Jackson v. Local 1603, Case No. 17-10671

ROY L. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. AFSCME MICHIGAN COUNCIL 25, LOCAL 1603, LaKAY AVANT, HURLEY MEDICAL CENTER,and ERIKA McDERMITT, Defendants.

Case No. 17-10671

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

March 28, 2019

Hon. Marianne O. Battani

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roy L. Jackson commenced this action in this Court on March 3, 2017, asserting claims of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against his former employer, Defendant Hurley Medical Center ("HMC"); his supervisor at HMC, Defendant Erika McDermitt; his former collective bargaining representative, Defendant American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME") Michigan Council 25, Local 1603 ("Local 1603"); and an official of the Defendant union, Defendant LaKay Avant. In support of these claims, Plaintiff alleges that his employment was terminated for leaving his work site, but that other employees of different races were not discharged despite engaging in the same or similar conduct. Apart from these claims of race discrimination, Plaintiff arguably appears to allege that he was subject to racial harassment and retaliation; that Defendants conspired to terminate his employment and to violate his civil rights; that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection; and that the Defendant union breached its duty of fair representation.

Two motions presently are pending before the Court. First, Defendants HMC and Erika McDermitt seek an award of summary judgment in their favor under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing primarily that Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination should be dismissed for failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies, and that these claims also are subject to dismissal in light of Plaintiff's failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or show that Defendant HMC's stated reason for discharging him was a pretext for discrimination. Next, Defendants Local 1603 and LaKay Avant move for summary judgment on similar grounds, citing Plaintiff's apparent failure to exhaust his administrative remedies or to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against the Defendant union, and further asserting that Plaintiff has not marshaled evidentiary support for his apparent claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Plaintiff has responded to each of the Defendants' motions, through a pair of nearly identical briefs that are almost completely bereft of citation to authority and engage in virtually no analysis of the pertinent legal principles as applied to the facts of this case.

Having reviewed the parties' submissions in support of and in opposition to Defendants' motions, as well as the remainder of the record, the Court has determined that it is appropriate to decide the pending motions without a hearing. See Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), Eastern District of Michigan. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary judgment.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2004, Defendant Hurley Medical Center ("HMC") hired Plaintiff Roy L. Jackson for the position of environmental tech, with duties similar to those performed by a custodian.¹ Upon completing a probationary period, Plaintiff became a member of Defendant AFSCME Michigan Council 25, Local 1603 ("Local 1603"). At all relevant times, Defendant Erika McDermitt was Plaintiff's immediate supervisor.

In the time period of relevance here, April of 2015, Plaintiff worked the first shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., and his job duties for HMC consisted of cleaning and maintaining the Dutcher Building, a standalone building across the street from the main HMC facility. (See Dkt. 20, Defendant HMC's Motion, Ex. G, Plaintiff's Dep. at 36-38; Ex. A, McDermitt Aff. at ¶ 2.) The Dutcher Building contains offices and meeting and conference rooms, as well as apartments for physicians that are referred to as the Bachelors' Quarters ("BQ"). (See Plaintiff's Dep. at 37-38; McDermitt Aff. at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff testified that while he was assigned to the Dutcher Building, he took his work breaks in the BQ apartments because there was "no designated area" for workers to take their breaks, and he acknowledged that he had left paperwork from his outside business, an auto body shop, and articles of clothing in these rooms. (Plaintiff's Dep. at 17-18, 39-44.)

