Jackson v. Cool

111 F.4th 689

Nathaniel JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Bill COOL, Warden, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 21-3207/3280

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Argued: March 18, 2024

Decided and Filed: August 6, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown. No. 4:07-cv-00880—James S. Gwin, District Judge.

ARGUED: Jana M. Bosch, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Adam M. Rusnak, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Jana M. Bosch, Benjamin M. Flowers, Diane R. Brey, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Adam M. Rusnak, Paul R. Bottei, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Before: MOORE, COLE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

The Great Writ of Habeas Corpus is an extraordinary remedy that "guard[s] against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This case is the epitome of such an extreme judicial malfunction.

Petitioner Nathaniel Jackson was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. But Jackson's sentencing proceeding was blatantly unconstitutional at its core due to the trial-court judge's bias and misconduct, as well as his exclusion at sentencing of relevant mitigating evidence. The prejudicial judicial bias and misconduct included numerous ex parte communications between the judge and prosecutor regarding substantive sentencing issues and the ghost writing by the prosecutor of the judge's opinion sentencing Jackson to death. In state court, when this unethical conduct came to light, the Ohio appellate courts publicly reprimanded the trial judge and ordered him to conduct new sentencing proceedings: the judge was to "personally review and evaluate the appropriateness of the death penalty" and "prepare an entirely new sentencing entry."

On remand, Jackson moved to present three additional volumes of mitigating evidence. The trial judge denied the motion, and he orally resentenced Jackson based on the stale, ten-year-old mitigation record. A few hours after the resentencing hearing concluded, the judge issued a second opinion sentencing Jackson to death that was functionally identical to the original, corrupted opinion and contrary to the Ohio Court of Appeals' specific instructions on remand. Nevertheless, the Ohio appellate courts affirmed Jackson's sentence.

Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted Jackson's petition on his claim that he was unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to present relevant mitigating evidence at his resentencing proceedings, but it denied Jackson's other claims, including that the trial judge was unconstitutionally biased. The warden appeals the district court's habeas grant, and Jackson cross appeals regarding his judicial-bias and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

We affirm the district court in part and reverse in part. We first hold that Ohio's standard for assessing the potential for judicial bias is contrary to clearly established federal law as defined by the Supreme Court. And on de novo review, Jackson has demonstrated that the trial judge was unconstitutionally biased. Second, the Supreme Court has clearly established that when a trial court is determining whether to impose the death penalty, capital defendants have a right to present any and all relevant mitigating evidence supporting a sentence less than death, including at resentencing proceedings, and Ohio's failure to provide Jackson that right violated the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, we affirm the district court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on Jackson's mitigating-evidence claim, reverse the district court's denial of Jackson's habeas petition on his judicial-bias claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

Nathaniel Jackson and Donna Roberts conspired to kill Roberts's former husband, Robert Fingerhut. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55, 73 N.E.3d 414, 419 (2016); State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 850 N.E.2d 1168, 1174-75 (2006). In 2001, they executed their plan: Jackson broke into Fingerhut's home and fatally shot him. The couple left a conspicuous trail of letters and phone calls, which enabled their quick apprehension. In 2002, they were each separately indicted, tried, and convicted in Ohio state court of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated murder with two death-penalty specifications—murder during an aggravated burglary and murder during an aggravated robbery.

At Jackson's and Roberts's mitigation hearings, the juries recommended that the court impose the death penalty.¹ The trial judge, Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas Judge John M. Stuard, followed those recommendations and imposed death sentences for both Jackson and Roberts. On direct appeal, the Ohio appellate courts affirmed Jackson's convictions and sentence and soon after denied his petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 839 N.E.2d 362, 385 (2006); State v. Jackson, 2006 WL 1459757, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal denied 111 Ohio St.3d 1469, 855 N.E.2d 1258 (2006) (unpublished table decision).

