Jackson v. Vill. of Univ. Park

MAXINE JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF UNIVERSITY PARK, ILLINOIS,an Illinois Home Rule Municipality, Defendant.

No. 17 CV 2313

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

April 30, 2019

Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER¹

Plaintiff Maxine Jackson was the Director of Human Resources for defendant Village of University Park, Illinois ("Village"). Plaintiff filed suit alleging discrimination and harassment on the basis of her sex and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Doc. #1). In response to the complaint, defendant filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. #12). In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 1, 2017, we dismissed plaintiff's claim of sexual discrimination and harassment (Count I) and plaintiff's retaliation claim (Count II) insofar as it sought to allege retaliation based on plaintiff's actions regarding a golf course development. We allowed Count II to proceed based on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated from her position with the Village for her actions in opposing sexual harassment (Doc. #28). Discovery has concluded, and defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining retaliation claim (Doc. #50). The matter is fully briefed (See Docs. ##58, 64). For the reasons given below, we grant defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If the movant shows that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support their case, the nonmovant "must go beyond the pleadings (e.g., produce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions on file), to demonstrate that there is evidence upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict in her favor." Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, we "must view the facts and make all reasonable inferences that favor them in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). We do not "assess the credibility of witnesses, choose between competing reasonable inferences, or balance the relative weight of conflicting evidence." Stokes v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2010).

A court can deny summary judgment if the facts (as opposed to mere conclusions) asserted by the opposing party are supported by evidence and create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Johnson, 892 F.3d at 901. That standard does not change even if the only evidence submitted on a fact is the "self-serving" testimony of the opposing parties in affidavits or depositions. Id.; see also Widmar v. Sun Chemical Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 459-60 (7th Cir. 2014). "[A] district court may consider any evidence that would be admissible at trial. The evidence need not be admissible inform, but must be admissible in content, such that, for instance, affidavits may be considered if the substitution of oral testimony for the affidavit statements would make the evidence admissible at trial." Wheatley v. Factory Card & Party Outlet, 826 F.3d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) ("[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated").

That said, we must be mindful that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Moreover, mere speculation or conjecture is insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 107 F.3d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Likewise, a "mere scintilla of evidence" is also insufficient—on its own—to prove a genuine issue of material fact. Nat'l Inspection & Repairs, Inc. v. George S. May Int'l Co., 600 F.3d 878, 882 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Delta Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir.2009)). As the Seventh Circuit has admonished, summary judgment is a "put up or shut up" time in the litigation, Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F. 3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003), when a party opposing summary judgment must "wheel out all its artillery" to show that there is a viable case that should proceed to trial. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996).

II.

For purposes of this motion, we accept as true the following facts (unless we indicate a genuine dispute between the parties on a given factual assertion). Plaintiff was hired as the Director of Human Resources for the Village on May 18, 2015 by the then Village Manager Bola Delano(Doc. #52: Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 and Supporting Exhibits ¶2). The Village operates under a managerial form of government wherein the Village Manager is the administrative head of the municipality and has the power and duty to appoint, suspend and remove all employees unless otherwise provided by statute (Doc. #52 ¶5). The Mayor and Board of Trustees do not have the authority to hire and fire employees, as that is the responsibility of the Village Manager (Doc. #52 ¶ 6). Additionally, the Village Manager, not the Mayor or Board of Trustees, handles the day to day operations of the Village (Doc. #52 ¶ 7).

Ms. Jackson was hired by the Village for the position of Director of Human Resources, and served in that position until her termination on January 12, 2016 (Doc. #52 ¶¶ 1, 31). At some point during Ms. Jackson's employment with the Village, Ms. Delano went on administrative leave and Johnna Townsend became the Acting Village Manager and plaintiff's supervisor; Joseph E. Roudez and Keith J. Griffin were trustees of the Village ("Trustees") (Doc. #31: Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Compl. ¶ 6; Doc. #52 ¶¶ 18, 19).

Prior to Ms. Jackson's employment, the Village did not have a Department of Human Resources or Director of Human Resources, and there has not been a Department of Human Resources or Director of Human Resources since Ms. Jackson was terminated (Doc. #52 ¶¶ 8, 9). The position of Director of Human Resources for the Village was not codified; in addition, a department of human resources was never established by way of ordinance (Doc. #52 ¶ 33). Both before and after Plaintiff's termination, the Village Manager performed the job duties and responsibilities related to human resource operations (Doc. #52 ¶ 10).

Plaintiff alleges that her difficulties with the Village began in June 2015, when she accepted the resignation of a relative of Trustee Roudez (Doc. #1 ¶ 14). Soon thereafter, Trustee Roudez called Ms. Jackson and told her to "stay in her lane," at the same time informing her that he was"from the west side - the hood" (Doc. #52 ¶ 21).² After that phone call, Plaintiff contacted Village Manager Delano to tell her about the conversation because she felt threatened (the parties disagree about whether plaintiff also told the Mayor about the call, but that dispute is immaterial to our decision) (Doc. #56 ¶ 4). At some point between June and August 2015, both Trustees Roudez and Griffin appeared at Ms. Jackson's office and yelled and screamed about a different matter - the liaison to the Board who was being let go (Doc. #52 ¶ 22).

On October 22, 2015, while Ms. Jackson was moving offices with the assistance of Chief of Police John Pate, Ms. Jackson overheard Trustee Griffin say to Chief Pate (in reference to Ms. Jackson) "fuck that bitch," and "find a reason to arrest her ass" (Doc. #52 ¶ 23). Ms. Jackson reported this comment to Ms. Townsend by email on the same day. Plaintiff complained that she was "appalled by the behavior" of Trustee Griffin, and felt the comment was unprofessional and degrading (Doc. #52 ¶¶ 23, 24). She also complained that Trustee Griffin made other snide remarks; that disrespect and childish banter occurred during board meetings; and that when Ms. Jackson would greet the trustee with a "hello" he would not respond or acknowledge her (Doc. #52 ¶ 24). As should be clear from the foregoing, there is no dispute that Trustee Griffin disliked Ms. Jackson (Doc. #52 ¶ 34). The parties dispute whether Ms. Townsend ever took any action in response to this complaint (Doc. #63: Def.'s Answer to Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(c) Statement of Additional Facts Requiring the Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 9).

Between October 22, 2015, and her termination on January 12, 2016, certain duties were taken away from plaintiff and given to other employees (Doc. #56: Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(c) Statement of Additional Facts Requiring the Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 20). Plaintiff has offered noevidence as to the specific duties that were taken from her, and no evidence that this action affected her title, pay or other terms of employment. The parties dispute whether certain other events, occurred between October 22, 2015 and the end of the year. For example, they disagree about whether plaintiff made complaints to Ms. Townsend after October 22, 2015; whether on October 22, 2015, Trustee Griffin told Chief Pate it was time for plaintiff "to go;" and whether in late October 2015 or, at subsequent times, Ms. Townsend told plaintiff tha...