Jaiyeola v. Rivian

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GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA, Plaintiff, v. RIVIAN, Defendant.

No. 22-cv-03982-BLF

United States District Court, N.D. California, San Jose Division

August 1, 2023

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [RE ECF NO. 29]

BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge

In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola alleges that Defendant Rivian Automotive, LLC (Rivian) did not hire him because of his race, color, and national origin. Jaiyeola asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”).

Before the Court is Rivian's Motion to Dismiss. Mot., ECF No 29; see also Reply, ECF No. 34. Rivian moves to dismiss Jaiyeola's Title VII claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) for improper venue and his ELCRA claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Jaiyeola opposes. Opp'n ECF No. 30. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds the matter suitable for submission without oral argument.

For the reasons that follow, Rivian's motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FILING IN A DISTRICT WHERE VENUE IS PROPER.

I. BACKGROUND

Jaiyeola applied for a materials engineering position with Rivian on April 27, 2020. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 24. Over the next several months, Rivian interviewed Jaiyeola for the position by Zoom and phone call. Id. ¶¶ 7-19. Rivian informed Jaiyeola on June 24, 2020, that he would not be hired. Id. ¶ 20. Jaiyeola asserts that Rivian did not hire him because he is black, African American, and of Nigerian national origin. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 37.

On August 17, 2020, Jaiyeola filed charges with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights (MDCR) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that he was not hired because of his race and national origin. Id. ¶ 23; see also Jaiyeola Decl. Ex. H (“MDCR-EEOC Compl.”), ECF No. 24-2.

The MDCR dismissed Jaiyeola's charge on December 22, 2021, determining that there was insufficient evidence to proceed. FAC ¶ 24. The EEOC issued Jaiyeola a notice of right to sue on April 12, 2022. Id. ¶ 25.

Jaiyeola filed this action on July 7, 2022, alleging that Rivian violated Title VII and the ELCRA. Compl., ECF No. 1. The Court dismissed Jaiyeola's complaint because Jaiyeola had not established that this Court was a proper venue for his Title VII claim and because Jaiyeola had failed to plausibly allege an ELCRA violation. Order, ECF No. 23.

Jaiyeola filed his FAC on March 7, 2023, realleging both of his claims. FAC ¶¶ 32-41. Rivian moves to dismiss both claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue Under Rule 12(b)(3)

A defense of improper venue may be raised by motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). When venue is improper, the court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that venue is proper. See Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Plaintiff had the burden of showing that venue was properly laid in the Northern District of California.”). “When the plaintiff asserts multiple claims, it must establish that venue is proper as to each claim.” Kaia Foods, Inc. v. Bellafiore, 70 F.Supp.3d 1178, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 2014). “However, where venue exists for the principal claim, federal courts will also adjudicate closely related claims, even if there is no independent source of venue for the related claims.” Id.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, “the allegations in the complaint need not be accepted as true and the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings.” eBay Inc. v. Digital Point Sols., Inc., 608 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Murphy v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004)). Whether to dismiss for improper venue, or alternatively to transfer venue to a proper court, is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court. King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(1)

A party may challenge the Court's subject matter jurisdiction by bringing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

In a facial attack, the movant asserts that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is apparent from the face of the complaint. Id.

In a factual attack, the movant disputes the truth of allegations that otherwise would give rise to federal jurisdiction. Id. “In resolving a factual attack on jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id. “The court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Id. Once the moving party has presented evidence demonstrating the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the party opposing the motion must present affidavits or other evidence sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Id. “However, in the absence of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing, disputes in the facts pertinent to subject-matter are viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d 705, 710 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff'd, 572 Fed.Appx. 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1996)). “The disputed facts related to subject-matter jurisdiction should be treated in the same way as one would adjudicate a motion for summary judgment.” In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d at 710 (citing Dreier, 106 F.3d at 847).

III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Before turning to the merits, the Court addresses Rivian's requests for judicial notice. A court “may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute” because it “is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201. These documents of which Rivian asks the Court to take judicial notice can be broken into two categories: (1) court filings and (2) a public website.

First, Rivian asks the Court to take judicial notice of certain court filings. See Mot. RJN Exs. A-C; Reply RJN Exs. A-B. “A court may . . . take judicial notice of the existence of another court's opinion or of the filing of pleadings in related proceedings; the Court may not, however, accept as true the facts found or alleged in such documents.” GemCap Lending, LLC v. Quarles & Brady, LLP, 269 F.Supp.3d 1007, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of these court filings but does not take judicial notice of the facts within them. For example, the Court takes judicial notice of the claims asserted in the complaint filed in the Western District of Michigan. The Court does not, however, take judicial notice of any facts in these documents-including statements Jaiyeola may have made about his residence or employment. See Reynoso v. Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co., No. 03:13-CV-01600-HZ, 2013 WL 6919666, *5 (D. Or. Dec. 31, 2013) (“[T]he court may not take judicial notice of facts presented in [documents filed in another case] or in court opinions for the purpose of establishing those facts in the case currently before it.” (citing Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003))). However, the Court does take judicial notice of Plaintiff's own representations to the various courts of his residence address.

Second, Rivian asks the Court to take judicial notice of a screenshot of a LinkedIn page. Mot. RJN, ECF No. 29-2; Reply RJN, ECF No. 34-1. Rivian cites this screenshot to establish Jaiyeola's location and employment. The Court denies Rivian's request that the Court take judicial notice of these facts based on this screenshot. McGucken v. Lonely Planet Glob., Inc., No. CV 22-5476-DMG (SKX), 2023 WL 4206107, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2023) (denying request to take judicial notice location of witnesses based on LinkedIn pages where the pages' accuracy had not been established).

IV. DISCUSSION

Rivian moves to dismiss both of Jaiyeola's claims. Rivian argues that the Court should dismiss Jaiyeola's Title VII claim because Jaiyeola has not alleged or otherwise established that venue is proper in this District under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Rivian argues that the Court should dismiss Jaiyeola's ELCRA claim because Jaiyeola has not established diversity jurisdiction and the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim.

A. Title VII Claim

Rivian moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) to dismiss Jaiyeola's Title VII claim for improper venue. See Mot. 5. Rivian argues that the claim should be dismissed because Jaiyeola has not alleged facts demonstrating Title VII venue in this Court. See id.

Jaiyeola does not dispute that he has not addressed these deficiencies. See Opp'n 2. Nor does his briefing point to any new evidence that would establish that venue is proper in this Court.

Accordingly for the reasons provided in this Court's order on Rivian's prior motion to dismiss (Order, ECF No. 23), Rivian's motion to dismiss Jaiyeola's Title VII claim for improper venue is GRANTED. Jaiyeola has now failed to plead or provide evidence supporting venue in this District multiple times. Jaiyeola's Title VII claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to...