Jackson v. City of N.Y.

29 F.Supp.3d 161

Larry JACKSON, Plaintiff,

v.The CITY OF NEW YORK, Jesus Tellado, Stanley MacNear, John Czulada, James T. Gherardi, Ryann Dunn, Patrick D'Onofrio, Robert J. Deferrari, Kenneth Braumann, Ben Kurian, Peter Boneta, Thomas E. Reo, Michael Failla, Robert E. Russo, and Brian E. Heerey, Defendants.

No. 11–CV–3028 (PKC).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 17, 2014.

Eric Sanders, The Sanders Firm, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Courtney B. Stein, NYC Law Department, Matthew J. Modafferi, Maxwell Douglas Leighton, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge:

Pending before the Court is the motion for partial summary judgment of the Defendant City of New York (“City”) and the individual police officer defendants (“Individual Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff, a New York City police officer, brought suit alleging claims arising from an incident at his home in which he was arrested and detained while off-duty by Defendants. Defendants presently move to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims with the exception of Plaintiff's excessive force, and related state law assault and battery, claims, which Defendants admit pose a disputed issue of material fact concerning the force used. (Dkt. 58 at 2 n. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part, and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

I. The Party Incident

On August 21, 2010, Plaintiff, a police officer in the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), held a 21st birthday party for his daughter at his home beginning around 5:30 p.m. (Dkt. 56 (“Def. St.”) ¶¶ 7–11.) ¹ A disc jockey played music from the backyard of Plaintiff's home from approximately 7:00 p.m. to midnight. Alcohol was served at the party; Plaintiff had one drink that evening. (Def. St. ¶¶ 12–17; Dkt. 57–5 at 22.)

At approximately 12:30 a.m. that night, an argument erupted outside Plaintiff's home between a party guest and an unknown man. (Def. St. ¶ 19.) The unidentified man brandished a gun during the argument, after which approximately 10 to 15 other individuals arrived with bats and other weapons. (Def. St. ¶ 20; Dkt. 57–4 at 69.) Several people at the party called 911 to report the man with the gun. (Def. St. ¶ 21; Dkt. 60–2 (Ex. 5A1) at 1.)

Plaintiff went outside and interceded in the argument. He successfully diffused the situation by directing the individuals with the weapons away from his home and down the street. (Def. St. ¶ 22; Dkt. 57–4 at 68–69.) Plaintiff followed them down the street to ensure that they were gone from the area. (Def. St. ¶ 22; Dkt. 57–4 at 68–69.) Plaintiff then returned to his house to find the party guests “more or less in the street.” (Dkt. 57–4 at 69.)

At approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer John Czulada and Sergeant Stanley MacNear arrived at Plaintiff's house in response to the 911 call reporting the man with the gun. (Dkt. 57–4 at 64.) Plaintiff's domestic partner, Charlene Strong, who had called 911, told the officers that she was the “lady of the house” and was “the one that called for help.” (Dkt. 60–2 (Ex. 11B) at ECF 52.) ²

After the officers were on the scene, Tiffanie Johnson, Plaintiff's niece, “stuck her head out [ ] the [front] door” and yelled to Plaintiff, “they are fighting” because two individuals had started fighting inside the house. (Def. St. ¶¶ 24–25; Dkt. 57–4 at 72; Dkt. 60–3 (Ex. 12) at 30; Dkt. 57–5 at 32.) ³ After Johnson yelled that there was a fight, Officer Czulada ran into the house, with Plaintiff following closely after him. (Dkt. 60–3 (Ex. 13A) at 75 and at ECF 12; Dkt. 60–3 (Ex. 12) at 34.) Other officers on the scene entered Plaintiff's home after hearing screams coming from inside the house. (Dkt. 60–2 at ECF 70; Dkt. 60–3 (Ex. 12) at 34.)

When Sergeant MacNear arrived at the scene, bystanders approached him and reported that “there had been a fight and there was a man that had a gun.” (Dkt. 60–2 (Ex. 11D) at ECF 68.) Officer Czulada also believed that the officers were responding to a call about a man with a gun. (Dkt. 60–2 at ECF 62.)

