Jarmon v. Trader Joe's Co.

MEMORANDUM

JOHN MILTON YOUNGE, JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before this Court is Defendant Trader Joe's Company's (“Trader Joe's”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16). The Court finds this motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; L.R. 7.1(f). For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum, Defendant Trader Joe's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) will be granted in part and denied in part.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

James Jarmon (“Plaintiff”) has filed this civil action against his former employer, Trader Joe's Company (“Defendant”) alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. On September 25, 2017, Plaintiff started working for Defendant as an Assistant Store Manager (also known as a “Mate”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 7; Def. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def. SUMF”) ¶ 7, ECF No 16-2.) During his tenure, Plaintiff would work at four of Defendant's locations: (1) Philadelphia, PA; (2) Media, PA; (3) Wayne, PA; and (4) North Whales, PA. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23, 32, 51, ECF No. 7.) On or around December 2017, Plaintiff had been transferred from Defendant's Center City Philadelphia location to Defendant's Media, PA location. (Def. SUMF ¶ 11, ECF No. 16-2.)

While at Defendant's Media, PA location, Plaintiff claims to have experienced racial discrimination in the following ways: a co-worker telling Plaintiff that he resembled a starving child in Africa; having an eggplant and greeting card resembling a white supremacy hand sign placed in his employee locker; being falsely accused of stealing and being lazy; receiving harsher performance criticism than his non-Black peers; and not being given a raise or a bonus, while his non-Black colleagues-who performed at or below his level-received them. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 7.) Upon completion of Plaintiff's paternity leave in or around May 2020, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not allow him to return to its Media, PA location because Defendant's employees did not want Plaintiff there anymore-ultimately resulting in Plaintiff's transfer to Defendant's Wayne, PA location. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29-32, ECF No. 7.)

While at Defendant's Wayne, PA location, Plaintiff alleges additional instances of racial discrimination. In or around August 2020, Plaintiff submitted a complaint of racial discrimination to Defendant's Human Resources Department after management failed to ask a non-Black customer to leave the store after Plaintiff informed management that the customer had made unwarranted and offensive remarks to Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-36, ECF No. 7.) Upon learning of the complaint, Plaintiff's then-manager-Sha Ron Williams-allegedly became very angry and chastised Plaintiff for filing the complaint and stated that such behavior was one of the reasons why Williams does not hire Black people. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-41, ECF No. 7.) Williams' alleged comments prompted Plaintiff to complain to Defendant's Human Resources Department. (Am. Compl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 7.) Shortly after Plaintiff complained to HR, Williams wrote Plaintiff up in connection with his handling of the interaction with the non-Black customer who allegedly made offensive remarks-causing Plaintiff to file another HR complaint for what he perceived to be a retaliatory write up. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-48, ECF No. 7.) On January 15, 2021, Plaintiff had been

informed that he would be written up again (for allegedly failing to lock the back door of the store), and would, on January 18, 2021, be transferred to Defendant's North Whales, PA location. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-52, ECF No. 7; Def. SUMF ¶¶ 74, 80, 83, ECF No. 16-2.)

While at Defendant's North Whales, PA location, Plaintiff-on May 26, 2021-initiated an FMLA-approved leave of absence because of the alleged hostile work environment Plaintiff had been subjected to by Defendant. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-55, ECF No. 7; Def. SUMF ¶ 92, ECF No. 16-2.) In or around the end of July 2021, Plaintiff returned to work from his FMLA leave and would be issued another write up for alleged performance and attendance issues that occurred prior to Plaintiff's leave. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-58, ECF No. 7.) On August 31, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court-alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) (Count I), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) (Count III), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, as amended, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. (“PHRA”) (Count IV). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74-98, ECF No. 7.) Since filing his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed his claim for retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”) (Count II). (Pl. Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summ. J., p. 1, n.1, ECF No. 17.) On September 4, 2021, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff engaged in an inappropriate conversation about guns with a colleague on the sales floor in front of customers. (Def. SUMF ¶¶ 101-104, ECF No. 16-2.) On September 10, 2021, the Philadelphia Magazine published an article covering Plaintiff's claims and his recently filed civil action against Defendant. (Def. SUMF ¶ 114, ECF No. 16-2.) On September 18, 2021, Defendant's Regional Vice President-Ylana Ebba-terminated Plaintiff based on his September 4, 2021 conversation being “completely inappropriate” along with other alleged performance issues. (Def. SUMF ¶¶ 107-108, ECF No. 16-2; Am. Compl. ¶ 61, ECF No. 7.)

Though Defendant alleges that the decision to terminate Plaintiff had been made prior to the publication of the article, Plaintiff's termination letter is coincidentally dated September 10, 2021-the same day that the Philadelphia Magazine article had been published. (Def. SUMF ¶¶ 110, 115, ECF No. 16-2.)

Currently before this Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment-wherein Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated racial discrimination or retaliation under Section 1981, Title VII, or the PHRA. (Def. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 16.) In response, Plaintiff argues that the September 4, 2021 conversation had been pretextual and in line with other frivolous disciplinary actions taken against Plaintiff and that his termination had come shortly after both his filing of his initial Complaint in this Court and the Philadelphia Magazine's coverage of his claims. (Pl. Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 17.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2012). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, there must be a factual dispute that is both material and genuine. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 24-49 (1986); Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if, based on the evidence, “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of a material fact. Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016). When the movant is the defendant, they have the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff “has failed to

establish one or more essential elements of her case.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). If the movant sustains their initial burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

At the summary judgment stage, the court's role is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007). In doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Horsehead Indus., Inc. v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, the court must be mindful that “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

IV. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, it is worth noting that Plaintiff's claims across Section 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA can be consolidated for purposes of this analysis. See Harley v. McCoach, 928 F.Supp. 533, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[Plaintiff's] Title VII, PHRA, and § 1981 claims all fall under the same analytical framework, and will therefore be examined together.”) Relatedly, Plaintiff's racial discrimination and retaliation claims are both subject to the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying McDonnell Douglas to Title VII racial discrimination claims); Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims).

Thus, this Court will consolidate Plaintiff's respective racial discrimination and retaliation claims across Section 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA, and will apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting...