Jackson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.

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CANDACE KIARA JACKSON, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

No. 3:20-cv-375-BJD-JBT

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

July 20, 2023

ORDER

BRIAN J. DAVIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

I. STATUS

Petitioner Candace Kiara Jackson is challenging her St. Johns County conviction for second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and aggravated battery through a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in the State Custody (Petition) (Doc. 1). Respondents filed a Response to Order to Show Cause (Response) (Doc. 11) and an Appendix of Exhibits to Response to Order to Show Cause (Appendix) (Doc. 12). Petitioner filed a Traverse to Order to Show Cause (Doc. 14).^[1]

II. HABEAS REVIEW

The role of this Court is limited when reviewing a state prisoner's application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254; “[u]nder AEDPA, a court cannot grant relief unless the state court's decision on the merits was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,' Supreme Court precedent, or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'” McKiver v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 991 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 441 (2021). Therefore, habeas relief is limited to those occasions where the state court's determinations are unreasonable, that is, if no fairminded jurist could agree with them. Id.

If there has been one reasoned state court judgment rejecting a federal claim followed by an unexplained order upholding that judgment, federal habeas courts employ a "look through" presumption: "the federal court should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (Wilson).

Also, a state court's finding of fact, whether a state trial court or appellate court, is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “The state court's factual determinations are presumed correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1354 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2469 (2021). This presumption of correctness, however, applies only to findings of fact, not mixed determinations of law and fact. Brannan v. GDCP Warden, 541 Fed.Appx. 901, 903-904 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (acknowledging the distinction between a pure question of fact from a mixed question of law and fact), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 906 (2014).^[2]Furthermore, the second prong of § 2254(d), requires this Court to “accord the state trial court [determination of the facts] substantial deference.” Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015)), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 124 (2021). As such, a federal district court may not supersede a state court's determination simply because reasonable minds may disagree about the finding. Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

Of import, “[i]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determination on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Indeed, a habeas petition grounded on issues of state law provides no basis for federal habeas relief as a violation of state statute or rule of procedure does not constitute a violation of the federal constitution. Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). As such, a federal writ is only available in cases amounting to federal constitutional error. Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 471 (11th Cir. 1993). This is so even if the claim is “couched” in terms of alleged constitutional violations, like due process. Branan, 861 F.2d at 1508.

The two-part Strickland standard governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.^[3] Knight v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 958 F.3d 1035, 1038 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 2471 (2021). See Freeman v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 46 F.4th 1193, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022) (“In an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, § 22543(d)'s terms are judged by the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington.”), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 1785 (2023). Pursuant to this standard, a defendant must show: (1) her counsel's performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced her defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A district court need not address both prongs if a petitioner makes an insufficient showing on one. Fifield v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 849 Fed.Appx. 829, 833 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (relying on Strickland), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 788 (2022).

To prevail, a petitioner must successfully show her counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” as well as show “the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, depriving [her] of a ‘fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.'” Raheem v. GDCP Warden, 995 F.3d 895, 908 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1234 (2022). Additionally, combining the deferential standard for judging the performance of counsel with the extra layer of deference that § 2254 provides, the resulting double deference “is doubly difficult for a petitioner to overcome[.]” Johnson v. Sec'y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 911 (2011).

To determine whether Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief, this Court must ask (1) whether the [state court] decisions were ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined' in Strickland, or (2) whether the . . . decisions were ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.'” Whatley v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Ctr., 927 F.3d 1150, 1175 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 1299 (2021). The AEDPA standard is quite difficult to meet as a state court's decision must be given deference and latitude.

III. GROUNDS

Petitioner raises eleven grounds in the Petition:

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to inform Petitioner of all of the evidence against her prior to trial;

(2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to argue the evidence only supported a manslaughter conviction, not murder;

(3) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to impeach the arresting officer, Mike Stevens;

(4) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to argue that Petitioner could not be convicted of aggravated battery;

(5) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present favorable evidence;

(6) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to ensure Petitioner had a jury of her peers;

(7) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion for change of venue;

(8) insufficiency of the evidence to present a prima facie case of second-degree murder;

(9) insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction for attempted second-degree murder; (10) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object when the state declined to seek an attempted manslaughter jury instruction as a lesser included offense to attempted first-degree murder; and

(11) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present favorable evidence.

Notably, the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing on grounds five and eleven. The Court concludes no additional evidentiary proceedings are required. The pertinent facts are fully developed in the record, or the record otherwise precludes habeas relief; therefore, the Court can adequately assess Petitioner's claims without any further factual development. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034 (2004).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One

In her first ground, Petitioner claims her trial counsel was ineffective for failure to inform Petitioner of all of the evidence against her prior to trial. Petition at 5. More specifically, Petitioner contends her counsel performed deficiently in failing to provide Petitioner with the deposition of arresting officer Corporal Mike Stevens prior to trial. Id.

Petitioner raised the claim in ground one of her Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief. Ex. G at 1084-86. The circuit court denied this ground and the motion. Id. at 1179-82. Petitioner appealed. Ex. H; Ex. I; Ex. J. On March 24, 2020, the 5th DCA per curiam affirmed the decision of the trial court. Ex. K. The mandate issued on April 17, 2020. Ex. L. As such, this ground is exhausted.

The circuit court denied the claim relying on the two-pronged standard set forth in Strickland. Ex. G at 1178-79. As the state court applied the twopronged Strickland standard in addressing the motion for post-conviction relief, Petitioner cannot satisfy the “contrary to” test of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court next considers whether the state court unreasonably applied that principle to the facts or premised its adjudication on the claim on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Although not a model of clarity, apparently Petitioner alleges that Corporal Stevens expanded his statement given in a defense report to include untruthful incriminating statements. Petitioner asserts she did not testify because she was unprepared to defend herself against unknown evidence held by counsel. The circuit court found Petitioner's contention that she did not testify for this reason “entirely conclusory and fails to sufficiently allege prejudice.” Ex. G at 1179 n.2. Petitione...