Jackson v. Knetzer

1

TOMMY EDWARD JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. SERGEANT KNETZER, et al., Defendants.

No. 21-C-1383

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

May 17, 2022

DECISION AND ORDER

LYNN ADELMAN, United States District Judge.

On December 6, 2021, plaintiff Tommy Edward Jackson, who is incarcerated and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. He also filed two supplemental complaints. On March 17, 2022, Magistrate Judge Nancy Joseph screened Jackson's original complaint and his two supplements and ordered him to submit an amended complaint that incorporates the allegations from his original complaint and two supplemental complaints. On March 25, 2022 Jackson filed an amended complaint. This order screens that amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

The amended complaint is written in a somewhat disjointed fashion that makes it difficult to understand. Also, pages 5 and 6 of the PDF version of the complaint (ECF No. 18) are out of order. Page 6 should be read before Page 5. However construing the plaintiff's pro se allegations liberally, as I must, see, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), I understand the plaintiff to be alleging the following claims arising out of a series of events that occurred between July and August of 2021.

On July 5, 2021, defendants Sergeant Knetzer and Officer Eickholt tried to find the plaintiff at the homes of his friend and his sister. Although it is not clear why the officers were looking for the plaintiff, it is possible that they were trying to execute a warrant for his arrest. The plaintiff alleges that a person identified in the complaint as “WFR” had made allegations of domestic violence against him. The plaintiff alleges that WFR's allegations were lies and that she was trying to get revenge on him. The plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that either officer committed an unlawful search or seizure-the only allegations against them are that they “went” to the houses “looking for” the plaintiff. (ECF No. 18 at 4 of 8.) The plaintiff makes references to the standards applicable to warrantless searches, but again, no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is alleged.

The plaintiff alleges that, in a separate event that appears to have occurred on July 7, 2021, Officers Janelle Kleeman and Veseth heard a call over police radio indicating that an occupant of a residence was complaining about an “unwanted male” trying to force his way into the upper unit of a house on 127 S. Van Buren Street in Green Bay, Wisconsin. (ECF No. 18 at 6 of 8.) Kleeman recognized the address from a domesticviolence report she had received the day before, and she believed that the person trying to get into the house was the plaintiff. Kleeman told police dispatch that she and Veseth would respond to the call.

As Kleeman and her partner walked towards the residence, she heard a male's voice coming from the residence and saw a black male standing at the top of the stairs that led to the door of the upper unit. As the male turned and started to descend the stairs, Kleeman said, “Tommy.” The plaintiff reacted, and Kleeman was able to identify him from mugshots she had reviewed the day before. At this point, the officers arrested the plaintiff. Veseth asked the plaintiff if he wanted to make a statement about “an incident that happened at the residence, ” and the plaintiff said no. (Id. at 6-5 of 8.) The officers searched the plaintiff incident to the arrest, put him in the back of their squad car, and took him to the Brown County Jail. The plaintiff appears to believe that these events violated his rights because the police conducted “no investigation, ” had “no witnesses, ” and because the “allegations” were based on “revenge.” (Id. at 5 of 8.) The plaintiff also alleges that the police embarrassed him by arresting him in front of “plenty of people.” (Id. at 6 of 8.)

The plaintiff alleges that, after he was arrested, his probation agent initially decided not to place a “probation hold” on him. (Id. at 5 of 8.) However, Kleeman placed “many calls to the agency office” urging that a hold be issued. (Id.) The complaint seems to allege that the probation agent issued a hold on July 7, 2021. (Id.) Although it is clear that the plaintiff has been in custody at the Brown County Jail since the date of the hold, it is not clear whether his current custody is pursuant to the hold, pursuant to an actual revocation of his probation, or pursuant to pretrial custody associated with pending criminal charges.

Finally, the complaint focuses on events that occurred in August 2021. According to these allegations, on August 11, 2021, the plaintiff mailed a postcard to WFR. On August 20, 2021, a state court entered a no-contact order that prohibited the plaintiff from having any contact with WFR. On August 25, 2021, WFR received a phone call from the Brown County Jail. When WFR answered her phone, a recording stated that the call was from “Tee, ” which is the plaintiff's nickname. WFR then hung up, thinking that it was the plaintiff trying to contact her. According to the plaintiff, he did not make this call. Instead, another inmate, Andre or Andrew Hill, placed the call from the jail using the plaintiff's jail PIN number. Because a prerecorded message stating that the call was from “Tee” was associated with the plaintiff's PIN number, WFR thought the call was from the plaintiff when it really wasn't. As a result of these events, defendant J. Schneider signed a criminal complaint alleging that the plaintiff had violated the no-contact order by placing the call (and possibly by sending the postcard) to WFR. The plaintiff alleges that Schneider was wrong in thinking that he had violated the no-contact order and that she could not have known that it was really him on the line rather than someone else.

For relief, the plaintiff requests that the charges based on Schneider's complaint be “brought to an end” (ECF No. 18 at 5 of 8), that he be awarded damages for pain, suffering, and emotional distress, and that he be allowed to question “eyewitnesses.” (Id. at 7 of 8.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Jackson was incarcerated when he filed his amended complaint. The PLRA requires courts to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

B. Analysis

I first address the plaintiff's request for dismissal of the criminal charges against him. To the extent that this is a request for immediate or speedier release from custody, the claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; instead, the plaintiff's sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). To the extent that this is a request for an injunction against further prosecution of the state criminal case, the claim cannot proceed because a federal court must abstain from interfering with an ongoing state criminal prosecution. See, e.g., J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021) (discussing abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).^[1] Relatedly, to the extent that the plaintiff is seeking damages for his ongoing custody in the Brown County Jail pursuant to legal process that has not already been set aside, his claim is subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Under Heck, a federal court may not grant relief in a suit under § 1983 that would necessarily imply the invalidity of an extant conviction or sentence or ongoing pretrial custody that has been judicially authorized. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018).

Although many of the plaintiff's clams are subject to dismissal without prejudice based on the above principles, he also appears to be alleging claims involving false arrest and other...