Jackson v. Teamsters Local Union 922

204 F.Supp.3d 97

Ralph JACKSON, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 922, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-2065 (JEB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 1, 2016

Joann P. Myles, Law Office of Joann P. Myles, Largo, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Diana M. Bardes, Richard C. Welch, John R. Mooney, Lauren Powell McDermott, Mooney, Green, Saindon, Murphy & Welch, P.C., Henry Adam Platt, Brett Stephen Covington, Saul Ewing LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge

As any buyer of a new car knows, driving off the lot typically triggers a feeling of buyer's remorse. In other words, once we know there is an opportunity lost by a decision we make, we often feel post-decision regret. Plaintiffs, eight former employees of Giant Food, LLC, who have brought a "hybrid" claim under the Labor Management Relations Act alleging wrongdoing by both Giant and their Unions, appear to suffer from a serious case of buyer's remorse with regard to the severance package they accepted when the grocery-store company laid them off. They insist that had they known that their decision to opt for severance pay meant they forfeited the right to be placed on a recall list, which might have afforded them an opportunity to be rehired within six months of their termination, they would not have accepted such payments. Giant maintains that the choice posed by the severance package was clear, and that Plaintiffs are precluded from suing the company by the releases they signed.

In bringing this suit, Plaintiffs contend that they are not bound by such releases because Giant only induced them to sign through material misrepresentations. As causes of action, they allege that the two Unions of which they were members, Local 730 and Local 922, failed to adequately discharge their duty of fair representation in negotiating the terms of the severance and release, and that Giant's termination of them and subsequent recall of other employees violated its collective-bargaining agreements with the Unions. In an earlier Opinion, the Court ruled that these two claims are interrelated, constituting one "hybrid" claim against both Giant and the Unions, all three of whom are Defendants in this suit.

Defendants reject Plaintiffs' narrative and, asserting that the material facts at issue are undisputed, have separately moved for summary judgment. Concluding that Giant made no material misrepresentations related to Plaintiffs' release agreements and that their waiver of claims is therefore valid, the Court will grant the company's Motion. In addition, as Plaintiffs' hybrid claim is deficient, the Court will also grant the Unions' Motion, putting an end to this long-running conflict arising from Plaintiffs' choice.

I. Background

While the Court well knows that facts on summary judgment should be considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it also notes that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), parties "asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record," and the Court "need consider only the cited materials, [though] it may consider others in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(3). In this case, Defendants have submitted a 54-page Joint Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs have responded with a 137-page Response, and both sides have each submitted more than 60 exhibits. See Def. JSOF (ECF No. 130-7); Pl. Resp. to JSOF (ECF No. 141-1). Plaintiffs' filings, in addition to being voluminous, are riddled with typographical errors and incomplete sentences, frequently confuse argument with fact, and often fail to identify precise record citations to support their claims. It is not the Court's duty to mine the record for every relevant evidentiary item. See Potter v. District of Columbia , 558 F.3d 542, 553 (D.C.Cir.2009) (Williams, J., concurring). Where "a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact ..., the court may ... consider the fact undisputed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1) ; see also LCvR 7(h)(1) (explaining that Court may assume that nonmoving party "admitted" facts it failed to "controvert" in its response or opposition). In other words, the Court will decline the invitation to fill in the literal blanks left by Plaintiffs' briefing. See, e.g. , Pl. Resp. to JSOF, ¶ 104 ("Plaintiffs further incorporate by reference their responses in response to Defendants allegations in paragraphs, as if fully pled herein."), ¶ 130 ("See Ex ––––"). With these principles in mind, the Court recites the facts relevant to its disposition of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.

A. Parties and Setting

Plaintiffs in this case are eight former employees of Giant, which operates a chain of grocery stores located in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia. See Pl. Resp. to JSOF, ¶ 1. While employed by Giant, Plaintiffs were members of one of two unions, Local 922 or Local 730 ("the Unions"). Id. , ¶ 2. Until 2011, Giant's retail stores were supported by two distribution centers located in Jessup, Maryland: one for "fresh" groceries and the other for "dry" groceries. Id. , ¶ 6. The fresh-foods center, including a recycling facility, was operated entirely by Giant, but the dry-goods compound was only partially operated by Giant; the dry-goods recycling facility was run by the company, but the dry-goods warehouse was run by a subsidiary of C&S Wholesale Company. Id. , ¶¶ 7-8, 15. All of the Plaintiffs worked at one of the two recycling facilities. Id. , ¶ 9.

