Jaromin v. Town of Yorktown

697 F.Supp.3d 816

Ryan JAROMIN, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF YORKTOWN and Marshal Todd St. John, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00320-JMS-MJD

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

Signed October 11, 2023

Benjamin C. Ellis, HKM Employment Attorneys LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

James Alex Emerson, Matthew L. Hinkle, Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C., Carmel, IN, for Defendant Town of Yorktown.

James Alex Emerson, Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C., Carmel, IN, Rosemary L. Borek, Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight, Ltd., Carmel, IN, James S. Stephenson, Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight, Ltd., Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant Marshal Todd St. John.

ORDER

JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, Judge

Plaintiff Ryan Jaromin is a police officer who has held various positions with the Yorktown Police Department ("YPD") since 2008. During his employment, he has had numerous clashes with former YPD Town Marshal Todd St. John. On February 14, 2022, Officer Jaromin initiated this litigation against Defendants the Town of Yorktown (the "Town") and Marshal St. John, and asserts claims for disability discrimination based on disparate treatment and a hostile work environment under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. ("Rehabilitation Act"); retaliation in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. ("FMLA"); interference with medical leave in violation of the FMLA; defamation; abuse of process; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Town and Marshal St. John have filed Motions for Summary Judgment which apply to all of Officer Jaromin's claims, [Filing No. 62; Filing No. 63], and Officer Jaromin has filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which applies only to his retaliation claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, [Filing No. 98]. All of those motions are now ripe for the Court's consideration.

I.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). On summary judgment, a party must show the Court what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). " 'Summary judgment is not a time to be coy.' " King v. Ford Motor Co., 872 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2017)). Rather, at the summary judgment stage, "[t]he parties are required to put their evidentiary cards on the table." Sommerfield, 863 F.3d at 649.

The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512 F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-finder. O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).

Each fact asserted in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be supported by "a citation to a discovery response, a deposition, an affidavit, or other admissible evidence." S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(e). And each "citation must refer to a page or paragraph number or otherwise similarly specify where the relevant information can be found in the supporting evidence." Id. The Court need only consider the cited materials and need not "scour the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(h). Where a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact, the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider disputed facts that are material to the decision. A disputed fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009). In other words, while there may be facts that are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if those facts are not outcome determinative. Harper v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Fact disputes that are irrelevant to the legal question will not be considered. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

"The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment does not . . . imply that there are no genuine issues of material fact." R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). Specifically, "[p]arties have different burdens of proof with respect to particular facts, different legal theories will have an effect on which facts are material; and the process of taking the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, first for one side and then for the other, may highlight the point that neither side has enough to prevail without a trial." Id. at 648.

II.STATEMENT OF FACTS¹

A. The Town and YPD

The Town's legislative body is the Town Council. [Filing No. 64-1.] The Town Council appoints the Town Manager, who serves at the Town Council's pleasure, functions as the Town's administrative head, and reports directly to the Town Council. [Filing No. 64-2 at 1.] The Town Manager does not make policy, but can make policy recommendations to the Town Council. [Filing No. 64-2 at 1.]

The Town Marshal is the head of YPD and is appointed by the Town Council after a comprehensive selection process. [Filing No. 64-3 at 1; 64-5 at 14-15; Filing No. 64-6 at 23.] As with the Town Manager, the Town Marshal serves at the pleasure of the Town Council and cannot make policy for the Town or for YPD, but may make policy recommendations to the Town Council. [Filing No. 64-2 at 1.]

B. The Town's Discrimination and Retaliation Policies and Grievance Process

The Town has an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy (the "EEO Policy") that governs unlawful discrimination, retaliation, and claims under the ADA. [Filing No. 64-2 at 2.] The EEO Policy prohibits retaliation against employees who bring charges of unlawful discrimination. [Filing No. 64-2 at 2.] It also provides that any employee with a disability, as defined by the ADA, who believes that he or she requires a workplace accommodation to perform the essential functions of their job should contact their supervisor as soon as possible. [Filing No. 64-2 at 3.]

The Town also has a grievance policy applicable to all Town employees, including police personnel. [Filing No. 64-2 at 9.] The grievance procedure consists of three steps: (1) the employee speaks to a supervisor; (2) if the employee is not satisfied, he or she may request a meeting with the Town Manager; and (3) if the employee is still not satisfied, he or she may request a meeting in executive session with the Town Council. [Filing No. 64-2 at 37.]

C. YPD Policies Regarding Reporting and Investigating Improper Workplace Behavior

YPD employees are not required to report unlawful discrimination or harassment through their normal chain of command and may instead go directly to the Town Manager. [Filing No. 64-2 at 2.] YPD has a policy titled "Complaints and Investigations Against Department Members," which provides a mechanism whereby intra-departmental complaints can be presented to the Town Marshal. [Filing No. 64-6 at 14-16; Filing No. 64-7 at 12-13.] The Town Marshal does not have authority from the Town to investigate Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charges, however. [Filing No. 64-2 at 15; Filing No. 64-3 at 4.]

D. Officer Jaromin's Positions With YPD and Compensation

Officer Jaromin was hired as a patrolman by YPD in 2008. [Filing No. 64-5 at 20-24.] He was interviewed and hired by Marshal St. John, who was the Town Marshal at that time. [Filing No. 64-5 at 24-25.] During Officer Jaromin's probationary year, he worked on different shifts to familiarize himself with each shift. [Filing No. 64-5 at 28.] After his probationary year, he remained on one shift throughout the year. [Filing No. 64-5 at 28.]

Officer Jaromin has held various positions with YPD, including his most recent position of investigator/detective, to which he was appointed in October 2022. [Filing No. 64-5 at 24; Filing No. 64-9 at 1.] In this position, he earns an additional $1,200 annual pay known as "tech pay." [Filing No. 64-9 at 1; Filing No. 64-10 at 20-23.] Tech pay is compensation that is paid in addition to an officer's base salary, based on certain factors such as additional education, rank advancement, shift assignment, and serving in various capacities beyond basic patrol duties. [Filing No. 64-10 at 21; Filing No. 64-10 at 42-43.] Officer Jaromin earned $2,900 in tech pay in 2020, $1,900 in tech pay in 2021, and $2,500 in tech pay in 2022. [Filing No. 64-10 at 40-41.]

E. Officer Jaromin's Initial Interactions With Marshal St. John

Almost immediately upon his hiring, Officer Jaromin realized that Marshal St. John was someone with whom he was not going to see eye to eye. [Filing No. 64-5 at 34-35.] Officer Jaromin also lacked respect for the way in which Marshal St. John conducted himself as Police Chief, felt that Marshal St. John had a strong personality and was a polarizing figure, and compared his leadership style to that of former Indiana University men's basketball coach Bobby Knight. [Filing No....