James v. State

DANIEL LEE JAMES CORY KNIGHT ANTONIO DOMINIQUE MCCLENNON v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 2615

No. 2680

No. 3378

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

February 28, 2020

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case No. CT-12-1375X

UNREPORTED

CONSOLIDATED CASES

Kehoe, Arthur, Wells, JJ.

Opinion by Wells, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

In this consolidated appeal, appellants, Daniel James, Cory Knight, and Antonio McClennon, challenge their convictions for first-degree and second-degree assault, armed carjacking, carjacking, conspiracy to commit armed carjacking, and use of handgun in the commission of a felony. The convictions resulted from a trial in which the appellants were tried jointly for assaulting Lashanda Jackson and taking her vehicle at gunpoint.¹ Because the circuit court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err, we affirm the convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Carjacking

On February 20, 2017, sometime between 11:30 and 11:45 p.m., Lashanda Jackson parked her 1999 Mercedes Benz SUV at her apartment building, located at 4141 Southern Avenue in Capitol Heights. As she was gathering her things, two men rushed up to the driver's door. One man pointed a gun at Jackson and demanded the vehicle's keys. Jackson obeyed, slid out of the Mercedes, and held up the key. The man grabbed it. As the men examined the key, Jackson walked toward her building, went to a neighbor's apartment, and called 911.

During the call with 911, Jackson gave the dispatcher a physical description of the two men, including what they wore. Jackson described both men as wearing hats "more like a durag" or a "skull cap" than a "sports cap." Later that night, at the police station, Jackson identified a picture of a firearm that reminded her of the gun the man pointed ather. Jackson also noted that her car "key" was unique in that it was black, rectangular, and thick. It also had two buttons: one jack-knifed the ignition key from a groove into the ready position; the other, for the emergency alarm, was missing.

About an hour after Jackson was carjacked, Officer Bryan Stevens of the Seat Pleasant Police Department was on patrol when he stopped a Toyota Yaris for a traffic violation in the 5700 block of Martin Luther King, Jr. Highway. Appellant, Cory Knight was driving, co-appellant Daniel James was in the passenger seat, co-appellant Antonio McClennon was sitting behind the driver, and Emilio Carr, was sitting behind the passenger.

Officer Stevens called for backup and the occupants were removed from the car. Inside the Yaris, Officer Stevens observed a loaded handgun on the floor behind the driver's seat, a ski mask on the back seat, and what he described as a Mercedes "key fob" in a cup holder in the center console. The four men were arrested. Later, a second, identical ski mask was found in the hood of Knight's jacket.

After viewing a photo array, Jackson identified Knight as one of her assailants. Jackson identified the key the police found in the Yaris as the one to her vehicle. The police test fired the gun and it was deemed operable. Jackson's Mercedes SUV was recovered several days later at the Hechinger Mall located in Northeast Washington, D.C. The key found in the Yaris unlocked the Mercedes.

B. The Trial

The appellants' joint trial began on September 4, 2018. Jackson testified that she never saw any of the appellants prior to trial. She confirmed that she had described the man with the gun as "light-skinned," approximately 5' 6" tall and 160 pounds. The other assailant was, according to Jackson, "dark-skinned, 5' 8' tall and 200 pounds. Both men wore all-black clothing. As for the gun, Jackson admitted she previously identified a revolver as the weapon used. Jackson testified that the material of the ski mask recovered was similar to the material of the "skullcap" that her assailants wore.

Seat Pleasant Police Officer Stevens testified regarding the traffic stop and the search of the Yaris. Officer Stevens testified that he stopped the Yaris about an hour after Jackson was assaulted and her car taken. Officer Stevens testified as to the location of each of the appellants when they were in the vehicle. He also testified as to the location of each of the items he found.

Detective Michael Washington testified that he was the lead detective and was assigned to the Robbery Suppression Team of the Prince George's County Police Department. Det. Washington's testimony made clear that the gun recovered from the Yaris had a magazine that inserted into the stock of the gun; it was not a revolver. Det. Washington testified that the police declined to do DNA tests on the gun or the Mercedes, because: (1) Jackson said her two assailants wore gloves, and (2) Det. Washington knew that Officer Stevens had handled the gun. Knight consented to give a DNA sample, but the police declined to do any DNA testing.

The jury ultimately convicted the appellants of first-degree and second-degree assault, armed carjacking, carjacking, conspiracy to commit armed carjacking, and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. The jury was unable to reach a decision as to Carr and the court declared a mistrial in his case. The court sentenced each appellant to an aggregate of 80 years and suspended all but 36 years' imprisonment.

Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

DISCUSSION

In some instances, two appellants make the same allegation of error. In those instances, each appellant's discrete arguments will be discussed under that topic. An argument raised solely by an appellant will be discussed separately.

I. Severance (James and McClennon)

Rule 4-253 governs joinder and severance in criminal trials. Subsection (c) grants discretion to the trial court in deciding a party's motion for severance:

If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents, or defendants, the court, may, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging documents, or defendants, or grant any other relief as justice requires.

(Emphasis added). The appropriate standard of review "when reviewing a severance determination in cases of codefendant joinder," as is found here, then, "remains whether the trial court abused its discretion." State v. Hines, 450 Md. 352, 366 (2016).

To determine whether joinder would be prejudicial, the trial judge must engage in a three-part analysis. Id. at 369-70. First, the court must determine whether non-mutually admissible evidence will be presented, and second, whether presentation of that evidence will cause unfair prejudice to the defendant moving for severance. Id. Finally, the court uses its discretion to determine how to address any unfair prejudice, which may include granting the motion to sever the offenses or the trials of the codefendants, "or by granting other relief, such as, for example, giving a limiting instruction or redacting evidence to remove any reference to the defendant against whom it is inadmissible." Id.

In Hines, the Court of Appeals identified only two instances where a Maryland appellate court held a trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant's motion to sever: Day v. State, 196 Md. 384 (1950) and Erman v. State, 49 Md. App. 605 (1981). Hines, 450 Md. at 379-83. In both cases, the Court found the co-defendant was prejudiced by the admission of evidence and was "unwilling to assume the jury was able to follow the limiting instructions given by the trial judge." Hines, 450 Md. at 383-84. Hines marked the third and most recent in this line of cases, holding the circuit court's redactions of admitted statements were insufficient for preventing undue prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 383-85. The Court acknowledged the trial judge's discretion to address potential prejudice in ways not limited to granting severance, including making adequate redactions. Id.

When an appellant establishes that the trial court erred in admitting or excluding evidence, our courts may still determine if the error was harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt. Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137, 164-65 (2009) (citing Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 332-33(2008)). The Court of Appeals adopted the harmless error analysis in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 (1976), stating:

[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed "harmless" and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of—whether erroneously admitted or excluded—may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.

Id. at 659. And in Taylor, the Court of Appeals explained, "[t]o say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed by the record." 407 Md. at 165.

Here, the issue of severance originated during a pre-trial hearing, in which the State noted its intention to elicit co-defendant Knight's statement to Det. Washington about the location of the victim's carjacked vehicle:

[PROSECUTOR]: The Supreme Court . . . held that Bruton² did not apply . . . where the confession of one defendant admitted at trial does not refer to a codefendant and the implication is only circumstantial at trial so long as the court gives an instruction to the jury, and it will be presumed by the court that juries can accept instructions and follow them by the court. And the instruction should be that the defendant's statement here,

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