The scene inside the house was chaotic after the police entered.⁴ Johnson saw one of the officers choking Plaintiff. (Dkt. 60–3 (Ex. 12) at 34.) Plaintiff was eventually detained, placed in handcuffs, and transported to the 113th Precinct in Jamaica, Queens. (Def. St. ¶ 29.) Three other individuals from the party also were arrested. (Def. St. ¶ 30.) The officers did not formally process Plaintiff's detention as an arrest. (Def. St. ¶ 34.)

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff identified himself as a police officer to the responding officers, resisted arrest, or fought with the responding officers. Whereas Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to identify himself as a police officer (Dkt. 58 at 9–10), Plaintiff maintains that he announced several times that he was a member of the NYPD before, during, and after the altercation. (See Dkt. 57–4 at 96.) ⁵ Plaintiff's claim is corroborated by several other non-party witnesses, including Johnson and Strong. ( See, e.g., Dkt. 60–5 at ECF 18–19; Dkt. 60–6 at ECF 6–7.) On the other hand, several police officers testified ⁶ that Plaintiff did not so identify himself or at least that they did not hear him do so. ( See Dkt. 60–5 at ECF 46; Dkt. 60–7 at ECF 25–26.) One non-party witness also testified that Plaintiff did not identify himself as a police officer, in part, because he was being choked and was therefore unable to do so. (Dkt. 60–5 at ECF 66; Dkt. 60–7 at ECF 63; Dkt. 60–8 at ECF 7.)

II. Post–Arrest Investigation and Disposition

Once at the station house, Plaintiff was placed in the youth officer's room, fell to the floor, and noticed that his hand was injured and bleeding. (Def. St. ¶¶ 31–33.) Officers called an ambulance and Plaintiff was taken to Booth Memorial Hospital in Queens, New York. (Def. St. ¶ 33.) Following treatment, Plaintiff was returned to the precinct and instructed to remain at the precinct by officers from the NYPD's Internal Affairs Bureau (“Internal Affairs”) and Investigations Division. (Def. St. ¶ 34.) That day, Internal Affairs placed Plaintiff on modified duty and his service weapon was confiscated. (Def. St. ¶ 35.)

Following an investigation, Internal Affairs recommended that Plaintiff be charged with “failing to identify himself as a police officer, making physical contact with a uniformed member of the service[,] and resisting being placed in handcuffs.” (Def. St. ¶ 37.) Internal Affairs also censured Defendants Czulada and Jesus Tellado for failing to comply with departmental arrest procedures. (Def. St. ¶ 38.) Plaintiff “rejected” the charges, which remain the subject of an ongoing internal NYPD trial. (Def. St. ¶ 39.) ⁷

Plaintiff sustained a broken hand as a result of the party incident and arrest. (Dkt. 57–4 at 35.) During his subsequent rehabilitation and recovery, Plaintiff continued to work on modified duty. (Dkt. 57–4 at 33.) In approximately December 2010, an NYPD doctor examined Plaintiff and cleared him to return to full duty. (Dkt. 57–4 at 36.) Although unclear from the record, it appears that Plaintiff remains employed with the NYPD as a police officer on modified duty pending the resolution of his departmental trial. (See Dkt. 57–4 at 52.)

Plaintiff initiated this action on June 24, 2011. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff's amended complaint (Dkt. 30) alleges a litany of state and federal claims as set forth below:

Counts 1, 2, 14, and 15 allege racial employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and New York State and City human rights laws.

Count 3 alleges abuse of authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Counts 4–11 are brought under the Fourth Amendment and allege illegal search of Plaintiff's home, illegal search and seizure of his person, false arrest, unlawful detention, malicious prosecution, and excessive force.

Counts 12 and 13 allege Monell claims against the City of New York for failure to train and discipline.

Counts 16–23 allege New York State law claims for negligence, assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.⁸

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes concerning any material facts, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Harvis Trien & Beck, P.C. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Blackwood Assocs., L.P.), 153 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir.1998) ( citingFed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

“The burden of showing the absence of any genuine dispute as to a material fact rests on the party seeking summary judgment.” McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.1997); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). “In assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue to be tried as to any material fact, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” McLee, 109 F.3d at 134.

“Although the moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, once such a showing is made, the non-movant must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505). “Mere conclusory allegations or denials will not suffice,” Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.1986), and a plaintiff opposing summary judgment must offer “some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Miner v. Clinton Cnty., New York, 541 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir.2008). It is within this framework that the Court...