Jackson v. United States

1

RAYMOND JACKSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 16 Civ. 4792 (LAP)

No. 96 Cr. 515 (LAP)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 31, 2022

OPINION & ORDER

LORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge:

Before the Court is Petitioner Raymond Jackson's (“Mr Jackson”) motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (See Mot. to Vacate (“Mot. Vacate”), dated June 21, 2016 [dkt no. 617 in 96-cr-515]; dkt. no. 1 in 16-cv-4792; see also Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Vacate (“Pet Mem.”), dated Oct. 13, 2020 [dkt. no. 683 in 96-cr-515].)^[1] The Government opposes the motion. (See Mem. in Opp. to Mot. Vacate (“Opp.”), dated Nov. 13, 2020 [dkt. no. 690].) Mr. Jackson replied to the Government's opposition. (See Reply to Opp. (“Reply”), dated Nov. 27, 2020 [dkt. no. 691].)

For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's § 2255 motion is denied.

I. Background

Mr. Jackson and his co-defendants were involved in a racketeering “enterprise, ” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), known as the “Preacher Crew, ” which operated principally in the Bronx during the 1990s. (See Superseding Indictment, dated Dec. 17, 1997 [dkt. no. 193], ¶¶ 1-5.) In furtherance of the enterprise, Mr. Jackson and his co-defendants “engaged in numerous acts of racketeering, including murder, robbery, extortion and narcotics trafficking.” See Jackson v. United States, No. 01-cv-03967 (MBM), 2002 WL 1968328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2002).

a. The Indictment

On December 17, 1997, a grand jury charged Mr. Jackson and eleven co-defendants in an eighty-six-count Superseding Indictment (the “Indictment”). (See dkt. no. 193.) The Indictment charged Mr. Jackson with, among other offenses, the following:

(1) Count 1: Racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (id. ¶¶ 1-44);

(2) Count 2: Racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), (id. ¶¶ 45-46); (3) Count 26: Conspiracy to murder Greg Hawkins in violation of New York State Penal Law and 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), (id. ¶¶ 94-95);

(4) Count 27: “[U]nlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly” murdering and aiding and abetting the murder of Greg Hawkins in violation of New York State Penal Law and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(1), (id. ¶¶ 96-97);

(5) Count 34: Conspiracy to murder Sheila Berry in violation of New York State Penal Law and 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), (id. ¶¶ 110-11);

(6) Count 35: “[U]nlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly” murdering and aiding and abetting the murder of Sheila Berry in violation of New York State Penal Law and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1959(a)(1), (id. ¶¶ 112-13);

(7) Count 77: Use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely, the murder of and conspiracy to murder Greg Hawkins as charged in Counts 1, 2, 26, and 27, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), (id. ¶ 144);

(8) Count 80: Use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely, the murder of and conspiracy to murder Sheila Berry as charged in Counts 1, 2, 34, and 35, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c). (Id. ¶ 147.)

b. The Plea Agreement & Mr. Jackson's Guilty Plea

Mr. Jackson's trial began on April 5, 1999. (See dkt. no. 459 at 1.) Two days into trial, Mr. Jackson pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (See Id. at 398:3-419:15.) The plea agreement stated that the Government accepted a guilty plea from Mr. Jackson to Count 20-the conspiracy to murder George Ford-and Counts 77 and 80 (the “§ 924(c) counts” or the “§ 924(c) convictions”)-the use and carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. (See dkt. no. 683-2 at 1-2 (Ex. B).) The plea agreement listed two predicate crimes of violence as the bases for each § 924(c) count: “(1) the conspiracy to murder and murder of Greg Hawkins . . . in aid of [racketeering], ” as to Count 77, and “(2) the conspiracy to murder and murder of Sheila Berry in aid of [racketeering], ” as to Count 80. (See Id. (emphasis added).) In exchange for Mr. Jackson's guilty plea, the Government agreed to dismiss “any open Racketeering Acts and Counts” against Mr. Jackson. (See Id. at 2.)

At the plea hearing on April 7, 1999, the Government proffered that if Mr. Jackson's case continued to trial the Government would prove the following: (1) Mr. Jackson “agreed with others to kill George Ford, ” (2) Mr. Jackson “shot Greg Hawkins to death, ” and (3) Mr. Jackson participated in the murder of Sheila Berry, which was carried out with firearms.

