James Ly v. Lesenskyj

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JAMES LY and NGA LAM, Plaintiffs, v. GEORGE LESENSKYJ, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17-2203 (ZNQ) (TJB)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

March 13, 2023

REVISED MEMORANDUM OPINION

QURAISHI, DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court upon Third-Party Defendant Bay Dreamer LLC's (“Bay Dreamer”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 78) and Defendant George Lesenskyj's (“Lesenskyj”) Motion for Summary Judgment and to Exclude Irrelevant and Prejudicial Evidence (ECF No. 85).^[1]Plaintiffs James Ly (“Ly”) and Nga Lam (collectively “Plaintiffs”) opposed both motions (ECF Nos. 79, 90), and Bay Dreamer replied (ECF Nos 83). After careful consideration of the Parties' submissions, the Court decides the Parties' Motions without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons outlined below, the Court denies both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court recites only the uncontested facts necessary to contextualize the present motions. On July 10, 2016, Ly rented a fifteen-foot skiff from Bay Dreamer.^[2](Bay Dreamer's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 78; Pls.' Responsive Statement of Material Facts (“RSMF”) to Bay Dreamer ¶ 2, ECF No. 79-2; Lesenskyj's SUMF ¶ 3, ECF No. 89; Pls.' RSMF to Lesenskyj ¶ 3, ECF No. 90-1.) Ly rented the skiff for purposes of fishing the Oyster Creek Channel with Phillip Kang (“Kang”) and Dr. Joshua Liao (“Liao”). (See Bay Dreamer's SUMF ¶¶ 4-6; Pls.' RSMF to Bay Dreamer ¶¶ 4-6.) Ly and Kang were not related and were “fishing buddies.” (Lesenskyj's SUMF ¶ 2; Pls.' RSMF to Lesenskyj ¶ 2.)

On July 10, 2016, Lesenskyj was operating a “twin outboard 36' Concept center console vessel with . . . 600 horsepower” in the Oyster Creek Channel. (See Bay Dreamer's SUMF ¶ 7; Pls.' RSMF to Bay Dreamer ¶ 7.) At approximately 2:23 p.m., Lesenskyj's vessel collided with Ly's rented skiff. (Bay Dreamer's SUMF ¶ 1; Pls.' RSMF to Bay Dreamer ¶ 1.) Lesenskyj's vessel struck the skiff at the port stern, where Kang was seated. (Bay Dreamer's SUMF ¶¶ 4, 11; Pls.' RSMF to Bay Dreamer ¶¶ 4, 11.) Tragically, Kang died as a result of the collision. (Bay Dreamer's Moving Br. 30, ECF No. 78.) At no point prior to the collision was any sound device used by either Lesenskyj or anyone on Ly's rented skiff to avoid a collision. (See Bay Dreamers' SUMF ¶¶ 18, 28; Pls.' RSMF to Bay Dreamer ¶¶ 18, 28.)

All other relevant or material facts in this matter are contested and will be recited where applicable in the Court's analysis below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v. County. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine dispute of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). “[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.

Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine dispute as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (setting forth types of evidence on which nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion that genuine disputes of material fact exist). “[U]nsupported allegations in . . . pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990). If the nonmoving party has failed “to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, . . . there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] of material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine dispute for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The summary judgment standard, however, does not operate in a vacuum. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.

III. DISCUSSION

For the reasons outlined below, the Court denies both Bay Dreamer and Lesenskyj's Motions for Summary Judgment.

A. Bay Dreamer's Motion for Summary Judgment

“An action arising out of a collision between two pleasure boats on navigable waters clearly falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts.” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Pansy F. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 672 (1982). In this case, Ly's rented skiff and Lesenskyj's boat were both pleasure boats that collided on navigable waters. (Pls.' RSMF to Bay Dreamer ¶¶ 2, 7.) As such, this case falls squarely within this Court's federal admiralty jurisdiction. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 627 (3d Cir. 1994).

“Whether a state law may provide a rule of decision in an admiralty case depends on whether the state rule ‘conflicts' with the substantive principles of federal admiralty law.” Id. As there is no well-defined federal maritime standard for negligence, “no conflict between New Jersey's common law of negligence and [any] federal maritime law of negligence” exists, and the Court applies New Jersey's negligence standard to this action. DiNenno v. Lucky Fin Water Sports, LLC, 837 F.Supp.2d 419, 427 (D.N.J. 2011); see also Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 627 (finding “[i]n the field of . . . maritime torts, the National Government has left much regulatory power in the States” and “state law can, and often does, provide the relevant rule of decision in admiralty cases” (citation omitted)). In New Jersey, “[i]n order to sustain a common law cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff must prove four core elements: (1) a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual damages.” DiNenno, 837 F.Supp.2d at 427 (citation omitted).

Bay Dreamer moves for Summary Judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs cannot establish their negligence claims against it. (See generally Bay Dreamer's Moving Br.) In relevant part for the Court's consideration, Bay Dreamer argues that any alleged failure by it to provide a whistle onboard the fifteen-foot skiff it rented to Ly “cannot be a proximate cause of the collision” and, therefore, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claim against it. (See id. at 4-5.)

1. The Pennsylvania Rule

The Court's analysis in resolving this motion centers on the applicability of the admiralty rule known as the “Pennsylvania Rule.” The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1873); Complaint of Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 F.3d 105, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1996) (setting forth the application of the Pennsylvania Rule in modern-day Third Circuit jurisprudence). The Pennsylvania Rule establishes that a plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of cause in a negligence action where “a ship at the time of a collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions.” Complaint of Nautilus, 85 F.3d at 113. The Pennsylvania Rule, if established, shifts the burden to a ship to show “not merely that [her] fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been.” Id. Here, the “ship” is the rental skiff Bay Dreamer provided Ly, and the question is whether its alleged violation of 33 C.F.R. § 83, et seq. (the “Inland Rules”) allows Plaintiffs to gain the Pennsylvania Rule's presumption of cause against Bay Dreamer.

The test as to whether to apply the Pennsylvania Rule's presumption of cause is threefold: First, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a mandatory duty occurred. Complaint of Nautilus, 85 F.3d at 114. Second, the statute or regulation violated must involve marine safety or navigation. Id. And third, the injury suffered must be of a nature that the statute or regulation was intended to prevent. Id. Here, Plaintiffs direct this Court's attention to Inland Rule 33 as the Rule Bay Dreamer's rental skiff allegedly violated it. 33 C.F.R. § 83.33. Inland Rule 33 provides a mandatory duty, stating “[a] vessel of less than 12 meters . . . shall be provided with some . . . means of making an efficient sound signal.” Id.

Bay Dreamer asserts its boat did not violate Inland Rule 33 where it provided a whistle that would satisfy the regulation. (See Bay Dreamer's SUMF ¶¶ 25-27 (citing testimony that each Bay Dreamer rental boat “has a whistle,” that Bay Dreamer...