James v. Dir., TDCJ-CID

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CEDRIC LAVON JAMES, #2165296 v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID

Civil Action No. 2:19cv144

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Marshall Division

August 1, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ROY S PAYNE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Cedric Lavon James, a prisoner within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice proceeding pro se, filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a Harrison County conviction. The petition was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the petition.

I. Procedural Background

On January 23, 2018, after the jury found him guilty, James was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for one count of evading arrest using a vehicle, (Dkt. #13, pg. Id. #676). His punishment was enhanced due to James's prior conviction for indecency with a child, to which he pleaded “true.” Id.

James filed a direct appeal, and the Sixth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a written opinion on July 21, 2018. James v. State, 555 S.W.3d 254 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2018, pet. dism'd). In affirming James's conviction and sentence, the appellate court found that the (1) trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of an extraneous offense that James evaded arrest twenty days prior to the charged crime as evidence of modus operandi; (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an extraneous offense as its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and (3) if the court did err, admitting evidence that James was a registered sex offender did not harm him. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed James's petition for discretionary review as untimely.

James filed a state habeas application on January 8, 2019, (Dkt. #13, pg. Id. #726). On February 20, 2019, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his application without written order. Id. at pg. Id. #660. James filed this federal habeas proceeding on April 9, 2019, pursuant to the mailbox rule.

II. James's Federal Petition

James raises a variety of claims in his federal petition. Specifically, he maintains that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) file a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence; (2) object to irrelevant evidence and hearsay; (3) object to the prosecutor's improper statements; (4) investigate the officer's testimony concerning a positive identification; and (5) object to the warrant with an incorrect date.

He further claims that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when (1) the evidence admitted was prejudicial, circumstantial, and inflammatory; (2) the State produced no tape or evidence; (3) the evidence was misleading; and (4) the use of a prior, alleged evading arrest incident was prejudicial. Finally, James maintains that the evidence against him was insufficient to support a conviction because there was no videotape, hearsay was used, he was arrested days later, and the witness was unreliable. James seeks a court order reversing his conviction and/or a new trial.

III. Respondent's Answer and James's Reply

After being ordered to do so, Respondent filed an answer addressing James's federal petition, (Dkt. #12). Respondent argues that several of James's claims are unexhausted and procedurally barred. Moreover, Respondent maintains that his exhausted claims are without merit-and that James failed to demonstrate that the state court's rejection of his claims was unreasonable or contrary to federal law.

James filed a reply, (Dkt. #18). He articulates that the State is “malicious” in its attempt to rely on the procedural bar, as the State is trying to prevent his claims from being addressed because the State is not interested in the Constitution. He also asserts that he is actually innocent and that appellate counsel was ineffective.

IV. Standard of Review

1. Federal Habeas Review

The role of federal courts in reviewing habeas petitions filed by state prisoners is exceedingly narrow. A prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus review must assert a violation of a federal constitutional right; federal relief is unavailable to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, or procedural law unless a federal issue is also present. See Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 503 F.3d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (“We first note that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'”) (internal citation omitted). When reviewing state proceedings, a federal court will not act as a “super state supreme court” to review error under state law. Wood v. Quarterman, 503 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 2007).

Federal habeas review of state court proceedings is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. Under the AEDPA, which imposed several habeas corpus reforms, a petitioner who is in custody “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2. resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings,” which demands that federal courts give state court decisions “the benefit of the doubt.” See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal citations omitted); see also Cardenas v. Stephens, 820 F.3d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Federal review under the AEDPA is therefore highly deferential: The question is not whether we, in our independent judgment, believe that the state court reached the wrong result. Rather, we ask only whether the state court's judgment was so obviously incorrect as to be an objectively unreasonable resolution of the claim.”). Given the highly deferential standard, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness and a petitioner can only overcome that burden through clear and convincing evidence. Reed v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 465, 490 (5th Cir. 2007).

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To show that trial counsel was ineffective, James must demonstrate both deficient performance and ensuing prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In evaluating whether an attorney's conduct was deficient, the question becomes whether the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on “prevailing norms of practice.” See Loden v. McCarty, 778 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2016).

Moreover, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that-absent counsel's deficient performance-the outcome or result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.; see also Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 773 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)). It is well-settled that a “reasonable probability” is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Importantly, the petitioner alleging ineffective assistance must show both deficient performance and prejudice. See Charles v. Stephens, 736 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A failure to establish either element is fatal to a petitioner's claim.”) (internal citation omitted). Given the already highly deferential standard under the AEDPA, establishing a state court's application whether counsel was ineffective “is all the more difficult.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011); see also Charles, 736 F.3d at 389 (“Both the Strickland standard and the AEDPA standard are highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

V. Discussion and Analysis

As an initial matter, Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts states that a habeas petition must:

(1) specify all of the grounds of relief available to the petitioner; (2) state the facts supporting each ground; (3) state the relief requested; (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten; and (5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. §2242.

Petitioner James's petition and “supplemental facts,” (Dkt. #9), largely do not comply with Rule 2(c) because his claims are conclusory and vague.

A. Exhaustion and the Procedural Bar

Nonetheless, first, Respondent maintains that several of James's claims are both unexhausted and procedurally barred. Specifically, it argues that James failed to exhaust the following claims: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the warrant; (3) the evidence was insufficient for lack of a videotape; (4) the evidence was lacking because only hearsay was offered to support the conviction; (5) he was arrested days after the incident; and (6) the conviction stemmed from an unreliable witness.

State prisoners filing petitions for a writ of habeas corpus are required to exhaust their state remedies before proceeding to federal court unless “there is an absence of available State corrective process” or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (emphasis added). In order to satisfy this...