Jahn v. Farnsworth

33 F.Supp.3d 866

Steven C. JAHN, Plaintiff

v.William T. FARNSWORTH, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 13–11309.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed July 16, 2014.

Mark W. Hafeli, Hafeli, Staran & Christ, P.C., Sylvan Lake, MI, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth B. Chapie, Timothy J. Mullins, Giarmarco, Mullins & Horton, P.C., Troy, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NANCY G. EDMUNDS, District Judge.

Currently before the Court is Defendants William T. Farnsworth, Thomas L. Valko, Patricia L. Speilburg, and Marysville Public Schools' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is Steven C. Jahn, father and personal representative of the estate of Steven Jacob Jahn, deceased. Because Plaintiff has not shown that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to either his procedural due process claim or his substantive due process claim, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. Facts

This case is about the tragic suicide of Steven Jacob Jahn (Jake), a senior at Marysville High School in Marysville, Michigan. On Monday, March 19, 2012, Jake took his own life after a trying day at school where he was accused of, and admitted to, stealing a teacher's laptop. Defendants had suspended Jake for the theft and released Jake into his father's care. Several hours after Jake arrived home, Jake left his house without anyone's knowledge and drove his car into a concrete abutment, killing himself. The events leading up to Jake's suicide began on Friday, March 16, 2012.

On Friday, March 16, 2012, Kirk Smith, a teacher at Marysville High School, reported his laptop stolen. (Smith Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3.) Smith reported the theft to the superintendent, James Cain, and to the assistant superintendent, Patricia Speilburg. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Marysville High School's technology director notified Smith that the laptop's last activity on the network was at approximately 2:58 P.M. (Id. at ¶ 7.) The security footage of the area appeared to show Jake leaving the classroom shortly after the computer was logged off the network. (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 8.) Time stamp evidence shows Jake leaving the classroom 20–30 seconds after the computer was “woken up.” (Farnsworth Dep. at 7.) No other students were seen leaving the classroom after Jake, and Jake was the only person seen on the tape. (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 8.) Bill Farnsworth (Farnsworth), the high school's principal, and Tom Valko (Valko), the assistant principal, decided to bring Jake in for questioning on Monday, March 19, 2012. (Defs.' Mot. Ex. 15 at 1.)

Farnsworth and Valko met with Jake at approximately 11:00 A.M. on Monday, March 19, 2012. (Id. ) Farnsworth informed Jake that he was a suspect in the theft of the computer. (Id. ) Farnsworth informed Jake of the school's due process procedure and explained the video evidence they had against him. (Farnsworth Dep. at 7.) Jake initially told Farnsworth that he did not take the computer. (Id. at 8.) Farnsworth told Jake that since there was evidence indicating Jake stole the computer, the investigation would continue. (Id. ) Jake then informed Farnsworth that he knew who took the computer, and that he could get the computer back. (Id. ) Jake provided Farnsworth with the name of another student, and Farnsworth told Jake that the student would be brought in for questioning. (Id. ) Jake then admitted that he took the computer. (Id. ) After Jake admitted that he took the computer, Farnsworth testified that he told Jake that the consequences of the theft would be a ten-day suspension and a recommendation for a long-term suspension.¹ (Id. at 6.) Farnsworth and Valko then made a conference call to Jake's father, Steven C. Jahn (Mr. Jahn) in order to retrieve the computer. (Jahn Dep. at 27.) Jake told his father the exact location of the computer, which was in Jake's room. (Id. ) Mr. Jahn retrieved the laptop and took it to the high school. (Id. at 31.)

Mr. Jahn arrived at the school and met with Farnsworth, Valko, and Jake. (Id. ) The parties dispute what Defendants said in this meeting. Defendants allege that they told Jake and Mr. Jahn that they would suspend Jake for ten days with a recommendation that he be suspended for the rest of the school year. (Valko Dep. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that Valko and Farnsworth told Mr. Jahn that “Jake was ... suspended for the remainder of the school year, would be finishing his AP classes from home, and would not be allowed on school grounds for commencement, senior prom, or any other school function.” (Jahn Dep. at 42–43.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants told Jake that if he did not confess to other thefts, they would turn those cases over to the police and Jake would be the prime suspect. (Id. at 33.) Defendants also allegedly told Jake and Mr. Jahn that they would be forced to notify Michigan State University and Wayne State University, two colleges Jake had applied to, of the events that took place. (Id. at 40–42.)

