Jackson v. State

897 S.E.2d 785

JACKSON

v.The STATE.

Castle

v.The State.

S23A0854

S23A0855

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 6, 2024

Superior Court, Bartow County, D. Scott Smith, Judge

Rodney Samuel Zell, Zell & Zell, P.C., 1111 Bull Street, Savannah, Georgia 31401, for Appellant in S23A0854.

Jason Michael McLendon, McLendon Law Firm, LLC, 1800 Peachtree Street NW, Suite 300, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Matthew Kyle Winchester, Law Offices of Matthew K. Winchester, Garland Law Building, 3151 Maple Drive NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30305, for Appellant in S23A0855.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Elizabeth Haase Brock, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Samir J. Patel, District Attorney, Cherokee Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, 135 W. Cherokee Avenue, Cartersville, Georgia 30120, for Appellee.

Bethel, Justice.

Following the deadly shooting of Norman Ray Moore, Jr., ("Norman") at a party in Bartow County, Dedric Jackson and Dimitrius Castle were jointly tried and convicted of felony murder and other related crimes.¹ On appeal, Jackson contends that he received ineffective assistance in several ways. Specifically, Jackson alleges that his trial counsel: withdrew his request for a jury charge on justification and failed to request a charge on defense of habitation; failed to object to evidence of a prior crime and of bad character; failed to object to certain witness testimony; and failed to object to two jury instructions. Jackson further asserts that the cumulative prejudice resulting from these actions and omissions violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, Jackson argues that the trial court erred by not charging the jury sua sponte on what he characterizes as his sole defense of justification.

Castle contends the following: that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction for battery (Count 5); that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request jury instructions on justification and related principles and accomplice corroboration and by calling a cumulative defense witness who opened the door to impeachment evidence of Castle’s defense theory; and that the trial court erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault verdict (Count 3) into the felony murder conviction (Count 2). For the reasons detailed below, each of Jackson’s and Castle’s claims fail. Accordingly, we affirm in both cases.

Background Facts²

The evidence presented at trial showed the following.³ Appellants Castle and Jackson, who are brothers, lived with their mother in an apartment complex in Cartersville. On the evening of March 13, 2010, they held Jackson’s eighteenth birthday party there. Leondris Jackson ("Leondris"), who was Appellants’ younger cousin, attended the party, along with Jackson and Castle.

Norman, the victim, came to the party with his cousin, Trinis Moore ("Trinis"), and a friend, Algernon Shaw. When Norman’s group arrived at the complex in an automobile, Norman rolled down his window and attempted to talk to a girl on the sidewalk outside of the apartment building. A group of people, including Jackson, Castle, and Leondris, were mingling on the apartment’s front porch and just inside the door. According to Trinis, someone in Castle and Jackson’s group taunted Norman’s group, daring them to get out of the car.

Norman and Trinis exited the car, shouting "east side" and "on the E," which were references to their gang. Jackson and Castle’s group walked out to meet them, with some shouting "BBS"⁴ as they approached Norman’s group. Trinis testified that when they exited the vehicle, Norman cocked his gun, pointed the gun down, and approached Jackson and Castle’s group. The two groups met between the sidewalk and driveway. Several other witnesses either heard or saw Norman cock his gun, and Leondris’s sister observed Norman put the gun in his pants. After seeing Norman’s gun, Jackson and Castle ran into their apartment to retrieve their own guns. Defontae Leonard, who also attended the party, testified that Castle’s weapon was a "40" and Jackson’s a 9-millimeter.

When Jackson and Castle reemerged, they confronted Norman and Trinis. Jackson began arguing with Norman, while a few feet away, Castle argued with Trinis. Alex Florez, a friend of Castle and Jackson, testified that Castle, Jackson, and Trinis carried guns during the confrontation, but that Norman was not holding a weapon. Several witnesses testified that, as the argument escalated, they saw Jackson hit Norman in the head with the gun, and Jackson and Norman then "got to fighting" on the ground. A crowd formed around Norman, with several people kicking and punching Norman. A family member of Trinis separated him from Castle. Florez then pulled Jackson off Norman.

Florez and Leonard testified that, when Jackson stood up, he shot Norman, Florez stated that Castle came "from around where he was" near the truck, about 10 or 15 feet away, and shot Norman a second time. Leonard testified that this second shot hit Norman in the chest. Castle and Jackson’s aunt testified that she "might have" seen Castle shoot someone, though she could not be sure. This was not the only version of events recounted at trial. Another witness testified that she saw Leondris hit Norman in the face with the gun, and three witnesses claimed that they saw Leondris shoot Norman.

At the scene of the shooting, police discovered Jackson’s driver’s license at Norman’s feet. Police also discovered a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson bullet in the road, as well as a Winchester 9-millimeter Luger shell casing. After the shooting, Jackson asked a friend to "hold the gun," but the friend refused.

Norman was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The medical examiner testified that Norman had an abrasion to his face caused by a blunt force injury, a non-fatal gunshot wound to his left forearm, and a fatal gunshot wound to his chest. At the hospital, a loaded semiautomatic Glock handgun was discovered tucked into the front of Norman’s shorts, and an EMT testified that the weapon was not visible during transport.

A witness later told an investigator that, after the shooting, she saw Leondris and Castle sneak out the back of the apartment with Leondris’s father. Later that evening, a car owned by Leondris’s father was seen leaving the complex, and the occupants of the vehicle’s backseat had their heads ducked down. Police discovered a brochure for a 9-millimeter handgun in the vehicle’s trunk,⁵ as well as Winchester 9-millimeter Luger bullets.

Case No. S23A0854

[1–5] 1. Jackson argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel in numerous regards. To prevail on his claims of ineffectiveness, Jackson

has the burden of proving both that the performance of his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. To prove deficient performance, [an appellant] must show that his trial counsel acted or failed to act in an objectively reasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms. To prove resulting prejudice, [an appellant] must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 799 (4), 837 S.E.2d 790 (2020). "A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of professional conduct." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ford v. State, 298 Ga. 560, 566 (8), 783 S.E.2d 906 (2016). With these principles in mind, we consider each of Jackson’s claims of ineffective assistance in turn.

[6] (a) Jackson first argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently by withdrawing his request for a jury charge on justification. We disagree.

At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that, based on the evidence presented at trial, he chose to pursue the "better" defenses of mere presence and association, arguing that someone else was responsible for the shooting. Counsel testified that he did not pursue a justification defense because Jackson had not admitted to firing any shots generally, let alone in self-defense, and such an admission was a "strong part" of pursuing the defense.

On appeal, Jackson argues that trial counsel’s reasoning for withdrawing the charge was unsound because there was witness testimony that Jackson shot Norman, and Jackson’s trial counsel testified that evidence showing that Jackson had fired shots during the altercation would have changed his mind about the justification defense. Jackson further argues that because he was indicted as a party to the crime, he need not have actually fired the fatal shot at all. One of his co-defendants could have fired the fatal shot, and had he been justified in doing so, that defense, would have been available to Jackson.

[7–9] However, properly assessing the performance of counsel "calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 110, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d, 674 (1984)). See also Head v. Carr, 273 Ga. 613, 615-16, 544 S.E.2d 409 (2001) ("To show deficient performance, [a claimant] must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was not reasonable under the circumstances confronting them before and during the trial, without using hindsight.") (internal citations removed); Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 875 (3) (a) n.7, 742 S.E.2d 707 (2013) ("[W]e are not limited in our assessment of the objective...