Jackson v. State

485 Md. 1

300 A.3d 169

Lateekqua JACKSON

v.STATE of Maryland

State of Maryland

v.Garrick L. Powell, Jr.

No. 35, Sept. Term, 2022

Supreme Court of Maryland.

August 14, 2023

Argued by Jeffrey M. Ross, Assigned Public Defender (Office of the Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner in No. 34.

Argued by Andrew H. Costinett, Asst. Atty. Gen. ( Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent in No. 34.

Argued by Andrew H. Costinett, Asst. Atty. Gen. ( Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner in No. 35.

Argued by John N. Sharifi, Asst. Public Defender ( Natasha M. Dartigue, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent in No. 35.

Argued before: Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.

Booth, J.

Under a Maryland statute and corresponding court rule, which are collectively known as the "Hicks rule," a criminal trial in a circuit court must commence within 180 days of the first appearance of the defendant or defense counsel in that court—a deadline known as the "Hicks date." A continuance of the trial beyond the Hicks date may be granted only for "good cause." Where a violation of the Hicks rule occurs, the defendant's charges must be dismissed with prejudice, unless the defendant or defense counsel sought or expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date.

In this case, it is undisputed that the criminal trial of three co-defendants whose cases had been consolidated was initially scheduled for a date beyond the Hicks date, and that the trial court made no finding of "good cause." We must determine whether the violation of the Hicks rule mandates the dismissal of the charges against co-defendants Garrick L. Powell, Jr. and Lateekqua Jackson, or whether the defendants or their counsel sought or expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date, thereby precluding the availability of the dismissal sanction.

After the defendants moved to dismiss their respective indictments because of the Hicks rule violations, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted the defendants’ motions and dismissed the charges against them. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland ¹ affirmed the circuit court's judgment in Mr. Powell's case, concluding that Mr. Powell's attorney did not expressly consent to a trial date beyond the Hicks date. State v. Henry , 256 Md. App. 156, 179–82, 286 A.3d 38 (2022). The Appellate Court reversed the judgment in Ms. Jackson's case, concluding that Ms. Jackson expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date. Id. at 178–79, 286 A.3d 38.

The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari in Mr. Powell's case, and Ms. Jackson petitioned for a writ of certiorari in her case. We granted both petitions to review the following questions, which we have consolidated and rephrased: ²

1. Did Mr. Powell's attorney, through his conduct at a scheduling hearing, seek a first trial date beyond the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal for a Hicks violation?

2. Did Ms. Jackson expressly consent to a first trial date in violation of the Hicks date, precluding dismissal for a Hicks violation?

3. Did Ms. Jackson's attorney, through her conduct at a scheduling hearing, seek a first trial date beyond the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal for a Hicks violation? ³

For the reasons set forth below, we answer yes to the first question. We hold that Mr. Powell's counsel, through his conduct at a scheduling hearing, sought a trial date that exceeded the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal of Mr. Powell's indictment as a remedy for the Hicks violation. We reverse the Appellate Court's judgment in Mr. Powell's case. We answer no to the second question. We hold that Ms. Jackson did not expressly consent to a trial date in violation of the Hicks rule. We answer yes to the third question. We hold that Ms. Jackson's attorney, through her conduct at a scheduling hearing, sought a trial date that exceeded the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal of Ms. Jackson's indictment as a remedy for the Hicks violation. We affirm the Appellate Court's judgment in Ms. Jackson's case, but for different reasons.

I Background

A. The "Hicks Rule" — The Text of the Statute and Rule

A criminal trial in a Maryland circuit court must begin within 180 days of certain triggering events. This deadline is set forth in statute and rule. In its current iteration, the statute provides:

(a) (1) The date for trial of a criminal matter in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of:

(i) the appearance of counsel; or

(ii) the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules.

(2) The trial date may not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.

(b) (1) For good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a designee of the judge may grant a change of the trial date in a circuit court:

(i) on motion of a party; or

(ii) on the initiative of the circuit court.

(2) If a circuit court trial date is changed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, any subsequent changes of the trial date may only be made by the county administrative judge or that judge's designee for good cause shown.

(b) The [Supreme] Court of [Maryland] may adopt additional rules to carry out this section.

Md. Code (2018 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.), Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") § 6-103. This Court has adopted a rule consistent with this statute— Maryland Rule 4-271. ⁴ As we noted above, "[t]he requirements established by the statute and rule are often referred to colloquially as the ‘Hicks rule’ and the deadline for commencing trial under those provisions as the ‘Hicks date.’ " Tunnell v. State , 466 Md. 565, 571, 223 A.3d 122 (2020). As is evident from its text, the statute does not specify the consequences for failure to begin a trial by the statutory deadline.

B. The Hicks Case

In a 1979 decision, this Court considered a prior version of the statute, ⁵ and held that compliance with the statutory deadline was mandatory and that any postponement beyond that deadline must be authorized by the administrative judge upon a determination of requisite cause. ⁶ State v. Hicks , 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). This Court held that a failure to commence a trial in accordance with the statutory timeline requires dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Id.

Prior to the Hicks decision, "it was widely understood that the deadline for trial set forth in the statute and rule was directory rather than mandatory." Tunnell , 466 Md. at 584, 223 A.3d 122. "That understanding was based in part on the absence of any sanction in the statute or rule for failure to meet the deadline—an understanding that was initially confirmed with respect to the statute by the appellate courts." Id. (citing Young v. State , 15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, aff'd , 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972) ). The Court's decision in Hicks "upended that understanding."

Id. Rather than describing the Hicks case anew, we restate some of this Court's recent discussion:

In Hicks , the trial was scheduled well within the rule's (then) 120-day deadline, but postponed when it turned out that the defendant was incarcerated in another state. At a motions hearing approximately 40 days past the deadline, the circuit court dismissed the charges for failure to comply with the deadline. The circuit court held that the 1977 adoption of the court rule set forth a mandatory deadline for commencement of a trial in a criminal case and that the failure to try the defendant in that case by the deadline required dismissal of the charges.

On appeal, this Court agreed that the rule established a mandatory deadline, although it also concluded that there was ‘extraordinary cause’—the standard set forth in the rule at that time—for continuance of the trial past the deadline. The Court therefore reversed the dismissal of the charges.

The Court explained that its conclusion that the rule was mandatory was based on the underlying purpose of the statute and court rule ‘to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges.’ Quoting a prior decision of the [Appellate Court of Maryland], the Court observed that postponement of criminal trials resulted in trial courts and court-supporting agencies ‘spinning their wheels,’ wasted time of attorneys and witnesses, and frustrated other persons involved in the system, all of which impaired public confidence in the courts. The Court was careful to distinguish this rationale from a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, stating that the court rule ‘stands on a different legal footing’ from the constitutional speedy trial requirement.

Although the Court in Hicks found that the ‘extraordinary cause’ standard was met under the circumstances of that case and allowed the prosecution to go forward, its holding set a strict standard that presaged dismissal of cases scheduled under the prior understanding of the rule, with results that could be unfair and unforeseen in pending prosecutions.

Tunnell , 466 Md. at 584–85, 223 A.3d 122 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

In response to the State's motion for reconsideration, the Court in Hicks issued a per curiam opinion that moderated the potential consequences of the sweeping nature of the mandatory dismissal sanction. 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration , 285 Md. 310, 334–38, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). Specifically, the Court stated that dismissal of criminal charges would be "inappropriate" in situations where the defendant, personally or through counsel, "seeks or expressly consents to a trial date" that does not comply with the Hicks rule:

[I]t is inappropriate to dismiss the criminal charges ... where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of [the rule]. It would, in our judgment, be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a

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