Jackson v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC

648 F.Supp.3d 1039

Jamie JACKSON, individually and on behalf of all similarly-situated citizens ofIllinois and the United States, Plaintiffs, v. DOLE PACKAGED FOODS, LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 3:22-cv-1448-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

Signed December 30, 2022

David C. Nelson, Nelson & Nelson Attorneys at Law, P.C., Belleville, IL, Matthew H. Armstrong, Armstrong Law Firm LLC, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Blake Mattingly, Stuart L. Cochran, Cochran Law PLLC, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Sarah L. Brew, Rory F. Collins, Tyler Young, Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Minneapolis, MN, Ruben I. Gonzalez, Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Jamie Jackson¹ brings this putative class action against Defendant Dole Packaged Foods ("Dole"),² alleging that Dole deceptively labeled one of its food products. Jackson claims that the labeling was false and intended to deceive the consumer in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. and common law express and implied warranties of merchantability, and resulted in unjust enrichment.

Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. (Docs 22 and 23). Dole contends that the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to plausibly allege facts to support an ICFA claim under the "reasonable consumer" standard. Dole also contends that Plaintiff's claims relating to products she did not purchase, as well as her request for injunctive relief, must be dismissed for lack of standing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. (Docs. 22, 23, 29, and 32).³

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Dole manufactures and sells Fruit Bowl products. Although Plaintiff purchased only a single Dole product, she takes issue with nine of Dole's Fruit bowls: Cherry Mixed Fruit, Diced Apples, Diced Pears, Mandarin Oranges, Mixed Fruit, Pineapple Tidbits, Red Grapefruit Sunrise, Tropical Fruit, and Yellow Cling Diced Peaches (collectively, the "Products").

The Products are labeled "in 100% fruit juice." Below is an image of the one of the Products as depicted in the Motion to Dismiss:

Front of Product

Image materials not available for display.

Back of Product

Image materials not available for display.

Jackson alleges that the "in 100% fruit juice" label is deceptive, unfair, misleading, and false, because it "leads Illinois and United States customers to believe that the juice in the container is in fact 100% fruit juice and contains no other added ingredients." (Doc. 1-1, pg. 2). According to Plaintiff, the claim is not true because, as revealed by the list of ingredients, the Products also contain ascorbic acid and citric acid, which Plaintiff describes as "added ingredients." According to Plaintiff, the presence of ascorbic acid and citric acid in the Products contravenes Dole's representations that the Products contain fruit "in 100% fruit juice." Plaintiff alleges that she was damaged because she paid a premium for the product, believing it contained only fruit and fruit juice.

Dole contends that the 100% fruit juice label does not indicate to the reasonable consumer that the product will not contain added ascorbic acid or citric acid. Rather, reasonable consumers understand this statement to mean that the medium in which the fruit is packed is "100% fruit juice" as opposed to water, syrup, gelatin, or some other substance - as is common in alternative products that are typically present on the same grocery store shelves. (Doc. 23, pg. 6). Dole also argues that Plaintiff failed to allege any facts plausibly suggesting that the presence of minute amounts of ascorbic acid and citric acid would be material to reasonable consumers. Id.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. Plaintiff's Standing as to Products She Did Not Buy.

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) and alleges that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring suit based upon the representations appearing on the labels of products she did not buy. Specifically, Jackson alleges that she purchased only one of nine different Dole Fruit Bowl® Products, Dole Mixed Fruit, yet she proposes classes for Illinois and Nationwide class members to assert claims relative to the unpurchased products. Plaintiff responds to Defendant's motion by asserting a majority of the courts hold that a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims for unnamed class members based on products she did not buy so long as the products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar. (Doc. 29 at 16)

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Article III standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and requires that the plaintiff prove that she has suffered an injury in fact, that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant, and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury caused by the defendant that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

Under Article III, a federal court may resolve only "a real controversy with real impact on real persons." American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., — U.S. —, 139 S.Ct. 2067, 2103, 204 L.Ed.2d 452 (2019) The requirement that a claimant have "standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. For there to be a case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff must have a " 'personal stake' " in the case—in other words, standing. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203, 210 L. Ed. 2d 568 (2021). And it is the burden of the plaintiff to demonstrate that she has a personal stake in the outcome of the case. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is the purchaser of Defendant's Mixed Fruit. (Doc. 1-1, pg. 3). Jackson does not allege that she purchased any of the other eight packaged Dole Fruit Bowls&reg. (Doc. 1-1 pg. 1). Notwithstanding, she argues that the Dole Mixed Fruit is "substantially similar" to the other eight Dole fruit products and that the label for each has the identical representation "in 100% fruit juice." Here, there is no dispute the Dole Fruit Bowl line contains very similar products (a variety of fruits) in similar packaging that use apparently highly similar (if not, identical) language that the Plaintiff claims to be deceptive. But despite the similarities, she has not demonstrated that she has a personal stake in the outcome of any litigation regarding any product except the Mixed Fruit product. More to the point, the problem with the Plaintiff's argument is that she has not plausibly pled the existence of a "case or controversy" arising from her purchase of any Dole product other than the Mixed Fruit. Substantially similar or not, she does fail to allege that any of the other eight Dole products caused her harm or created an "injury in fact." And, Plaintiff does not point to any authority to suggest that Rule 23 abrogates the principle that Article III judicial power exists "only to redress or protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

Here, Jackson's allegations do not clear the "irreducible constitutional minimum of Article III." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. And, this Court is unwilling to read into the "case and controversy" requirement of Section 2 of Article III to the United States Constitution a "substantially similar" exception so as to allow Plaintiff to maintain claims when she has no "injury in fact" that are traceable to representations made on Fruit Bowls she did not purchase.⁴ See Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc. 3 F. 4th 927 (Finding no standing where Plaintiff's alleged injury relating to products he did not buy that were similar to those he had bought.). See also Payton v. Cnty. of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[A] person cannot predicate standing on injury he does not share. Standing cannot be acquired through the back door of a class action.") (Citing Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 828-829, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing and, consequently, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff's claims as to the following Dole Fruit Bowls®: Cherry Mixed Fruit, Diced Apples, Diced Pears, Mandarin Oranges, Pineapple Tidbits, Red Grapefruit Sunrise, Tropical Fruit and Yellow Cling Diced Peaches.

B. Injunctive Relief

Dole argues that Jackson lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because she is now aware of the allegedly deceptive nature of the label. A plaintiff must meet three requirements to establish that she has standing to bring a lawsuit: (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, and (3) redressability. Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1074 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). "[T]o establish injury in fact when seeking prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must allege a 'real and immediate' threat of future violations of their rights . . . ." Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)); see also Kensington's Wine Auctioneers & Brokers, Inc. v. John Hart Fine Wine, Ltd., 392 Ill.App.3d 1, 330 Ill.Dec. 826, 909 N.E.2d 848, 858 (2009) ("To be eligible for injunctive relief under the Deceptive Practices Act, a...