets contain some entries with block billing. As a result, he argues that her fees should be reduced by—at most—no more than 15%. Id. at pg. 3.

The Defendant concedes that block billing is not impermissible, per se. (D. 173 at pg. 6). Roche attests to the accuracy of her billing records in this matter under penalty of perjury. (D. 156-10). Plaintiff's counsel further represents that none of the work Roche billed to the Plaintiff was duplicative. (D. 176 at pp. 2-3). Accordingly, the Court does not find any of the specific billing entry unjustified. The acknowledged block billing on her timesheet, however, makes it impossible for the Court to differentiate which fees are compensable from those which are not. As a result, the Court reduces Roche's fees by 15%. This brings her total fees from $27,573.75 to $23,437.69.

Next, the Defendants argue the trial team was overstaffed. (D. 173 at pp. 8-9). More specifically, they dispute that the Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for Pierce's billable hours and costs. In the Defendants' view, Pierce's presence at trial was excessive and unnecessary in a straight forward, uncomplicated case attended by three other experienced trial attorneys. The Plaintiff did not address this point in his Reply. The Defendants' argument is persuasive. Pierce billed 28.5 hours for a total of $5,985.00 in fees. (D. 178 at pg. 20). Given the circumstances of the case, her assistance—while undoubtedly valuable—was a luxury for the trial team. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is not entitled to $5,985.00 in fees for Pierce's billing. The Court furtherreduces the Plaintiff's cost award for the amount of Pierce's attendance at trial, $934.68. (D. 156-20 at pg. 3).

The Defendants also claim that the Plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence to support reimbursement of attorney fees for Jon Loevy, Arthur Loevy, and Kanovitz. (D. 173 at pp. 9-10). They assert that the billing entries are poorly supported. Combined, these attorneys billed 6 hours for a total of $1,269.00 in fees (D. 156-9 at pg. 4); (D. 156-8 at pg. 13); (D....