Jarvis v. United States

DEREK N. JARVIS, Plaintiff, v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 21-1148C

United States Court of Federal Claims

August 19, 2021

Pro Se Claim; Reparations Claim Founded on Native American Heritage Enslaved Ancestors, and Systemic Racism; RCFC 12(b)(1)

Derek N. Jarvis, Silver Spring, MD, pro se.

Borislav Kushnir, United States Department of Justice Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARGARET M. SWEENEY Senior Judge

Plaintiff Derek N. Jarvis is proceeding pro se in this matter. In his complaint he requests forty million dollars in damages related to the treatment of indigenous Americans who were enslaved and whose descendants continue to suffer from systemic racism. Mr. Jarvis also applies to proceed in forma pauperis. Defendant moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"), to dismiss Mr. Jarvis's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Mr. Jarvis's application to proceed in forma pauperis and also grants defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Jarvis is a frequent litigant in federal courts.^[1] See, e.g., Jarvis v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 310 F.Supp.3d 79, 83 (D.D.C.) (granting defendant's summary judgment motion in a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") action), aff'd, No. 18-5127, 2018 WL 5115539 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2018); Jarvis v. City of Alexandria, No. 17-CV-378, 2017 WL 2692682, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 22, 2017) (entering an antifiling injunction because Mr. Jarvis had "a history of vexatious litigation, having now filed over twenty-five meritless lawsuits in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia"), aff'd sub nom. Jarvis v. City of Alexandria Mayor's Off., 699 Fed.Appx. 186 (4th Cir. 2017) (mem.); Jarvis v. FedEx Off. & Print Servs., Inc., No. 08-1694, 2011 WL 826796, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2011) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on a civil rights claim), aff'd, 442 Fed.Appx. 71 (4th Cir. 2011). In this court, Mr. Jarvis has filed four prior suits, three of which were FOIA suits dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see Jarvis v. United States, No. 17-829C, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cl. July 6, 2017); Jarvis v. United States, No. 17-828C, 2017 WL 2735597, at *1 (Fed. Cl. June 26, 2017); Jarvis v. United States, No. 17-763C, slip op. at 2 (Fed. Cl. June 22, 2017), and a fourth, also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, which alleged that he had been denied access to impartial justice by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Jarvis v. United States, No. 17-762C, 2017 WL 4674048, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 18, 2017), aff'd, 718 Fed.Appx. 984 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (mem.).

In the complaint now before the court, Mr. Jarvis's allegations of fact largely concern the historic treatment of Native Americans, slaves, and their descendants, as well as the "Black-White wealth gap." Compl. 23. Mr. Jarvis alleges that he is a "direct descendant of the Cherokee Freedmen," id. at 1, that he is of Cherokee, Powhatan, and Iroquois ancestry, and that he is "100% Native American" and "NOT AFRICAN," id. at 4. As a result of historical forces and the effects of racism, Mr. Jarvis asserts that he is destitute.

Mr. Jarvis's complaint references numerous sources of law that are examined in more detail below. To cite just a few examples of the law upon which he relies, Mr. Jarvis refers to the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, as well as civil rights statutes. He also alleges that he has been slandered and that his birthright of land, labor, and wealth has been "converted" by the United States. Id. at 19. Perhaps the most accurate characterization of his claim is that he seeks reparations for acts against "so called (Black) Americans" by the United States (or the original thirteen colonies). Id. at 8.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, to which Mr. Jarvis responded. In his response, Mr. Jarvis raises two new legal bases for jurisdiction for his suit that are addressed below. Defendant then filed its reply. The court deems oral argument unnecessary; thus, defendant's motion is ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Pro Se Plaintiffs

Pro se pleadings are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and are "to be liberally construed." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, the "leniency afforded to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements." Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed.Cl. 249, 253 (2007); accord Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The fact that [the plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be."). In other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from his burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. See Banks v. United States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

B. Motion to Dismiss Under RCFC 12(b)(1)

Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). When considering whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1), the court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and construes those allegations in the plaintiff's favor. Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("Court of Federal Claims") to entertain suits against the United States is limited. "The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The waiver of immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).

The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and "does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a "money-mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States." Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

To determine whether it has jurisdiction, the court discerns the true nature of the claims in the complaint and is not constrained by the plaintiff's characterization of those claims. Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, RCFC 12(h)(3) requires the court to dismiss that claim.

III. DISCUSSION

The court discerns in the complaint a number of legal grounds for Mr. Jarvis's claims. Although the true nature of his claims is a request for reparations based on historic events and systemic racism, the court first addresses the jurisdictional limits that bar the other possible claims discernable in the complaint.^[2] The court then turns to a new jurisdictional allegation set forth in Mr. Jarvis's response brief. Finally, the court considers whether it has jurisdiction over reparations claims such as the one asserted here by Mr. Jarvis.

A. Claims Against Nongovernmental Entities

As an initial matter, the court observes that Mr. Jarvis names multiple defendants in his complaint: the United States, "United States Corporations," and "Universities." Compl. 1. However, it is well settled that the United States is the only proper defendant in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (providing that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims against the United States); RCFC 10(a) (requiring that the United States be designated as the defendant in the Court of Federal Claims); Nat'l City Bank of Evansville v. United States, 163 F.Supp. 846, 852 (Ct. Cl. 1958) ("It is well established that the jurisdiction of this court extends only to claims against the United States, and obviously a controversy between private parties could not be entertained." (footnotes omitted)); Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 186, 190 (2003) ("[T]he only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual."). Indeed, the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims "is confined to the rendition of money judgments in suits brought for that relief against the United States, . . . and if the relief sought is against others than the United States, the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court." Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. Accordingly, Mr. Jarvis's claims against all parties except the United States must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Civil Rights Claim

Turning to Mr. Jarvis's claims...