Defendants insist they did not make those statements.

After Farnsworth and Valko's discussion with Mr. Jahn and Jake, Valko escorted Jake out of the building. On the way out, Jake became distraught and broke down. (Valko Dep. at 25.) Jake told Valko he was worried because his dad was very angry at him. (Id. at 26.) Valko told Jake, “Jake, It's not that he doesn't love you. He doesn't love what you did, you know, at this time, and you'll be fine.” (Id. ) Valko and Jake talked for a few more moments, then Jake shook Valko's hand and thanked him for not involving the police. (Id. at 26, 72.) After seeing Jake off, Valko told Mr. Jahn that Jake was upset, and that Mr. Jahn should keep an eye on Jake. (Id. ) Jake drove himself home and called Mr. Jahn from the driveway. (Jahn Dep. at 25–26.) Mr. Jahn arrived at the house at approximately 12:50 P.M., five minutes after the phone call from Jake. (Id. at 26.) From 12:50 P.M. until approximately 4:00 P.M., Jake was in the custody of either his father, or his grandfather, Clifford Jahn. (Id. at 47–50, 59–60, 63–64, 66.)

At some point between 4:00 P.M. and 4:30 P.M., Jake took the spare key to his car and drove away from the house without anyone's knowledge. (Id. at 68.) Mr. Jahn did not realize Jake was not in the house until approximately 5:20 P.M. (Id. at 67.) At approximately 5:00 P.M., a police officer was dispatched to the site of an automobile accident on I–69. (Defs.' Mot. Ex. 17, Police Report.) Witnesses to the accident reported that the vehicle drifted into the median and collided with a concrete pillar. (Id. ) The vehicle was on fire, and the driver did not get out of the car. (Id. ) The officer on the scene described the vehicle to Marysville police. (Pl.'s Resp. Ex. 15, Marysville Police Report.) The vehicle came back registered to the Jahn household, and police made contact with Mr. Jahn to inform him of the accident. (Id. ) The police told Mr. Jahn to call a detective in Lapeer County. (Jahn Dep. at 79.) Mr. Jahn did so, and the detective informed him that Jake was in a fatal automobile accident. The body was eventually identified as being Jake's, and his death was ruled a suicide. (Defs.' Mot. Ex. 19, Death Certificate.) Farnsworth called Mr. Jahn that night offering his condolences. (Jahn Dep. at 83.) Mr. Jahn told Farnsworth that he did not want to talk to him and that there was no reason for Farnsworth to ever call him again. (Id. at 83–84.)

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) Defendants violated Jake's procedural due process rights; (2) Defendants' negligence; (3) Defendants violated Jake's substantive due process rights; and (4) Defendants intentionally or recklessly inflicted emotional distress. (Compl. ¶¶ 37–90.) The Court dismissed the negligence and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress claims without prejudice. (Dkt. 11, Order of Dismissal as to Pl.'s State Law Claims.) At issue in this case are the two due process claims.

II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 56 summary judgment standard

The Sixth Circuit employs the familiar standard for summary judgment, namely, that summary judgment is proper when the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” U.S. SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ) (quotations omitted). When reviewing the record, “the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. Furthermore, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material, and summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

When considering the material facts on the record, a court must bear in mind that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Moreover, “[i]n order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must be able to show ‘sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [their] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.’ ” Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 605 (6th Cir.2008) (citing and quoting Lewis v. Philip Morris Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 533 (6th Cir.2004) ).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' actions violated Jake's procedural and substantive due process rights. Defendants argue that they afforded Jake all of the procedural due process to which he was entitled and that they did not violate his substantive due process rights because a cause of action does not exist when a person takes his own life. Because the Court finds that Jake received all the...