However, in Roberts's direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed her convictions but vacated her death sentence due to Judge Stuard's ex parte use of the prosecutor in preparing Roberts's sentencing opinion. Roberts, 850 N.E.2d at 1172. At Roberts's sentencing hearing, her counsel noticed that the prosecutor "was looking at a document and appeared to be reading along with [Judge Stuard]." Id. at 1188. Roberts's counsel vehemently objected, and Judge Stuard conceded that he had engaged in ex parte communications with the prosecution in drafting the sentencing opinion—apparently, Judge Stuard had given notes to the prosecutor outlining the sentence to be imposed with supporting reasons and tasked the prosecutor with drafting the opinion and making revisions. This conduct plainly violated Ohio law's requirement in death-penalty cases that the trial court personally weigh the evidence and draft the sentencing opinion, Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.03(F), so the Ohio Supreme Court vacated Roberts's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

After Judge Stuard's conduct surfaced in Roberts's case, Jackson moved for new sentencing proceedings and asked the Ohio Supreme Court to disqualify Judge Stuard. Judge Stuard responded, conceding that he had engaged in the same ex parte communications with the prosecutor's office in drafting Jackson's sentencing opinion. In re Disqualification of Stuard, 113 Ohio St.3d 1236, 863 N.E.2d 636, 637 (2006) (mem.). Nevertheless, the single Ohio Supreme Court justice tasked with adjudicating the petition declined to disqualify Judge Stuard because, in his view, there was no record of hostility or bias toward either party. Id. at 638.

Jackson's motion for new sentencing proceedings remained pending for nearly three years. Only after Jackson initiated a mandamus action to compel a ruling; Jackson again sought Judge Stuard's disqualification; and the Ohio Supreme Court publicly reprimanded Judge Stuard for violating two canons of Ohio's code of judicial conduct based on his ex parte communications with the prosecution, Disciplinary Couns. v. Stuard, 121 Ohio St.3d 29, 901 N.E.2d 788, 792 (2009), did Judge Stuard rule on the motion—he denied Jackson a new sentencing hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed. State v. Jackson, 190 Ohio App.3d 319, 941 N.E.2d 1221, 1225-26 (2010). Because Judge Stuard's improper conduct was the same in both cases, the court afforded Jackson "the same relief" it gave to Roberts, and on remand for resentencing proceedings, it ordered Judge Stuard to "personally review and evaluate the appropriateness of the death penalty, prepare an entirely new sentencing entry[,]... and conduct whatever other proceedings are required by law and consistent with this opinion." Id. at 1226.

Nearly two years later, in 2012, Judge Stuard denied a motion for his recusal and resentenced Jackson. During the resentencing hearing, Judge Stuard permitted Jackson to offer an allocution, in which Jackson described his good behavior on death row. However, Judge Stuard denied Jackson's motion to introduce three volumes of mitigating evidence that he had not proffered at his first sentencing proceedings. This evidence included statistics on Ohio death-row inmates, affidavits from Jackson's family members, his own affidavit expressing dissatisfaction with his trial counsel, psychological information showing his intellectual disabilities, his school records, and his criminal history. The court therefore relied on the ten-year-old record made at Jackson's mitigation hearing.

Judge Stuard again imposed the death penalty. He issued the second sentencing opinion—which largely mirrored the original opinion—mere hours after the resentencing hearing. Apart from adding some introductory paragraphs explaining the additional procedural history, making minor typographical and grammatical changes, and rewriting a few paragraphs describing the trial evidence, the second sentencing opinion was "almost identical" to the first. Jackson, 73 N.E.3d at 433. Compare, 2002 Opinion, R. 47-6, PageID 10070-81, with 2012 Opinion, R. 47-17, PageID 13477-93. Indeed, it did not even mention Jackson's new allocution or request to admit additional mitigating evidence.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Jackson's second death sentence. Jackson, 73 N.E.3d at 419. Relevant here, the court rejected Jackson's claims that Judge Stuard was biased, that Judge Stuard...