Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia

1

ANDRE JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

No. 23-cv-922 (CRC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Andre Jackson has brought suit against the District of Columbia and two Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers for his allegedly unlawful arrest in the spring of 2022. Jackson maintains that he was standing on a sidewalk when MPD Officers Donald Green and Afam Ishakwue (the “Officers”) illegally arrested him based on the erroneous, and possibly pretextual, ground that he had fled from the scene of a purported traffic incident two nights prior. Jackson responded by filing the present action, alleging a host of constitutional and common law claims against the Officers as well as tort claims against the District, directly based on negligent supervision and vicariously under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

The District and MPD Officers now move to dismiss six of Jackson's eight claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court finds Defendants are half right, as three of the six challenged charges currently fail to state a claim. In particular, the Court finds Jackson has met his burden of plausibly alleging constitutional and common law false arrest claims and in asserting that these violations may have resulted from the District's negligent supervision of MPD “jump-out” tactics. By contrast, the Court concludes that the three “alternative” counts in the complaint cannot proceed as alleged. First, Jackson's negligence and the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not separate and distinct from his intentional tort claims because Jackson does not allege a violation of any legal duty beyond the prohibition on arresting without probable cause. Accordingly, these two claims must be dismissed pursuant to D.C. law. Second, Jackson's claim that the Officers violated his Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process similarly merges with his false arrest claims. To the extent his Fifth Amendment claim reaches beyond the justification for his arrest to challenge the manner in which it was effectuated, such a challenge to the reasonableness of police conduct during an arrest must be brought under the Fourth Amendment. The Court will therefore grant the motions to dismiss as to these three claims. However, it will afford Jackson an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure these current deficiencies should he choose to do so.

I. Background

The Court draws the following background from Jackson's complaint. Defendants no doubt contest many of his allegations.

On an early April evening in 2022, Jackson alleges that he was calmly leaning against a car and chatting with some friends on a sidewalk outside of the Park Morton Apartments when Officers Green and Ishakwue “jumped out of their patrol car and made their way towards him.” Compl. ¶¶ 17-19. Jackson claims he “was wearing a face covering to protect his face from the elements, making only his eyes, eyebrows, and forehead visible.” Id. ¶ 21. The MPD Officers nonetheless acted as if they recognized him, cryptically proclaiming that he was “driving the car the other day.” Id. ¶ 23. As they approached, Jackson maintains that he did not move away or otherwise attempt to evade the Officers. Id. ¶ 24.

The situation soon escalated when, seconds later, Officer Ishakwue allegedly asked Jackson for identification while Officer Green “simultaneously began reaching for the front pocket of Mr. Jackson's hoodie.” Id. ¶ 25. Again, Jackson claims he did not move or resist the Officers in any manner as Green “grabbed the pocket of his hoodie.” Id. ¶ 26. Jackson instead insists that he stood still and asked, “What are you touching me for?” Id. ¶ 27. Before Jackson had finished his question, he claims that Officer Green instructed Officer Ishakwue to handcuff him. Id. ¶ 28. Ishakwue complied and began placing Jackson in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 29. At this point, Jackson tells a somewhat conflicting tale of his response. In one paragraph, the complaint states that he “remained calm and stationary” as the Officers slapped the handcuffs around his wrists while he asked them why he was being arrested and professed his innocence. Id. ¶ 30-33. Several lines later, however, Jackson reports that he “feared for his safety” when the officers started to handcuff him, causing him to “tense up, pull away, and bring his hands toward his body.” Id. ¶ 35.

Officer Green and an unknown officer then allegedly pinned Jackson against the vehicle that he had been leaning against as they approached. Id. ¶ 36. When Jackson later attempted to call his parole officer, the Officers confiscated his phone. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Several other officers soon reported to the scene and, for some unknown reason, purportedly began roughing up the already detained Jackson. Id. ¶¶ 39-48. Jackson claims that four MPD officers grabbed his body and twisted his arm in an unnatural angle, causing him to cry out in pain. Id. ¶¶ 41-44. After Jackson continued asserting his innocence and requested a supervisory officer, id. ¶ 45, he contends that Officer Green “repeatedly and unjustifiably groped [his] genitals while [he] was handcuffed,” id. ¶ 47. As a result, Jackson alleges that he had scratches all over his body and had to be transported to a hospital for treatment to his wrists and arms. Id. ¶ 48. Jackson was also taken into custody and held for 24 hours before being released. Id. ¶ 63. His arrest was eventually “no papered,” however, meaning the prosecution decided not to proceed with any charges against him. Id.

In his initial arrest report, Jackson was cited for two offenses: “fleeing a law enforcement officer” and “resisting arrest.” Id. ¶ 49. The flight charge allegedly stemmed from a traffic stop involving a white BMW that had occurred two nights before Jackson's arrest. Id. ¶ 50. Yet Jackson claims he does not own a white BMW (or know of anyone who does) and notes that the car he was leaning against on the day of his arrest was a gray Dodge Charger, not a white BMW. Id. ¶ 59. Officer Green also left a traffic ticket for “driving the wrong way on a one way street” on the windshield of Jackson's grandmother's car, which was at the scene of the arrest, and jotted an incorrect badge number on the ticket. Id. ¶¶ 59-62. Jackson notes that his grandmother's car is also not a white BMW. Id. ¶ 59. The police report of the traffic incident states that it occurred around 6:05 p.m. two days prior on the 600 block of Lamont Street in the Northwest part of the District, but the monitoring device that Jackson is required to wear as a condition of his parole supposedly shows he was nowhere near that area during the relevant time period. Id. ¶ 58.

Confounded by the Officers' seeming failure to perform a rudimentary investigation that would have exonerated him, Jackson surmises he may have been the target of an unlawful “jump-out.” Id. ¶ 3. According to his complaint, “jump-outs” are a well-known phenomenon in the District consisting of “several MPD officers jumping out of their cars and seizing a civilian without probable cause.” Id. Jackson claims that jump-outs typically take place in poor, Black neighborhoods and that the Park Morton Apartments, a D.C. Housing Authority property reserved for low-income residents, is a prime example of a target area. Id. The complaint also cites to a deposition from MPD Sergeant Charlotte Djossou's ongoing Whistleblower Act case in which Djossou has alleged that she informed higher ups in 2015 and again in 2018 that certain MPD units were performing jump-outs in poor neighborhoods to search and seize individuals without probable cause. Id. ¶ 4. According to Djossou's complaint and subsequent deposition, her superiors retaliated against her for blowing the whistle and did not make any effort to counteract jump-outs. Id. ¶ 6.

Jackson has filed suit against Officers Green and Ishakuwe as well as against the District, alleging a variety of constitutional and common law claims. In all, his complaint contains eight counts: (1) a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against the MPD Officers; (2) a common law false arrest claim against the Officers and against the District under the doctrine of respondeat superior; (3) assault and battery against Officer Green and against the District under respondeat superior; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress against both Officers and against the District under respondeat superior; (5) negligent training, retention, and supervision against the District; (6) a common law negligence claim against both Officers and against the District under respondeat superior (in the alternative to Counts 1-3); (7) a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim against both Officers (in the alternative to Count 1); and (8) negligent infliction of emotional distress against both Officers and against the District under respondeat superior (in the alternative to Count 4). Both the District and the Officers responded by filing motions to dismiss. Together, their two motions seek to toss out all claims except for Counts 3 and 4.

II. Legal Standard

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible on its face if it “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will “construe the complaint ‘liberally,' granting plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts...