Jackson v. Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire Dist.

1

Karen Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire District, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-21-08156-PCT-SPL

United States District Court, D. Arizona

January 16, 2024

ORDER

Honorable Steven P. Logan, United States District Judge.

Before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two and Count Three of First Amended Complaint (Doc 105), Defendant's Statement of Facts to Support Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Two and Count Three of First Amended Complaint (Doc. 106), Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 107), and Plaintiff's Statement of Facts (Doc. 108). The Motions have been fully briefed and are ready for consideration.^[1] (Docs. 109, 110 111, 112, 115, 116). The Court rules as follow.

I. BACKGROUND

This case is based on an employment discrimination dispute. Defendant Lake Mohave Ranchos Fire District (“the District”) provides fire, medical, and community services to residents who live within the District's boundaries. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 1). The District is governed by board members (the “Board”), and the Board manages the District's finances, ensures the District operates within the budget, and employs the Fire Chief. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 2). At relevant times, the Fire Chief was responsible for, among other things, the hiring, equipping, training, oversight, and evaluation of the work of all District personnel. (Doc. 109 at 1). In November 2016, the District employed Plaintiff Karen Jackson to work as the Administrative Assistant. (Docs. 106 at ¶ 8; Doc. 108 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff was an hourly employee and was expected to work at least 32 hours per week in the District office. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 10; Doc. 110 at 1).

Plaintiff attributes the following circumstances to the fact that she has long suffered from, and been diagnosed with, anxiety, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). (Doc. 109 at 2). Plaintiff claims to have a significant mental health history that began when she was only 12, which includes substantial difficulty sleeping, depression, and suicidal ideation. (Id.). In or about 2001, Plaintiff was drugged and raped by someone she met at a bar. (Id.). From about 2004 to 2006, Plaintiff was verbally and physically abused by her former husband; and in 2006, she was raped by this former husband. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that her medical problems affect her ability to groom properly, have sexual relations with her husband, and interact with others. (Id.). It also causes her to experience periods of generalized fear, severe anxiety, mistrust, and several other issues. (Id.).

On December 20, 2016, Plaintiff was the only person in the fire station when “a woman ran into the station screaming and bloodied, and told [Plaintiff] that a man was trying to rape her.” (Doc. 110 at 5). In February 2017, the Fire Chief, Tony DeMaio, approved Plaintiff's request to work from home because Plaintiff was pregnant and felt unsafe working in the office alone. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 11-16; Doc. 110 at 6). In November 2017, the Board asked Mr. DeMaio why Plaintiff did not perform her duties in the office, and he expressed that the Board could not ask questions about why Plaintiff worked from home because “it was protected by law.” (Doc. 106 at ¶ 20-23; Doc. 110 at 7). Nevertheless, Mr. DeMaio told the Board that Plaintiff worked at home to “tak[e] care of her baby.” (Doc. 106 at ¶ 20-23; Doc. 110 at 7). The parties dispute whether Mr. DeMaio ever informed the Board that Plaintiff was experiencing medical problems. (Id.).

In May 2019, Mr. DeMaio retired as the Fire Chief. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 24; Doc. 110 at 1). The fire chief position changed two additional times during Plaintiff's employment. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 24, 37; Doc. 110 at 1). The parties agree that Plaintiff told both of the fire chiefs that she worked from home due to a disability. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 25, 38; Doc. 110 at 3, 8). The parties, however, dispute whether Plaintiff provided the fire chiefs or the Board with any additional information or documentation pertaining to her disability. (Id.).

After November 2019, Plaintiff was still working from home when the Board changed Plaintiff's title to Administrative Manager and gave her a raise. (Doc. 106 at ¶¶ 29-30; Doc. 110 at 1). But on December 7, 2020, the Board held a special meeting and voted to eliminate the Administrative Manager position. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 45; Doc. 108 at ¶ 8). Following this meeting, several members of the public filed complaints with the Arizona Attorney General's Office (the “AGO”) alleging that the Board violated Arizona's open-meeting law by voting to eliminate the Administrative Manager position when that issue was not on the agenda. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 50; Doc. 110 at 1). On December 9, 2020, Plaintiff emailed the Fire Chief stating that she understood the Board's actions to mean her employment was terminated, and the Fire Chief confirmed that her understanding was correct. (Doc. 31 at ¶ 55).

On December 17, 2020, the Board held a subsequent meeting with a new agenda for the purpose of ratifying the votes taken on December 7, 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 50-53; Doc. 108 at ¶¶ 13-15). On January 28, 2021, the Board received a letter from the AGO regarding the open-meeting law complaints, and the Board responded that it had ratified the actions from December 7, 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 54-55; Doc. 110 at 1). On October 29, 2021, the Board received another letter from the AGO stating it had concluded that open-meeting law violations had occurred in December 2020. (Doc. 106 at ¶ 56; Doc. 108 at ¶¶ 18-19).

On January 13, 2022, Plaintiff served Defendant a Notice of Claim. On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), alleging three causes of action against the District and individual members of the Board. (Doc. 109 at 9).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the factual record and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately, giving the nonmoving party for each motion the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Eat Right Foods Ltd. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 880 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

Both parties are moving for partial summary judgment with respect to Counts Two and Three asserted within the FAC. (Doc. 31). In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”) by eliminating the Administrative Manager position. (Doc. 31 at 8-9). In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Arizona's Employment Protection Act by terminating her from her employment. (Doc. 31 at 9). The Court will address the claims individually.

A. Count Two: Disability Discrimination Claim Under The ADA

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To withstand a motion for summary judgment on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must either provide sufficient direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent, or give rise to an inference of discrimination by satisfying the burden-shifting test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Mickealson v. Cummins, Inc., 792 Fed.Appx. 438, 440 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted). “To establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) [s]he is disabled, (2) [s]he is qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] position, and (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability.” Id.

i. Defendant Is An “Employer” Under The ADA

As an initial matter, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment to establish that Defendant is an employer as defined by the ADA. (Doc. 107 at 11). The ADA defines an “employer” as a person “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111. During discovery, Defendant produced a list of individuals who were employed at the District in some compacity from January 2016 through December 2020. (Doc. 108-1 at 2-3). The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was terminated in December 2020, therefore, 2019 and 2020 are the relevant years for calculating Defendant's employees.

Plaintiff argues that “the District had employment relationships with 20 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 2020, and had employment relationships with 26 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in 2019.” (Doc. 107 at 12). Defendant raises no factual dispute concerning the list that Plaintiff relied on to reach this total, however, Defendant objects to the method that Plaintiff used to calculate the total number of employees. (Doc. 111 at 13). Plaintiff argues that the total number of employees include all employees that were on Defendant's payroll in 2019 and 2020....