Jackson v. Ramirez

ROBERTO E. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ANGIE RAMIREZ; LEWIS SQUILLACIOTI; GARFIELD BOLTON; JUDGE PORTER;MURIEL HARVEY; MS. BURGESS; MARIA DIMEO; CRISANTA ROCKWELL; M.D. YENER BALAN; GAIL WALTHALL;ANDREA EVANS; MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER NORTH DIVISION, Defendants.

1:15-cv-617-GHW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 22, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GREGORY H. WOODS, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roberto Jackson, proceeding pro se, is a parolee who had his parole revoked after his clinical social worker, with whom he attended bi-monthly therapy sessions at Montefiore Medical Center, reported to his parole officer that he had threatened her. After being released from custody, Mr. Jackson filed suit alleging that the social worker, his parole officer, a number other employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), and employees of Montefiore Medical Center conspired to falsely accuse him of threatening the social worker. In a 113-page complaint, Mr. Jackson alleges various federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law claims, and refers to violations of federal and state criminal law, as well as biblical canons and other varied forms of authority. Because the complaint fails to state a federal claim for the reasons outlined below, defendants' motion to dismiss the federal claims is GRANTED. Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, those claims are remanded to state court, where Mr. Jackson initially brought this action.

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Jackson is a parolee who attended bi-monthly therapy sessions with defendant Maria Dimeo, a licensed clinical social worker at defendant Montefiore Medical Center's mental health clinic. Compl. at 18:385-388. During a March 8, 2012 therapy session, Mr. Jackson alleges that he got into an argument with Ms. Dimeo because she was communicating his missed appointments to his parole officer, defendant Angie Ramirez. Id. at 19:398-407; 20:422-424. Mr. Jackson complained that such communications violated his privacy rights. Id. During the argument, Mr. Jackson alleges that he warned Ms. Dimeo that he would sue her if he went to jail as a result of anything that she said to his parole officer. Id. at 20:425-427. At his next parole office visit on May 15, 2012, parole officer Ramirez arrested Mr. Jackson for violating the conditions of his parole—specifically, for threatening Ms. Dimeo. Id. at 21:450-454. Rather than merely threatening to sue her, Ms. Dimeo accused Mr. Jackson of physically threatening her by stating: "If I go to jail[,] I have family, if you know what I mean." Id. at 22:455-457.

A parole revocation hearing was initially scheduled for May 25, 2012 with defendant Administrative Law Judge Porter presiding, but that hearing was adjourned because ALJ Porter ruled that she did not have enough information before her at the time. Id. at 22:473-483. The revocation hearing was subsequently held on June 8, 2012. Id. at 23:489-493. Mr. Jackson was represented by counsel on both occasions. See id. at 22:473-475; 61:1251-1254. Ms. Dimeo appeared at the hearing, after being subpoenaed and brought to testify as a witness by defendant parole officer Muriel Harvey. See id. at 24:494-500; 27:555-563. Ms. Dimeo testified that Mr. Jackson threatened her during the March 8, 2012 therapy session, consistent with what Mr. Jackson had been told at the time of his arrest. Id. at 67:1368-1369 ("[H]e said all I have to do is make aphone call if I go back to jail[,] I have family[,] that was exactly it and that did make me fearful . . . ."); see also id. at 40:830-834. On the basis of this testimony, defendant ALJ Porter found that Mr. Jackson had violated the conditions of his parole by threatening Ms. Dimeo. See id. at 44:914-917; 56:1161. As a result, Mr. Jackson was confined for a period of about 120 days, and released from custody on September 25, 2012. Id. at 102:2088-103:2090.

Although much of Mr. Jackson's sprawling complaint is unfocused, the crux of his allegations is that Ms. Dimeo testified falsely during the parole revocation hearing—Mr. Jackson alleges that he only threatened to sue Ms. Dimeo, and that he did not additionally threaten her with physical harm. Mr. Jackson alleges that nearly everyone involved in his arrest and the revocation hearing process conspired to have Ms. Dimeo testify falsely, and thereby have his parole revoked on the basis of her testimony. He also alleges that Ms. Dimeo violated his privacy rights by disclosing to parole officer Ramirez his attendance at therapy sessions, bipolar diagnosis, and a list of his current medications. Compl. at 31:658-32:653. On the basis of these allegations, Mr. Jackson raises a host of legal claims against a number of state defendants from DOCCS and private actors from Montefiore Medical Center.

With respect to the state defendants, Mr. Jackson specifically alleges that: (1) parole officers Ramirez and Harvey conspired with Ms. Dimeo to have her testify falsely at the revocation hearing, and altered Mr. Jackson's DOCCS records to include Ms. Dimeo's accusations, id. at 27:555-559; 43:892-44:923; (2) DOCCS employees presented fraudulent evidence at the revocation hearing, id. at 46:960-47:969; (3) Parole Revocation Specialists ("PRS") Garfield Bolton and Maria Burgess, who were responsible for prosecuting the parole revocation, conspired with parole officer Ramirez and others to present false evidence at the hearing, id. at 27:46:960-47:969; 70:1440-1443; 81:1657-82:1673; (4) PRS Bolton prosecuted the parole revocation in retaliation for Mr. Jackson exercising his free speech, id. at 65:1339-65:1341; (5) ALJ Porter was biased during the revocation hearing,colluding with PRS Bolton and others to favor the prosecution; id. at 52:1073-1080; 60:1233-61:1248; 63:1287-1289; 70:1440-1443; and (6) Regional Director Gayle Walthall¹ and Assistant Commissioner Andrea Evans failed to supervise the other DOCCS defendants, id. at 3:76-81; 4:100-5:107.

Mr. Jackson, proceeding pro se, filed suit in state court on December 22, 2014. The action was subsequently removed to federal court by the state defendants on January 28, 2015. The complaint brings a wide-range of federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including procedural and substantive due process violations, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment retaliation. The complaint also alleges violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPPA"), a number of state law claims, and violations of various state and federal criminal laws.

On May 19, 2015, three sets of motions to dismiss the complaint were filed by several defendants: (1) Crisanta Rockwell; (2) Ms. Dimeo; and (3) PRS Bolton, Ms. Walthall, and parole officers Harvey, Ramirez, and Lewis Squillacioti. See Dkt. Nos. 21, 26, 33. On June 9, 2015, Defendants Yener Balan and Montefiore Medical Center also filed a motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 47. On June 16, 2015, plaintiff requested an extension of time to amend the complaint in response to the motions to dismiss, which the Court subsequently granted. See Dkt. Nos. 52, 57. Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint, but instead filed a letter on July 8, 2015, which the Court construed as an opposition to the motions to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 58, 59. The final set of defendants—ALJ Porter, PRS Burgess, and Ms. Evans—filed a motion to dismiss on September 3, 2015. Dkt. No. 65. After the Court sua sponte granted plaintiff an extension of time to respond tothe final motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted an "affadavit [sic] of truth in opposition" to the motion on November 12, 2015. See Dkt. Nos. 71, 72.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 "does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court "must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor." LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court, however, is not required to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this plausibility standard, the plaintiff must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

Because he is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe plaintiff's submissions and "interpret[ ] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . ."). "This admonition 'applies with particular force when a plaintiff's civil rights are at issue.'" Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Maisonet v. Metro. Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).

B. Claims Brought Under Section 1983

To prevail on a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show that a defendant "acted under color of state law and that she deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 78 (2d...