Jay v. Venetozzi

NATHANIEL JAY, Plaintiff, v. D. VENETOZZI and WILLIAM HUGHES, Defendants.

15-CV-147S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

July 30, 2020

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Nathaniel Jay alleges that Defendants, employees of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), violated his constitutional rights by denying him due process at a disciplinary hearing and by affirming the decision that resulted from that hearing. Before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which Jay opposes. (Docket Nos. 40, 46). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are not disputed for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. This Court takes the facts in the light most favorable to Jay, the non-moving party. See Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 2016) (at summary judgment, a court "views the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to ... the non-moving party").

At all relevant times, Jay was an inmate at Attica Correctional facility, under the care and custody of DOCCS. (Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Docket No. 40-1, ¶ 1.) Defendant William Hughes was Deputy Superintendent of Security ("DSS") at Attica. (Id., ¶ 2.) Defendant Donald Venetozzi was the Director of the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") for DOCCS. (Id., ¶ 3.)

A. The February 17, 2012, Incident

On February 17, 2012, an incident occurred between Jay and C.O. Summers. According to the misbehavior report subsequently authored by Summers, Jay reached his arm out of his cell and struck Summers in the left shoulder with an altered mirror. (Docket No. 40-3 at p. 50.) The report indicates that Summers ordered Jay to stop, and that Jay refused to stop or to surrender the mirror. (Id.) Jay appears to contest these allegations. (Docket No. 46 at pp. 8, 17.) Summers left and reported the incident to Sergeant Leonard. (Docket No. 40-3 at p. 50.)

After this incident, Summers recovered the altered mirror in Jay's cell. (Id.) Jay disputes whether Summers actually performed the search. (Docket No. 46 at p. 8.) Jay was served with Summers's misbehavior report on this incident on February 21, 2012. (Docket No. 40-1, ¶ 9.)

B. The Tier III Hearing

Defendant William Hughes presided over the Tier III disciplinary hearing related to this incident. The hearing began on February 23, 2012, and ended on March 5, 2012, after being adjourned several times. (Docket No. 40-1, ¶ 6.) Jay was charged with seven violations: violent conduct; assault on staff; possession of a weapon; possession of an altered item; harassment; refusing a direct order; and threats. (Docket No. 1 at p. 20; see also Docket No. 40-3 at p. 54.)

There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Hughes personally participatedin any investigation of Jay's alleged misconduct prior to the hearing.

All of the witnesses Jay requested testified at the hearing: C.O. Summers; Sergeant Leonard; C.O. Caldwell; and Nurse Cathy Sault. (Id. at pp. 39-46.) Jay asked many questions of the witnesses during the hearing. (Id.) At the hearing, Jay's hands were restrained behind his back. He asked for the restraints to be removed, or that his hands be cuffed in front of him to permit him to access his documents. (Docket No. 40-3 at p. 16) In response, Hughes stated, "No but anything you want let me know I will grab it," to which Jay replied, "alright." (Id.)

During the hearing, Jay requested the introduction of his disciplinary records. (Id. at p. 44.) Hughes denied this request, stating that the records were irrelevant. (Id. at p. 45.) After hearing the witnesses' testimony, Hughes found Jay guilty of all charges and imposed a penalty of 24 months in SHU with a corresponding loss of privileges. (Id. at pp. 46-47.) There are two versions of the hearing disposition form in the record, one without a tape number,¹ which Jay attached to his complaint (Docket No. 1 at p. 20), and one with a tape number, which Defendants attached to their motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 40-3 at p. 56.)

C. Jay's Appeal and Article 78 Proceeding

Jay appealed Hughes' decision and sentence to defendant Donald Venetozzi, director of the SHU. (Docket No. 40-1, ¶ 3.) On May 15, 2012, Venetozzi modified Jay's sentence to 18 months of SHU and loss of privileges. (Docket No. 40-3 at p. 58.) Jay ultimately served 13 months and 20 days of his SHU sentence. (Id. at p. 123.)

Jay filed an Article 78 Motion in New York State Supreme Court in Wyoming County, seeking review of his Tier III hearing. (Id. at p. 125.) Acting Supreme Court Justice Mark Dadd denied Jay's petition, finding that Jay's due process rights were not violated at the hearing. (Id. at p. 126.) Judge Dadd held that Jay was not prevented from calling witnesses or submitting relevant documentary evidence, that Hughes acted rationally when he excluded Jay's disciplinary record as irrelevant, that credibility determinations were validly made, and that the sanction imposed was not excessive. (Id.) Jay appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which affirmed Judge Dadd's decision on June 13, 2014. (Id. at pp. 128-29.)

III. DISCUSSION

Cognizant of the distinct disadvantage that pro se litigants face, federal courts routinely read their submissions liberally, and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). This is especially important when reviewing pro se complaints alleging civil rights violations. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2001). Since Jay is proceeding pro se, this Court has considered his submissions and arguments accordingly.

Two claims remain from Jay's original complaint.² He claims first that Hughes denied him due process at his Tier III hearing, by (1) failing to serve as an impartial hearing officer; (2) serving as a hearing officer when his role as DSS was to overseesearch and contraband; (3) keeping Jay in manual restraints during the hearing; (4) refusing to admit evidence of Jay's prior disciplinary history at the hearing; (5) failing to record the tape number on the hearing disposition sheet; and (6) imposing a sentence beyond that recommended in DOCCS guidelines. (Third Cause of Action.) Jay also claims that Venetozzi violated his rights by affirming Hughes' determination, and that Venetozzi's reduction of Jay's penalty proves that Hughes' original sentence violated Jay's rights. (Second Cause of Action.)

Defendants move for summary judgment on Jay's claims against Hughes and Venetozzi on the basis that Jay was afforded due process at his Tier III hearing, and that Venetozzi is not liable for affirming Hughes' finding or for reducing Jay's sentence.

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Addickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). Indeed, "[i]f, as to the issue on which summary judgment is sought, there is anyevidence in the record from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party, summary judgment is improper." Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

But a "mere scintilla of evidence" in favor of the nonmoving party will not defeat summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. A nonmoving party must do more than cast a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts; it must "offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); D'Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, there must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

"It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Triestman v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)). "A pro se plaintiff, however, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by simply relying on the allegations of his complaint; he must present admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in his favor." Belpasso v. Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 400 F. App'x. 600, 601 (2d Cir. 2010); see Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1996) (summary judgment properly entered against pro se plaintiff who failed to oppose motion with admissible evidence after receiving plainly worded warning of the consequences of such failure).

In the end, the function of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions...