Jean-Denis v. Tate

JEAN-EWOLL JEAN-DENIS,¹ Plaintiff, v. LT. WAYMAN TATE and JULIAN AVILES, Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-938-J-34JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

April 27, 2020

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Jean-Ewoll Jean-Denis, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on August 16, 2017, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Jean-Denis asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following Defendants: (1) Sergeant Tate; (2) Sergeant Robinson; (3) Sergeant Trent; and (4) Julian Aviles,² M.D.³ He asserts that Defendant Tate deprived him of meals andrunning water while he was housed on self-harm observation status (SHOS) at Union Correctional Institution (UCI), and Defendant Aviles denied him proper medical treatment. As relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages.⁴

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Tate's Motion for Summary Judgment (Tate Motion; Doc. 76) and Defendant Aviles' Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Aviles Motion; Doc. 77). They submitted exhibits in support of the Motions. See Def. Exs., Docs. 75-1 through 75-4; 76-1 through 76-7; 77-1⁵ through 77-6.⁶ The Court advised Jean-Denis of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the motions. See Order (Doc. 5); Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 78). Jean-Denis filed responses in opposition to the motions. See Response to Defendant Tate's Motion for Summary Judgment (Part 1) (Response; Doc. 93); Response to Defendant Aviles' Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Response II; Doc. 94); Plaintiff's Declaration Explaining Inability to Present before the Court Additional Facts and Evidence Essential to Justify Plaintiff's Opposition to the Defendants' SummaryJudgment Motions (Doc. 95). He also submitted exhibits. See P. Exs., Docs. 93-1; 93-2; 94-1; 94-2; 95-1 through 95-4. Defendants' motions are ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff's Allegations⁷

In his Complaint, Jean-Denis asserts that Defendant Tate deprived him of "all meals" while he was housed in UCI's V and T dormitories on SHOS from September 16, 2013, through October 4, 2013. Complaint at 7. He describes "an unofficial policy" where officers used starvation "as a cruel tactic to force" prisoners off SHOS. Id. Additionally, he states that Tate deprived him of running water "at one point" during the relevant time period. Id. Jean-Denis avers that Defendant Aviles disregarded the urgent nature of his resulting medical needs and failed to schedule him for an appointment with an "outside" physician who could provide "specialized treatment or evaluation." Id.

The injuries Jean-Denis complains about are allegedly the result of Defendant Tate denying him meals, and Defendant Aviles depriving him of urgent medical care. According to Jean-Denis, he suffered dehydration, decreased blood sugar, and low blood pressure during the nineteen-day starvation period, and was found unconscious in his confinement cell several times. See id. at 7-8. He maintains that his stomach is "severely injured" from the starvation, and he experiences ongoing stomach pain and intolerance to most foods and drinks that are available at the prison. Id. at 8. He states that he often regurgitates after eating and has bloody vomit sometimes. See id.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules(s)), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).⁸ An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v.Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). "Summary judgment is improper, however, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Guevara v. NCL(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In the Motions, Defendants Tate and Aviles assert that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment in their favor as to Jean-Denis' Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Tate Motion at 9-16; Aviles Motion at 10-12. Aviles contends that Jean-Denis failed to comply with Florida's pre-suit requirements, and therefore, requests dismissal of Jean-Denis' state-law negligence claim against him. See Aviles Motion at 12. Tate maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See Tate Motion at 13-14. Additionally, he asserts that Jean-Denis is not entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because he has not alleged any physical injuries resulting from Defendant's acts and/or omissions. See id. at 14-16. In his Response, Jean-Denis maintains that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment in their favor because there remain genuine issues of material fact as to his Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Response; Response II.

V. Law

A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for a claim of constitutionally inadequate care:

"The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones . . . ." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976 (internal quotation and citation omitted).[⁹] Thus, in its prohibition of "cruel andunusual punishments," the Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials provide humane conditions of confinement. Id. However, as noted above, only those conditions which objectively amount to an "extreme deprivation" violating contemporary standards of decency are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000.[¹⁰] Furthermore, it is only a prison official's subjective deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm caused by such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 1974 (quotation and citation omitted); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct. at 2327.[¹¹]

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). "A prisoner bringing a deliberate-indifference claim has a steep hill to climb." Keohane v. Fla. Dept. of Corr. Sec'y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). "To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry." Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)). First, the plaintiff must satisfy the objective component by showing that he had a serious medical need. Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).

"A serious medical need is considered 'one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Id.[ ¹² ] (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)). In either case, "the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).

Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351. Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective component, which requires the plaintiff to "allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state of mind that constituted deliberate indifference." Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing the three components of deliberate indifference as "(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.") (citing Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245); Lane v....