(Dkt. no. 459 at 413:1-414:1.) During the plea colloquy, Mr. Jackson testified under oath that: (1) he “pointe[d] [sic] out Ford” to “somebody else in the gang” knowing that “they [were] supposed to kill him;” (2) he “went and got the gun, ” “was present” when Greg Hawkins was killed, and “understood that the gun was going to be used in connection with killing [Mr. Hawkins];” and (3) he “went and got the gun, ” “want [sic] with others to the apartment” and “knew [Sheila Berry] was going to be killed” with the gun. (Id. at 415:2-417:13.) The Government and Mr. Jackson's counsel agreed that Mr. Jackson's colloquy provided a “sufficient factual predicate for the plea.” (Id. at 417:17-20.) The Court accepted Mr. Jackson's plea, satisfied that there was a factual basis for Mr. Jackson's guilt. (Id. at 400:9-418:1.)

c. Sentencing

On June 29, 1999, the Court sentenced Mr. Jackson to a total of thirty-five years' imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. (Dkt. no. 683-3 at 7:12-22 (Ex. C).) The Court delineated the break-down of the aggregate sentence as: 120 months' imprisonment for Count 20 (conspiracy to murder), 60 months' imprisonment for Count 77 (§ 924(c) count), and 240 months' imprisonment for Count 80 (§ 924(c) count). (Id.) All time was to be served consecutively. (Id.) The remaining open counts of the Indictment were dismissed.

(Id. at 8:8-11.) The Court confirmed that Mr. Jackson waived the right to appeal his sentence but could appeal if he believed there were irregularities with his plea.^[2] (Id. at 9:5-18.)

d. Subsequent Motions to Vacate

After sentencing, Mr. Jackson did not pursue a direct appeal. (See Pet. Mem. at 3.) However, he filed multiple motions to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In his first § 2255 motion, Mr. Jackson alleged that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to appeal the validity of his plea on the § 924(c) counts. (See dkt. no. 1 in 01-cv-03967.)

The Court rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that without the stipulated sentence in the plea agreement, Mr. Jackson faced up to fifty-four years of imprisonment for the charges he pled to. Jackson, 2002 WL 1968328, at *1-2. The Court further held that Mr. Jackson was aware that he waived the right to appeal his conviction and that his counsel could not be faulted “for failure to pursue an appeal that [was] legally barred.” Id. at *2. Finally, the Court noted that “Jackson's conduct as he described it [during the plea colloquy] could also have resulted in conviction for either conspiracy to commit murder” or aiding and abetting murder.^[3] Id.

Mr. Jackson appealed the denial of his motion to vacate in 2002. (See dkt. no. 559.) The Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal. (See dkt. no. 567.) Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Jackson's requests to file a successive motion to vacate in 2006 and 2009. (See dkt. nos. 586, 591.) Mr. Jackson moved to reduce his sentence in 2011, ^[4] (see dkt. no. 592), but this Court denied that motion. (See dkt. no. 597.) The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's denial. (See dkt. nos. 598, 603.)

In his prior motions to vacate, Mr. Jackson did not argue that his § 924(c) convictions were based on invalid predicate offenses. The instant action raises that argument for the first time.

After the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), Mr. Jackson requested to file a successive § 2255 motion in 2016, based on Johnson. (See dkt. no. 617.) The Court granted a stay of his motion pursuant to the Court's Standing Order, (dkt. no. 624), which was issued in anticipation of many § 2255 petitions that would follow the Johnson decision. (Dkt. no. 618.) In 2020, the Court granted Mr. Jackson leave to file a successive § 2255 motion. (See dkt. no. 674; dkt. no. 675.) Subsequently, Mr. Jackson filed a memorandum in support of the instant motion on October 13, 2020. (See dkt. no. 683.)

II. Legal Standards

a. Motion to Vacate

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, courts may “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence on grounds that, inter alia, “the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, . . . or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Relief under § 2255 is available “only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)). To prevail on a § 2255 motion, a defendant “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982). This is because collateral challenges “are in ‘tension with society's strong interest in the finality of criminal convictions.'” See Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)). On a § 2255 motion, a defendant bears...