James v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York

471 F.Supp.2d 226

Julia JAMES, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, Defendant.

No. 01CV1106(RJD)(VVP).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

January 25, 2007.

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Julia James, Brooklyn, New York, Plaintiff pro se.

Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, New York, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DEARIE, District Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action against her former employer, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ("New York Fed"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"). Defendant moved under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the complaint, and under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to strike plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. In a Memorandum & Order dated August 8, 2005, 2005 WL 1889859, the Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss with regard to plaintiff's allegations of retaliation for her sex discrimination claim under Title VII and for her ADA claim, reserved judgment on plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, and granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's other claims. Defendant then moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Rule 6.3 of the Local Rules of the United States District. Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, seeking reconsideration of the Court's denial of its motion to dismiss. On October 18, 2006, in a second Memorandum & Order, the Court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. The Court now vacates its Memorandum & Order of October 18, 2006, grants defendant's motion for reconsideration, and affirms its Memorandum & Order of August 8, 2005 granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case is set forth in this Court's August 8, 2005 Memorandum & Order. The Court now states only the facts necessary for disposition of this motion. Plaintiff Julia James worked for the New York Fed from 1970 until her termination on February 23, 2001. During and subsequent to her employment, plaintiff asserted various claims of employment discrimination and retaliation in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charges dated November 13, 2000, February 8, 2001, and April 20, 2001, as well as in a discrimination complaint filed with defendant's human rights office on March 7, 2000. Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Exs. 2-4; Amend. Compl. ¶ 20. After receiving right to sue letters from the EEOC, plaintiff commenced this action.

Defendant moved under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss plaintiff's claims, and under Rule 12(f) to strike plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. In its August 8, 2005 Memorandum & Order, the Court granted defendant's motions to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims except those for retaliation pursuant to Title VII and the ADA. Defendant subsequently moved for reconsideration of the Timeliness section of the Memorandum & Order, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Rule 6.3 of the Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the Court incorrectly applied the longer of two limitations periods within which a claimant must file charges with the EEOC, and that under the correct, shorter limitations period, plaintiff's claims are time-barred. Under Title VII, the longer period of 300 days applies where "the person aggrieved has initially, instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice," and the shorter, 180-day period applies in all other cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Defendant argues that the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"), which enforces state and local anti-discrimination laws, lacks the "authority to grant or seek relief' from the practices in which defendant is alleged to have engaged. Specifically, defendant argues that it is a federal instrumentality, immune from state regulation unless such regulation is expressly authorized by Congress, and that state and local laws regulating employment practices are preempted by the Federal Reserve Act ("FRA").

A. Reconsideration

The reviewing standard for a motion for reconsideration "is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or [facts] that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995). "[On a Rule 6.3 motion,] a party may not advance new facts, issues, or arguments, not previously presented to the Court." Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stroh Cos., 265 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Polsby v. St. Martin's Press, No. 97 Civ. 690, 2000 WL 98057, at *1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 596, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "It is well-settled that Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a `second bite at the apple' ...." Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998).

The crux of defendant's argument for reconsideration is that in holding that defendant was subject to NYSDHR jurisdiction, the Court overlooked the existence of conflicts between Title VII and the ADA, on one hand, and the NYSHRL, on the other. Although there was discussion at oral argument of the conflicts alleged to exist between federal and state employment law, those alleged conflicts were not addressed in the Court's August 8, 2005 Memorandum & Order. Defendant therefore is entitled to reconsideration of the preemption issue to which such conflicts would be relevant. Likewise, although defendant briefed the question whether it is a federal instrumentality presumptively immunized against state regulation of its employment practices, this issue was not fully addressed in the August 8, 2005 Memorandum & Order. Defendant therefore is entitled to reconsideration of this issue, as well.

B. Timeliness

Defendant argues that because more than 180 days elapsed between the alleged discriminatory conduct and plaintiff's initial EEOC filing, plaintiff's action is untimely. The 180-day time limit applies, according to defendant, because the NYSDHR lacks jurisdiction over the New York Fed, and therefore has no "authority to grant or seek relief" from the conduct alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff responds that the Court must apply the 300-day time limit, and that her action therefore is timely. Defendant is correct that the 300-day time limit applies to plaintiff's case only if the NYSDHR has jurisdiction over the New York Fed.

Under Title VII, the time limit for filing an EEOC charge is 180 days, except that a 300-day limit applies "in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Federal regulations narrow the exception, providing that the 300-day limit applies only where the state agency has subject matter jurisdiction over the charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(2). The elements of an EEOC charge include not only the nature of the challenged conduct, but also the identity of the defendant. Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 566 (2d Cir.2006) (interpreting 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.3, 1626.6, 1626.8). Where a state agency lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the charge, the 180-day limit applies, as if the agency did not exist: "A jurisdiction having a [fair employment practices] agency without subject matter jurisdiction over a charge (e.g., an agency which does not cover sex discrimination or does not cover nonprofit organizations) is equivalent to a jurisdiction having no [fair employment practices] agency." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a)(2).

Accordingly, the Second Circuit has held that although the State of New York has a fair employment practices agency, the NYSDHR, where the NYSDHR lacks jurisdiction over a defendant in an employment discrimination case, the 180-day time limit applies, as if the NYSDHR did not exist. Dezaio v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 205 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[E]ven in a deferral jurisdiction like New York, where the State's fair employment practices agency has no jurisdiction over the employer, that employer is to be viewed as if it, were in a non-deferral state...."). See also Vernon v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 154 F.Supp.2d 844, 850 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (finding that the NYSDHR lacked jurisdiction over the Port Authority, and the 180-day limit applied); Minott v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 116 F.Supp.2d 513, 522 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (same).

Where jurisdiction has not been in issue, some courts in the Second Circuit have described the law as though the 300-day time limit always applied in New York. See, e.g., Carela v. N.Y.C. Parks & Recreation Dep't, No. 98 Civ. 2753, 2005 WL 2105546, at *6 n. 4, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18791, at *18 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005) ("[I]f the act occurs in a state that has anti-discrimination laws and an agency to enforce those laws, which New York State does, then a claimant has 300 days to file with the EEOC."); Subramanian v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. CV-01-6500, 2003 WL 23340865, at *3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23231, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2003) ("Since the alleged discriminatory acts occurred in New York, which has anti-discrimination laws and an enforcement agency, plaintiff had 300 days to file his discrimination charges.")....