James v. Am. Airlines, Inc.

247 F.Supp.3d 297

Alecia JAMES, Plaintiff,

v.AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

16–CV–674 (PKC) (PK)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 31, 2017

Alecia James, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.

David Scott Rutherford, L. Diana Mulderig, Rutherford & Christie, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Alecia James filed this action seeking nominal damages and injunctive relief based on alleged racial discrimination against her by Defendant American Airlines, Inc. ("American") while she was a passenger on an airplane operated by American. James, a black woman, alleges that she was the subject of racial discrimination when, in response to an altercation between James and another passenger on the flight, an American flight attendant admonished James and threatened to remove her from the plane if she continued cursing. James asserts claims against American under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (" Section 1981"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a), and N.Y.S. Executive Law, Article 15 (Human Rights) ("NYHRL").

Before the Court is American's motion to dismiss this action in its entirety. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants American's motion as to all of James's claims except her Section 1981 and NYHRL clams.

I. Background

A. Facts¹

On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff Alecia James, a black woman, took an American Airlines flight from Las Vegas to New York. (Dkt. 15–1 at 3; Dkt. 24 ¶ 4.) A few minutes after James boarded the plane, a white woman sitting in the seat behind James began violently banging and pounding the back of James's seat. (Dkt. 24 ¶ 4.) James asked the woman to stop, but the woman continued to bang and pound on the back of James's seat. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5.) James pleaded with the passenger to stop, but she did not, which "led to words being exchanged." (Id. ¶ 5.)

No flight attendants were present to observe this interaction between James and the other passenger. (Id. ¶ 6.) A few minutes later, as a flight attendant was passing James's seat, James told the flight attendant that she (James) was being "antagonized and attacked" by the passenger behind her. (Id. ¶ 7.) James requested a new seat, and the flight attendant complied, reassigning James to a new seat in a different aisle. (Id. )

After James had been seated in her new seat for about ten minutes, two flight attendants came over. (Id. ¶ 8.) In a voice loud enough for other passengers to hear, one of the flight attendants told James that she would be removed from the flight "if [she] continued cursing." (Id. ) The flight attendant told James that this message was coming from the pilot of the plane. (Id. ) Neither the pilot, nor any flight attendant or any other American employee, admonished in any way the white woman who had banged and pounded on James's seat. (Id. ¶ 10.)

James was perplexed by how American had treated her. (Id. ¶ 9.) She did not understand why she had been singled out for public humiliation and a threat of removal from the plane, when James had not cursed at anyone around her in the new seat. (Id. ) Other passengers also expressed their surprise and confusion about how American had singled James out. (Id. ) Bereft of any other explanation, James concluded that American had publicly admonished her and threatened to remove her from the plane because she was black. (Id. ¶ 11.)

James alleges that she suffered "severe emotional distress" as a result of this event. (Dkt. 15–1 at 4.) Further, James alleges that "[g]iven [American's] known history of prejudice towards me, it's likely that I'll be discriminated again if I travel aboard their carriers." (Id. )

B. Procedural History

Four days after the incident, on August 21, 2015, James filed a verified complaint with the NYSDHR charging American with an unlawful discriminatory practice relating to public accommodation because of race or color in violation of New York Executive Law, Article 15 (Human Rights Law). After an investigation by the NYSDHR, which included written submissions to the NYSDHR and at least one conference, the NYSDHR issued its Determination, dated December 30, 2015, in which the Division held that "there is no probable cause to believe that [American] has engaged in or is engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practice complained of," and dismissed the complaint on that basis. (Dkt. 20–2.)² The Determination notified the parties that "any party to this proceeding may appeal this Determination to the New York State Supreme Court in the County wherein the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice took place." (Dkt. 20–2.)

On February 5, 2016, plaintiff commenced this action. (Dkt. 1.) The original complaint asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a based on the circumstances described above. (Dkt. 1–1 at 2.) Following a motion to dismiss by American, James filed an amended complaint (Dkt. 15–1), which is now the operative complaint in this action. In her amended complaint, James asserts claims of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ( Section 1981 ), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a ("Title II"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"), 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a), and N.Y.S. Executive Law, Article 15 (Human Rights Law) (NYSHRL). James does not allege any damages, but instead requests "[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief as the court sees fit," "sanction[s] for [American's] discriminatory practices," and indemnification for her filing and litigation costs. (Dkt. 15–1 at 5.) American moves under Fed. R Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim.

II. Legal Standard

To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead facts sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The liberal notice pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) only requires that a complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint need not set forth "detailed factual allegations," but the plaintiff must present "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. In evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enter., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006). Furthermore, and of particular relevance here, "the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. " Smith v. Levine , 510 Fed.Appx. 17, 20 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) ) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); Triestman , 470 F.3d at 474–75 (noting that this "well-established" "policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the understanding that ‘[i]mplicit in the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training’ " (quoting Traguth v. Zuck , 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) )).

III. Analysis

A. Res Judicata

As a threshold matter, American contends that all of James's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (Def.'s Br. 22.) American argues that the NYSDHR's finding of "no probable cause" in James's administrative proceeding against American (Dkt. 20–2) precludes James from pursuing discrimination claims in this Court based on the same facts that served as the basis for her administrative proceeding. (Def.'s Br. 22.)

The standards for giving preclusive effect to an administrative determination are well established. The Supreme Court has held that, "when a state agency acting in a judicial capacity resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts." Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott , 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). In New York, preclusive effect is given to an administrative determination if (i) the determination is "quasi-judicial," (ii) "the issue sought to be precluded is identical to a material issue necessarily decided by the administrative agency in a prior proceeding," and (iii) "there was a full and fair opportunity to contest this issue in the administrative tribunal." Jeffreys v. Griffin , 1 N.Y.3d 34, 769 N.Y.S.2d 184, 801 N.E.2d 404, 407 (2003). The party asking for application of preclusion "must show identity of the issue, while the opponent must demonstrate the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate." Id.

There is little question that the NYSDHR is a quasi-judicial agency whose determinations may, in some circumstances, carry preclusive effect. See, e.g. , Peguero–Miles v. City Univ. of N.Y. , 13 Civ. 1636, 2015 WL 4092336, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (citing DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr. , 821 F.2d 111, 117–18 (2d Cir. 1987) ). And James does not dispute that the fundamental issue disputed in her NYSDHR proceeding—i.e. , whether she was the subject of intentional race discrimination by American employees—is identical to her claims in this action. (Def.'s Br. 22; Pl.'s Br. 3–5.) The only question for purposes of preclusion, therefore, is whether James had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate her discrimination claim before the NYSDHR.

When evaluating whether an unreviewed decision by the NYSDHR afforded a plaintiff a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate her claims, courts in New York consider "the...