James v. N.J. State Police

957 F.3d 165

Arlane JAMES, In re: Willie Gibbons; J. R. G., a minor, by his mother and legal guardian, Ikeya Crawford; D. K. L., a minor, by his mother and legal guardian, Angel Stephens; L. M. G., a minor, by her mother and legal guardian, Angel Stephens

v.NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE; State of New Jersey; John Does 1-10; Noah Bartelt, State Trooper; Phillip Conza, State Trooper; Daniel Hidder, State Trooper; Michael Koriejko, State Trooper; James McGowan, Sergeant, in their individual and official capacities,Noah Bartelt, Appellant

No. 18-1432

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: January 14, 2020

Opinion Filed: April 21, 2020

Yvette C. Sterling [Argued], Sterling Law Firm, 400 High Street, Burlington City, NJ 08016, Ronald C. Hunt Hunt, Hamlin & Ridley, 60 Park Place, Suite 1602, Newark, NJ 07102, Counsel for Appellees

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of New Jersey, Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy Attorney General [Argued], Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Department of Law & Public Safety, 25 Market Street, Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, NJ 08625, Counsel for Appellant Noah Bartelt

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Qualified immunity protects government officials from being held liable for damages when their conduct does not violate a citizen’s clearly established rights. As the Supreme Court has noted, qualified immunity advances a policy of "shield[ing] officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

The issue here is whether New Jersey State Trooper Noah Bartelt is entitled to qualified immunity after using deadly force against Willie Gibbons, a suspect who refused to drop his gun when Trooper Bartelt ordered him to do so. Gibbons’s mother (Arlane James) and minor children (J. R. G., D. K. L., and L. M. G.) (collectively, "James") filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Trooper Bartelt and other state actors alleging constitutional violations arising from Trooper Bartelt’s use of force against Gibbons. All individual defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The District Court granted qualified immunity to all individual defendants except Trooper Bartelt. The District Court then denied James’s and Trooper Bartelt’s cross-motions for reconsideration.

Trooper Bartelt is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Gibbons’s clearly established rights. Thus, we will reverse the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity to Trooper Bartelt and remand with instructions to grant judgment in his favor.

I

Trooper Bartelt appeals the District Court’s order denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity under the "collateral-order doctrine." See E. D. v. Sharkey , 928 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2019).¹ Under this doctrine, our review is plenary and "strictly limited to the legal questions involved." In re Montgomery Cty. , 215 F.3d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 2000). We lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s determination that a factual dispute is genuine, but we have jurisdiction to consider whether the disputed fact is material to the issue on which a party sought summary judgment. See Davenport v. Borough of Homestead , 870 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, we accept the District Court’s facts as true for purposes of this appeal, see id ., and we will review "the record to determine what [other] facts the [D]istrict [C]ourt ... likely assumed," Johnson v. Jones , 515 U.S. 304, 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).

II

Willie Gibbons lived with Angel Stephens in Bridgeton, New Jersey. After the two had a domestic argument on May 24, 2011, Stephens called 911 and reported that "[Gibbons] hit her" and that Gibbons had a "gun in his truck." A12–13. The police drove to Stephens’s house, and Stephens and Gibbons each completed written statements describing the incident. Stephens then obtained a temporary restraining order from Fairfield/Downe Joint Municipal Court against Gibbons. The order prohibited Gibbons from possessing firearms and from returning to Stephens’s house.

The next day, on May 25, 2011, Gibbons requested a police escort to retrieve possessions from Stephens’s house, but the police informed him that he needed judicial approval for the visit. Gibbons went to Stephens’s house alone anyway, in violation of the court’s temporary restraining order. Another argument followed between Gibbons and Stephens. Stephens was speaking with a friend on the phone at the time, so the friend called the police to report that Gibbons had violated the restraining order. Gibbons then left Stephens’s house.

Trooper Philip Conza soon arrived at the house and Stephens told him that Gibbons had waved a gun throughout their argument. Trooper Conza told Stephens to make a complaint against Gibbons at the police barracks and reported over the police radio that Gibbons had brandished a firearm. Trooper Conza, joined by Troopers Bartelt and Michael Korejko, then searched for Gibbons at the nearby home of Gibbons’s mother, Arlane James. James told the Troopers that she did not know where Gibbons was and that he may be off his medication.²

While Stephens was driving to the barracks, she saw Gibbons walking alongside the road. She called 911 and reported Gibbons’s location. Troopers Bartelt, Conza, and Korejko, along with Trooper Daniel Hidder responded to the location.

When Trooper Bartelt pursued Gibbons, he knew that Gibbons: (1) had violated a restraining order; (2) was in possession of a firearm that he had brandished within the last hour; and (3) was reportedly mentally ill and may not have been taking his medication.³

Trooper Bartelt was the first officer to engage Gibbons. As Trooper Bartelt approached Gibbons by car (with his window down), he heard Gibbons say, "stay away from me." A16. Trooper Bartelt then parked his car and, while exiting, observed that Gibbons was holding a gun in his left hand and pointing it at his own head. Trooper Bartelt drew his weapon, stood behind his car door, twice told Gibbons to drop his weapon, and ordered him to "come over here." Id. Gibbons did not comply with the commands and may have repeated, "stay away from me." Id. Separated by seven to fifteen yards, Trooper Bartelt then shot Gibbons twice. Trooper Bartelt shot Gibbons within seconds of stopping his car. Trooper Conza arrived on the scene before Trooper Bartelt fired the shots. Troopers Korejko and Hidder arrived shortly after. Gibbons was flown to the hospital but died that night.

III

Trooper Bartelt challenges the District Court’s ruling denying him qualified immunity. Qualified immunity has two prongs. "First, a court must decide ‘whether the facts that a plaintiff has ... shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.’ " Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist ., 800 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson , 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808 ). "And second, the court must determine ‘whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.’ " Id. We may begin with either prong. Id.

The District Court held that Trooper Bartelt failed to satisfy both prongs, so he was not entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, Trooper Bartelt argues that the District Court erred by finding that he may have violated one of Gibbons’s constitutional rights and by concluding that the constitutional right was clearly established.

We will not review the District Court’s holding that Trooper Bartelt may have violated a constitutional right—the first prong of qualified immunity. The District Court based this holding on its conclusion that "genuine issues of disputed fact" existed, but it did not identify these disputed facts. See A30. To the extent that the District Court is correct that these unstated facts are material to the inquiry, we lack jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine to review its holding on this prong. See Davenport , 870 F.3d at 278 ; see also Johnson , 515 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 2151. Thus, we will assume without deciding that Trooper Bartelt violated one of Gibbons’s constitutional rights and proceed to qualified immunity’s second prong.⁴

IV

Qualified immunity’s second prong "shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Mullenix v. Luna , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (quoting Pearson , 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 ).

"Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful." District of Columbia v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The inquiry is an "objective (albeit fact-specific) question," under which "[an officer]’s subjective beliefs ... are irrelevant." Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Because the inquiry is from the perspective of a reasonable officer, we "consider[ ] only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officer[ ]." White v. Pauly , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (citation omitted).

In rare cases, a plaintiff may show that a right is clearly established if the "violation [is] ‘obvious.’ " See Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194, 199, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) ). In the excessive-force context, "obvious cases" are those that obviously violate Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), and Tennessee v. Garner , 471...