Jaiyeola v. Jaiyeola

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OMOLARA O. JAIYEOLA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GANIYU A. JAIYEOLA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 364963

Court of Appeals of Michigan

December 21, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Kent Circuit Court LC No. 22-002281-DM

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and RICK and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM

In this contested divorce, defendant, Ganiyu A. Jaiyeola, appeals by right the judgment of divorce. On appeal, defendant argues on his own behalf that the trial court erred in numerous respects. He maintains that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him; that the trial court should not have held the trial after he informed it that he would be unable to attend; that the trial court improperly considered evidence admitted in violation of MRE 408; that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to order plaintiff, Omolara O. Jaiyeola, to undergo a psychological examination; and that the trial court violated his right to due process in various ways. We conclude that defendant has not identified any errors that warrant relief. Accordingly we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

Plaintiff met defendant in their homeland, Nigeria. She was 53 years of age as of January 2023. Defendant was about 68 years of age. Plaintiff and defendant formally married in Nigeria in February 2007. They emigrated to the United States in 2009 and became citizens in 2017. Plaintiff and defendant have three boys.

Plaintiff worked as a nurse's aide and supported the family when they first came to the United States. She has since earned a Bachelor's degree in nursing, but she has not been able to pass the nursing examination.

Plaintiff testified that defendant became aggressive and disrespectful with her over the last few years before the divorce. Defendant informed her on a Thursday that he had taken a job with Apple in California. He moved to California on the next Monday in February 2022. Defendant also told her that he would be taking the two youngest children to live with him. After defendant informed her of these things, plaintiff decided to divorce defendant.

Defendant testified at a hearing that he had a Ph.D. in Material Science. He took the job with Apple, and his new salary was $195,000 a year. He also earned a $60,000 bonus.

Plaintiff sued for divorce in March 2022. The trial court held a one-day trial in January 2023. Defendant did not show for the trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court orally stated its findings and determinations. In relevant part, the trial court determined that it was in the children's best interests to award plaintiff sole legal and physical custody. The trial court entered a judgment of divorce, a uniform child support order, and a uniform spousal support order in February 2023.

Defendant appeals from the judgement of divorce. We affirm.

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant first argues that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him because it began conducting hearings even before he answered plaintiff's complaint. We review de novo whether a trial court had personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Yoost v Caspari, 295 Mich.App. 209, 219; 813 N.W.2d 783 (2012).

B. ANALYSIS

Before it could exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant, defendant had to have been served with process sufficient to give him fair notice of the divorce proceedings, and there had to be sufficient contacts with this state to make it permissible for the state to extend its judicial power over him. See Fitzwater v Fitzwater, 97 Mich.App. 92, 97; 294 N.W.2d 249 (1980). The evidence showed that defendant maintained a domicile in this state while married to plaintiff before moving to California. Defendant also admitted that he returned to that domicile on trips from California. That relationship was sufficient to warrant the exercise of long-arm personal jurisdiction. See MCL 600.705(7). Accordingly, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant once defendant was served with the summons and complaint. See Lowe v Lowe, 107 Mich.App. 325, 328-329; 309 N.W.2d 254 (1981).

There was also record evidence that a process server served defendant with plaintiff's summons and complaint during one of defendant's visits to Michigan. Although defendant's son answered the door, the process server indicated that defendant appeared at the top of some stairs, and after the process server asked him if he was defendant, defendant stated that he was refusing the papers and yelled at his son not to accept the papers. The process server then identified the documents as court papers, dropped them on the floor, and informed defendant that he had been served. The trial court did not rule on the adequacy of this service. The service was sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over defendant, however, because the process server had adequate assurances that defendant was the person to be served, he identified the documents as court papers, he left the papers within defendant's control, and he informed defendant that he had been served.

See Barclay v Crown Bldg and Dev, Inc, 241 Mich.App. 639, 646-650; 617 N.W.2d 373 (2000) (holding that the party served does not have to accept service of process-it is enough that the process server leaves the summons and complaint in the party's control after identifying the documents).

In any event, defendant specifically stipulated that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him for "all issues in this divorce case" when he signed the order setting aside his default. By stipulating to entry of an order setting aside the default with the agreement that the court had personal jurisdiction, defendant made a general appearance that waived any purported defect in the service of process. See Ragnone v Wirsing, 141 Mich.App. 263, 265; 367 N.W.2d 369 (1985) (stating that a party makes a general appearance when he or she demonstrates knowledge of the proceedings and expresses an intent to appear). Contrary to defendant's contention, the filing of an answer is not the only manner for making a general appearance. See id.

In sum, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant.

III. DUE PROCESS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We next address defendant's claim that the trial court deprived him of due process in various ways. We review de novo whether a party received due process of law. See Reed v Reed, 265 Mich.App. 131, 157; 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005). We review de novo the proper interpretation of law. See Martin v Martin, 331 Mich.App. 224, 244; 952 N.W.2d 530 (2020). We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision whether to adjourn a trial. See Pugno v Blue Harvest Farms LLC, 326 Mich.App. 1, 27; 930 N.W.2d 393 (2018). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Id.

B. ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court denied him due process by refusing to adjourn trial after he gave the court notice that he would not be attending. Due process generally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker. See Souden v Souden, 303 Mich.App. 406, 413; 844 N.W.2d 151 (2013). The record demonstrates that defendant knew about the trial date and chose not to attend. Nevertheless, he argues that the trial court's failure to adjourn the trial date deprived him of due process. Accordingly, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to adjourn the trial.

Defendant was not automatically entitled to adjourn the trial. Rather, he had to request the adjournment by motion and had to demonstrate good cause for the adjournment. See MCR 2.503(B)(1); Pugno, 326 Mich.App. at 28. Good cause means a legally sufficient or substantial reason for acting. See In re Utrera, 281 Mich.App. 1, 10-11; 761 N.W.2d 253 (2008).

On January 4, 2023, the trial court entered an amended scheduling order setting the trial for January 9, 2023. The trial court had already notified the parties of that date, however, on the record at the hearing held in October 2022. Accordingly, defendant had months to prepare for trial and to make his travel plans.

Defendant prepared and signed a motion to adjourn the trial on January 6, 2023. He relied on a declaration of a weather emergency in California that the state issued on January 4, 2023. He then mailed the motion to the circuit court, but it did not arrive in Michigan and get entered by the circuit court's clerk until after the trial court had already started to hear testimony.

Defendant did not send his motion to adjourn on the date the state of California declared a weather emergency, but instead waited two days to send it. He first e-mailed the trial court's clerk, who responded that he needed to seek relief by motion. In his motion, he did not present any evidence concerning the actual weather conditions in his area and did not identify whether, or in what way, the weather conditions made it unsafe for him to travel. He did not identify the mode of travel that he had planned to use. Additionally, he did not establish that the state of emergency persisted from January 4 through January 9, 2023, such that he could not make a timely appearance through alternate means. Indeed, he did not even seek to participate remotely. Rather, he merely informed the court that he would not be appearing, with the apparent expectation that the court would adjourn to accommodate him. Defendant not only made an untimely motion to adjourn, he also failed to support his motion and establish good cause to adjourn. See MCR 2.503(B)(1). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to adjourn the trial when defendant did not appear. See Pugno, 326 Mich.App. at 27.

Under these circumstances, the decision to proceed...