According to Erika McDermitt, a fellow HMC employee, Debi Wright, contacted her on April 7, 2015 and advised her that "she thought someone was using one of the BQ apartments as a personal break room." (McDermitt Aff. at ¶ 2.) Upon entering theapartment with Ms. Wright and a public safety officer, Ms. McDermitt "saw a jacket on the sofa, which was the same jacket Plaintiff wore into work that morning," as well as "other items in the apartment that appeared to belong to Plaintiff." (Id. at ¶ 3.) Ms. McDermitt then attempted to locate Plaintiff in order to discuss this situation, but "he could not be found on [the] premises," and he also failed to respond to numerous attempts to page him. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

A "couple of days later," Ms. McDermitt asked the HMC public safety department to "review video surveillance camera footage and Plaintiff's identification card swipe data" in an effort to determine his whereabouts on April 7. (Id. at ¶ 5.) As a result of this review, it was "determined that Plaintiff left [HMC] property at some point earlier in the day on April 7, 2015, and returned to HMC at 2:37 p.m. to punch out." (Id. at ¶ 5.) Based on "suspicion that this was a frequent occurrence," HMC's public safety staff broadened its review of surveillance camera footage and card swipes and determined that on March 29, April 3, and April 6, Plaintiff had "left HMC property for 2 or 3 hours[] without swiping out." (Id. at ¶ 5.) This "absence of card swipes during those lengthy periods of time led [Ms. McDermitt] to conclude that Plaintiff left HMC numerous times without punching out and, thus, received money in his paycheck for time he did not actually work." (Id. at ¶ 7.)

Plaintiff disputes these investigative findings. First and foremost, he denies that he ever clocked in and then left the HMC premises without permission. (See Plaintiff's Dep. at 51-52.) Although HMC points to video footage and card swipe data that purportedly support Ms. McDermitt's conclusion that Plaintiff left the workplace without punching out, Plaintiff testified that "[t]hey have no footage of me," and that the personshown in the video was not him. (Id. at 52-53.)² As for the card swipe data, Plaintiff explained that he usually would pass through a tunnel when traveling between the main HMC facility and the Dutcher Building, and that it was not necessary to swipe his card in order to go back and forth between the two buildings via this tunnel. (See id. at 54-56.)

Based on its determination that Plaintiff had left the workplace without permission, HMC suspended Plaintiff for violating medical center policy and various employee conduct rules. (See Defendant HMC's Motion, Ex. C, Record of Disciplinary Action.) After further investigation, this suspension was converted to a termination of employment effective May 6, 2015. (See Defendant HMC's Motion, Ex. D, Notice of Termination.)

Following his termination, Plaintiff requested that the Defendant union file a grievance on his behalf, and the union did so. (See Plaintiff's Dep. at 70-71.) The matter proceeded through the steps of the grievance process, culminating in a live appeal held on May 2, 2016. (See id. at 72-79; see also Dkt. 22, Defendant Local 1603's Motion, Ex. C, 5/10/2016 Denial Letter.) Upon hearing Plaintiff's appeal, an arbitration review panel determined that his grievance "lack[ed] merit for arbitration." (5/10/2016 Denial Letter.) The panel explained:

The employer provides badge swipe records and video/screenshots of an individual they allege is [Plaintiff] exiting [from] and returning [to] thefacility. [Plaintiff] denies the individual in the video and in the photographs [is] him; however, the timestamps from the video and photographs line up with the badge swipe records provided in the file.

(Id.) The panel further stated that because "a Live Appeal is the last step in the appeal process," Plaintiff's grievance would be "move[d] to final closure." (Id.)

This suit followed on March 3, 2017, with Plaintiff asserting Title VII claims of race discrimination against HMC, Ms. McDermitt, Local 1603, and a union representative, LaKay Avant. Although Plaintiff's complaint is not clear on this point and lacks separate counts setting forth distinct theories of recovery, he arguably also has asserted claims of racial harassment and retaliation against Defendant HMC and Ms. McDermitt. He further appears to allege that Defendants violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, and that Local 1603 breached its duty of fair representation owed to Plaintiff.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Through the present pair of motions, Defendants seek an award of summary judgment in their favor on each of the claims asserted in Plaintiff's complaint. Under the pertinent Federal Rule governing this motion, summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the Supreme Court has explained, "the plain language of Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).

In deciding a motion brought under Rule 56, the Court...