Jackson v. Quick, 1:19-cv-01591-NONE-EPG (PC)

CORNEL JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. JASON QUICK, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-01591-NONE-EPG (PC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 29, 2020

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION PROCEED ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS JASON QUICK, ELIZABETH ALVAREZ, A. ROSSETTE, LT. FOLLOWELL, LISETTE LOPEZ, DOMINIC RAMOS, KASANDRA SANCHEZ, HERMINA MARLEY, AND C. PURDENTE FOR VIOLATING PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL CORRESPONDENCE AND FOR CONSPIRACIES TO VIOLATE SUCH RIGHTS AND AGAINST DEFENDANT ELIZABETH ALVAREZ, FOR VIOLATING PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS, AND THAT ALL OTHER CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS BE DISMISSED

(ECF NO. 25)

TWENTY-ONE DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Cornel Jackson ("Plaintiff") is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on November 7, 2019. (ECF No. 1). The Court screened Plaintiff's First amended Complaint on July 15, 2020. (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended complaint on August 10, 2020. (ECF No. 25). The Complaint brings claims concerning his legal mail and access to legal supplies.

The Court has reviewed the complaint and finds, for screening purposes, that Plaintiff's complaint states cognizable claims against (1) Defendants Jason Quick, Elizabeth Alvarez, A. Rossette, Lt. Followell, Lisette Lopez, Dominic Ramos, Kasandra Sanchez, Hermina Marley, and C. Purdente for violating Plaintiff's First and Sixth Amendment rights with respect to Plaintiff's legal correspondence and for conspiracies to violate such rights and (2) Defendant Elizabeth Alvarez, for violating Plaintiff's right to defend himself under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and right of access to the courts under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court recommends that these claims be allowed to proceed past the screening stage and that all other claims and defendants be dismissed.

Plaintiff has twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of these findings and recommendations to file his objections.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by inmates seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the inmate has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff's legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges as follows:

A. Legal Mail Allegations

Madera County Department of Corrections Classification Unit and Mailroom officers intentionally and continuously violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights when they opened all his outgoing and incoming privileged attorney mail, read it, confiscated or withheld it, and turned it over to the district attorney to prejudice Plaintiff in a pending criminal case.

Over the course of six months, Plaintiff mailed several sealed letters to his defense counsel. The sealed envelopes were prominently labeled "Legal Mail." The letters discussed "defense strategies, as well as evidence found on official misconduct, inconsistencies, racially edited words of the N-word used by law enforcement, and biasness."

Plaintiff's defense counsel performances were below standards. Plaintiff wrote mail to courts, state bar members, and public officials for the purpose of presenting his claims of violations suffered and to retain counsel.

Plaintiff filed a state bar complaint against his defense counsel. It was confiscated or withheld by defendants in the classification unit. They turned photocopies of the complaint over to the district attorney, who then forwarded a copy to defense counsel. This was a clear, conspired practice to keep all participants in the federal crime against Plaintiff aware and prepared.

Madera County Jail policy defines "legal mail" as "all mail addressed to or from non-Judicial government official[s], courts, and Attorneys[.]" Plaintiff's outgoing mail sent to his attorney and the courts called legal mail was confiscated or withheld by the classification unit.

The facility's policies, and California law and the constitution were disregarded by Defendant Jason Quick's ("Quick") request. Quick was the head of the classification unit. Upon his request, and to benefit the prosecution team, he conspired with Defendants Elizabeth Alvarez and CPL. A. Rossette ("Alvarez" and "Rossette") to censor and accomplish the prosecutor's unconstitutional request. The conspired agreement between the prosecution team and Quick was ongoing for five months to strip Plaintiff of his Due Process by gathering evidence to use against him and aid the malicious prosecution against him.

Plaintiff's defense counsel knowingly allowed the Defendants to prejudice Plaintiff's defense. Plaintiff's defense counsel "has a constitutional duty of effective performance and contract with the Plaintiff and refusing to litigate these violations adjuncted [sic] him to the misconduct."

Plaintiff filed a Marsden motion. At the hearing, Plaintiff's defense counsel admitted on the record to knowing that Defendants were opening and monitoring Plaintiff's mail and he was forwarded copies from the district attorney. Plaintiff began acting in pro-per.

Plaintiff appealed the Marsden hearing. "By appealing the hearing the Plaintiff would receive the direct evidence needed from the courts or his appellate counsel that would prove the conspired prejudice by the Defendant(s), District Attorney, and Defense Counsel." Quick or his training officer, Lt. Followell ("Followell"), immediately instructed the mailroom officers, Defendants Lisette Lopez, Dominic Ramos, Kasandra Sanchez, Hermina Marley, and C. Purdente ("Lopez," "Ramos," "Sanchez," "Marley" and "Purdente") "to adjunct with the Classification Units conspired acts and ongoing practice of unjustified censorship by opening and reading all [Plaintiff's] incoming legal mail from the Courts or his Attorney, and to confiscate [and]/or withhold all favorable documents (transcripts) that expose the Defendant(s) in CSU."

Plaintiff filed a grievance to get answers from Defendants who refused to provide a notice that they were going to open, read, or confiscate Plaintiff's legal mail and provide it to the district attorney's office. Quick responded and denied Defense Counsel's allegations. Plaintiff appealed and all the supervisor agreed with Quick's reply.

/// Plaintiff also filed a grievance with the mailroom officers named as Defendants in this action after his mail from courts was received and opened outside his presence. Lopez rejected the grievance. For sixteen months, Plaintiff's First and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants in the mailroom regularly opening all his incoming legal mail from federal courts and attorneys outside his presence without his consent.

Plaintiff's legal runners asked the mailroom Defendants about the legal mail, but the mailroom Defendants denied any censorship.

On a couple of occasions, Sanchez personally provided Plaintiff with opened legal mail from the courts. Plaintiff filed a grievance, but it was rejected.

Plaintiff contacted a number of attorneys and established a relationship through requests for assistance. Envelopes marked "Confidential Legal Mail" from attorneys were received and opened outside of his presence or without his consent.

The Northern Innocence Project responded and requested a consent letter to correspond with Plaintiff's legal runners. Plaintiff complied and sent a consent letter to receive assistance with his pending case. Plaintiff's legal runners contacted the Innocence Project lawyer, who had been informed of the legal mail tampering in the first letter. The legal runners told Plaintiff that the lawyer sent additional letters, which Plaintiff never received. Plaintiff also received no notice about them. Plaintiff alleges that withholding these incoming documents violates Plaintiff's right to send and receive legal mail.

The first such letter was delivered, but it was opened outside of Plaintiff...