Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia

1

ANDRE JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

No. 23-cv-922 (CRC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

May 13, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

In early 2023, Plaintiff Andre Jackson filed suit against the District of Columbia and two Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers, alleging a suite of constitutional and common law claims stemming from his allegedly unlawful arrest the prior spring. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss six of Jackson's eight claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which the Court partially granted in a November 2023 opinion. In doing so, the Court found Jackson had plausibly alleged constitutional and common law false arrest claims and a claim that his arrest may have stemmed from the District's negligent supervision of MPD “jump-out” tactics. By contrast, the Court explained, Jackson's three “alternative” counts could not proceed as alleged because: (1) his negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were not separate and distinct from his intentional tort claims, as required under D.C. law; and (2) his Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim was not cognizable because constitutional challenges to the reasonableness of an arrest, including the level of force deployed, must be packaged under the Fourth Amendment. Because these deficiencies might be curable, however, the Court afforded Jackson another bite at the apple.

Jackson responded by filing an amended complaint. That amended complaint addresses only the identified deficiencies with Jackson's negligence claims, as he opted to stand pat on his Fifth Amendment claim rather than restyle the supporting allegations under the proper constitutional clause. The only question, then, is whether Jackson's new complaint states viable claims of negligence against MPD Officers Donald Green and Afam Ishakwue (“the Officers”) and the District under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court finds that it does, at least for pleading purposes. Accordingly, though substantial questions remain about the long-term prospects of this pair of negligence claims, the Court will deny in part Defendants' pending motion to dismiss and allow these counts to proceed for now alongside Jackson's intentional tort claims.

I. Background

Jackson's amended complaint closely mirrors his allegations the first go around, which the Court already described in its prior opinion. See Jackson v. District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-922 (CRC), 2023 WL 7182120 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023).

On an early April evening in 2022, Jackson alleges that he was standing on the sidewalk outside of the Park Morton Apartments in Northwest D.C. when Officers Green and Ishakwue “jumped out of their patrol car and made their way towards him.” FAC ¶¶ 17-19. Despite the spring setting, Jackson claims he “was wearing a face covering to protect his face from the elements, making only his eyes, eyebrows, and forehead visible.” Id. ¶ 21. The Officers nonetheless acted as though they recognized him, proclaiming that he was “driving the car the other day.” Id. ¶ 23. As they approached, Jackson says he did not move away or otherwise attempt to evade the Officers. Id. ¶ 24. Yet, in the matter of a few short seconds, the Officers purportedly placed Jackson in handcuffs. Id. ¶¶ 25-35. The Officers then allegedly pinned him against a vehicle and, for some unknown reason, began roughing him up. Id. ¶¶ 36-48. After the melee, Jackson was taken into custody and held for 24 hours before being released. Id. ¶ 70.

His arrest was later “no papered,” meaning the authorities decided not to proceed with any charges against him. Id. The reason no charges were brought, Jackson claims, is because the Officers detained the wrong guy: The alleged incident of “fleeing a law enforcement officer” had stemmed from a traffic stop involving a white BMW that had occurred two days prior to his arrest. Id. ¶¶ 49-50. Yet Jackson claims he neither owns a white BMW nor knows anyone who does. Id. ¶¶ 51-52. Moreover, the police report of that traffic incident says it occurred around 6:05 p.m. two days prior on the 600 block of Lamont Street in the Northwest part of the District, but the monitoring device that Jackson is required to wear as a condition of his parole supposedly shows he was nowhere near that area during the relevant time period. Id. ¶ 63.

One year later, Jackson filed suit against the Officers and the District. In all, his initial complaint contained eight claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim; (2) a common law false arrest claim; (3) assault and battery; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligent training and/or supervision against the District; (6) negligence (in the alternative to Counts 1-3); (7) a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim (in the alternative to Count 1); and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress (in the alternative to Count 4). The two sets of Defendants responded with motions to dismiss, together moving to toss out all claims save for Counts 3 and 4.

In November 2023, the Court issued a split decision on the Defendants' motions. For the “primary” claims, the Court found that Jackson had adequately alleged false arrest and negligent training. Jackson, 2023 WL 7182120, at *3-7. But Jackson stumbled on his three “alternative” claims.

On Counts 6 and 8, the Court found these two negligence claims failed under D.C. law because, as alleged, “they [were] not ‘separate and distinct' from Jackson's intentional false arrest claims.” Id. at *7 (quoting District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 707 (D.C. 2003)). In cases involving police misconduct, the Court explained, this “separate and distinct” requirement demands that the negligence cause of action be (1) “distinctly pled,” (2) “based upon at least one factual scenario that presents an aspect of negligence apart from” the police officer's purported intentional tort, and (3) “violative of a distinct standard of care.” Id. (quoting Blair v. District of Columbia, 190 A.3d 212, 224 (D.C. 2018)). Though Jackson satisfied the first requirement, the Court held that he did not meet the second and third because his negligence claims appeared to center entirely on the allegation that the Officers had arrested him without probable cause-the same complaint that undergirded his false arrest claims. The Court accordingly dismissed both negligence claims. Id. *8. But it did so without prejudice to afford Jackson a chance to “cure these deficiencies by pointing to some separate legal duty that the Officers violated beyond the duty to establish probable cause before making an arrest,” including by identifying “some D.C. law or regulation” setting forth a distinct standard of care that the Officers may have breached. Id.

As to Count 7, the Court explained that when police misconduct “arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, rather than under a substantive due process approach of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. (cleaned up). To the extent “this due process claim reiterate[d] Jackson's challenge to the Officers arresting him absent probable cause,” the Court found that it “merge[d] with his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim and need not be restated.” Id. But “to the extent this claim reache[d] beyond his current false arrest claim to challenge the manner in which the Officers executed his arrest rather than their justification underlying it,” the Court informed Jackson that he was free “to re-allege his challenge to the Officers' conduct during his arrest under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

Jackson filed an amended complaint one month later. In it, Jackson further developed his negligence claims by explaining how, in his view, the Officers were negligent in failing to perform an adequate follow-up investigation for the traffic incident before they arrested him. FAC ¶¶ 55-65, 122-31, 137-42. That failure to conduct a proper investigation directly led to his wrongful arrest, he says. On this score, Jackson identifies three MPD General Orders that he believes the Officers breached when investigating the traffic incident and arresting him. Id. ¶¶ 55-65. By contrast, Jackson opted not to correct the identified deficiencies in his substantive due process claim, realleging the charge under the Fifth Amendment rather than reframing the allegations under the Fourth Amendment. See id. ¶¶ 132-36.

Defendants once more have moved to dismiss these three claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In their motion, they contend that Jackson's efforts to patch up his negligence claims leave holes uncovered and note that he entirely failed to address the problem with his Fifth Amendment claim. See Partial Mot. Dismiss at 1-2. Jackson contests the first charge but concedes the second: He explains that the Court provided him “the option of amending these counts” and clarifies that he opted not to exercise that option for Count 7. See Opp'n at 4 (emphasis in original).

II. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will “construe the complaint ‘liberally,' granting plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Barr v. Clinton,...