In previous years, Giant had operated a variety of facilities in support of its stores—including its own dairy, bakery, and the like—but at the time of the events at issue, the company was focused more on the operation of its retail grocery stores and, in streamlining its operations, reallocated or laid off workers. Id. , ¶ 16. In addition, in June 2012, C&S closed the dry-goods warehouse it operated in Jessup, Maryland, and relocated those operations to Pennsylvania, leading to a number of layoffs, including some members of Local 730. Id. , ¶ 19. The parties agree that Giant learned of that planned closure in April 2012 and made some efforts to prepare for those layoffs, though they dispute precisely what actions were taken and when, id. , ¶¶ 20-24; those disputes, however, are irrelevant to Defendants' Motions.

In a memorandum dated April 26, 2012, and addressed to the entire Giant Distribution Team, Giant's Vice President of Distribution Operations, Mike Scott, informed the Team of the dry-goods-warehouse closure and indicated that "Giant was still assessing the impact of C&S's decision." Id. , ¶ 26. This memorandum was posted in some employee break rooms. Id. Giant ultimately concluded that, after the C&S closure, "it would be more efficient to operate only one recycling facility instead of two." Id. , ¶ 29 (citing Def. Exh. 12 (ECF No. 132-2) (Deposition of Billye Pounds, Giant Senior Manager of Human Resources) at 46:3-16). Because "multiple people" had been doing the "same work" at the two separate facilities, Giant expected that after their consolidation, it would not require as many employees. See id. , ¶ 32; Pounds Dep. at 55:10-56:10. The parties disagree about how Giant arrived at that expectation, whether its belief in the reduced need for employees was reasonable, and other such details, but Plaintiffs point to no testimony indicating that Giant did not "believe that the consolidation of the two warehouses would ... mean that there was going to be less work for employees to do." Pounds Dep. at 55:13-15.

B. Negotiation and Termination

In late May and early June of 2012, Giant met with the leaders of Local 730 and Local 922 to discuss the effects of the facilities' consolidation—what the parties refer to as "effects bargaining." See Pl. Resp. to JSOF, ¶¶ 34-46. Ritchie Brooks, President of Local 730, and Ferline Buie, President of Local 922, agreed that the two Unions would jointly negotiate with Giant during the effects bargaining. Id. , ¶¶ 39, 46. At least one meeting between Buie and Giant was attended by five of the Plaintiffs. Id. , ¶ 43.

The Unions sought to convince Giant that the layoffs were not necessary, the number of laid-off employees should be fewer than the company's predictions, and Giant should engage in a $50,000 voluntary buyout. Id. , ¶¶ 49-51. The Unions succeeded in bargaining down the number of laid-off employees but not on their other demands. Id. , ¶ 50. The Unions then requested severance pay for the affected employees or, in the alternative, "recall rights," meaning the right to be placed on a list for potential rehire, based on seniority, following termination of employment. Id. , ¶ 51. As to severance, the Unions asked Giant to provide two weeks of severance pay for each year of employment with the company, but Giant agreed to only one week per year of service. Id. , ¶ 52. As to recall, the Unions asked that those employees who decided not to accept the severance package would have recall rights for one year. Id. , ¶ 53. Giant and the Unions disputed whether each Union's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company already gave Union members recall rights, and Plaintiffs and Defendants continue to dispute what the CBAs required. Id. , ¶¶ 54-57.

Ultimately, the Unions and Giant agreed to a severance package under which affected employees would have the option either to receive up to eight weeks of severance pay, depending on their years of service but with a minimum of two weeks' pay, or instead to be placed on the recall list for six months. Id. , ¶ 58. If they chose the latter option, they would still lose their jobs, but would be eligible for rehire if Giant recalled any employees. The company agreed to reduce its number of layoffs to eight employees from Local 730 and twelve employees from Local...