Jefferson Cnty. v. S.M.S. (In re S.M.S.)

397 Wis.2d 244

959 N.W.2d 93 (Table)

2021 WI App 27

In the MATTER OF the Condition of S.M.S.:

Jefferson County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. S.M.S., Respondent-Appellant.

Appeal No. 2020AP814

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

March 11, 2021

GRAHAM, J. ¹

¶1 S.M.S. appeals from circuit court orders that involuntarily committed him to the custody of the Jefferson County Department of Human Services pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20 and authorized the involuntary administration of medication and treatment. The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court lost competency over the commitment proceeding by failing to comply with the seven-day time limit in § 51.20(7)(a) for holding a probable cause hearing. Here, the court adjourned the probable cause hearing after 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day of S.M.S.’s emergency detention and did not make a probable cause determination until the following day. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, in which the one-day adjournment of the hearing was caused by S.M.S.’s own conduct and litigation strategy, I conclude that the court did not lose competency. I affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 S.M.S. was involuntarily detained pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.15(1), and the County sought his commitment for treatment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20. The circuit court held an initial probable cause hearing within 72 hours of his detention, as required by § 51.20(7)(a).

¶3 At the initial probable cause hearing, S.M.S. stated, among other things, that he did not want to proceed with appointed counsel as his attorney, and that he wanted to represent himself or be represented by someone else. S.M.S. also requested a postponement of the probable cause hearing so that he could present witness testimony. WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(7)(a) allows a court to postpone the probable cause hearing "[a]t the request of the subject individual," "but in no case may the postponement exceed 7 days from the date of detention." The circuit court granted S.M.S.’s request and postponed the probable cause hearing until September 18, 2019, which was the seventh day following S.M.S.’s detention, excluding weekends.

¶4 The circuit court scheduled two hours on September 18th for the postponed probable cause hearing. Among other things, S.M.S. refused the assistance of counsel and stressed his desire to represent himself. The circuit allowed S.M.S. to examine witnesses and make objections with appointed counsel acting as standby counsel. A significant portion of the allotted time that day was taken up by S.M.S.’s various motions, requests, and objections, as well as court-ordered breaks so that S.M.S. could consult with standby counsel.

¶5 The circuit court then heard the testimony of the County's four witnesses: the deputy who had initial contact with S.M.S. on the night of his detention, two medical health professionals, and S.M.S.’s mother. During the presentation of the evidence, the court had to repeatedly warn S.M.S. not to interrupt the witnesses as they testified. S.M.S. vigorously cross-examined the witnesses on an array of wide-ranging topics. At one point, S.M.S. moved to dismiss the matter on the merits; the court denied this motion. At another point, S.M.S. asked the court to order genetic testing of his mother so that he could use the results to prove that she was an imposter. The court denied the request. S.M.S. also asked the court to order the sheriff to arrest his mother, and that request was also denied.

¶6 The hearing continued past 5:00 p.m. At that point, the County had no further evidence to present; however, S.M.S. indicated that he had additional questions for his mother, and he had not been given an opportunity to present witnesses on his own behalf. By that time, the courthouse had been closed for thirty minutes, and the judge informed the parties that he had commitments beyond business hours. The circuit court requested input from counsel about adjourning the hearing and continuing it on another day, and the prosecutor and S.M.S.’s standby counsel both opined that the hearing needed to be completed that day to be timely under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(a). The court disagreed with their interpretation of the statute and adjourned the hearing until the following day.

¶7 When the probable cause hearing continued the afternoon of September 19, the circuit court made the following statement about the reasons for the adjournment:

As the Court indicated, the Court took a recess so people could sleep and eat. The Court does believe it's in compliance with the statute. The statute requires that the matter be scheduled and heard. The matter has been scheduled and heard; has not been disposed of, however. The Court's doing the best it can to balance the interest of [S.M.S.’s] ... due process rights, as well as reality of a 24-hour day.

S.M.S. moved for dismissal of the case, and the court denied the motion. S.M.S. then proceeded to testify on his own behalf. After hearing S.M.S.’s testimony and the parties’ closing arguments, the court found that there was probable cause to believe S.M.S. met the criteria for commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a).

¶8 S.M.S. demanded a jury, and following the final commitment hearing, the jury found that S.M.S. met the criteria for commitment. ² S.M.S. filed a motion for postdisposition relief, arguing the circuit court lost competency by failing to conduct the probable cause hearing within the statutory time limits. The court denied the motion, and S.M.S. appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 The term "competency" refers to a court's power to render a valid judgment; a court loses competency when it has jurisdiction over a matter but lacks the power to render a judgment for other reasons. ³ Dane Cnty. v. Stevenson L.J. , 2009 WI App 84, ¶6 n.4, 320 Wis. 2d 194, 202, 768 N.W.2d 223. The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court lost competency when it adjourned the probable cause hearing on the seventh day of S.M.S.’s emergency detention and concluded the hearing the following day. The answer turns on the interpretation and application of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(a), a question of law subject to de novo review. Id. , ¶8.

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(7) provides time limits for conducting the probable cause hearing and the final commitment hearing. The time limits for the probable cause hearing—that is, a hearing at which the circuit court determines whether there is probable cause to believe the allegations made in the involuntary commitment petition—are found in subsec. (7)(a). As mentioned, if the individual is subject to an emergency detention, the court must hold the probable cause hearing "within 72 hours after the individual is taken into custody ..., excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays." Id. The probable cause hearing can be postponed "[a]t the request of the subject individual or his or her counsel ..., but in no case may the postponement exceed 7 days from the date of detention." Id. Subsection (7)(c) provides time limits for the final hearing, at which the court or jury will determine whether the individual should be committed. See § 51.20(7)(c). The court "shall schedule the matter" for a final hearing "within 14 days from the time of detention of the subject individual" unless the probable cause hearing was postponed, in which case the final hearing "shall be scheduled for hearing within 21 days from the time of detention of the subject individual." Id. These timelines can be pushed back under some circumstances if the individual is incarcerated or to accommodate a jury trial when a jury demand is made. See § 51.20(11)(a).

¶11 The time limits pertaining to Chapter 51 proceedings are "strict procedural guidelines," and the failure to hold the hearings within the statutory time limits can result in the court's loss of competency to enter a commitment order. Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M. , 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. The reason for strict time limits is to protect the significant liberty interests at stake when an individual is detained for mental health treatment. See, e.g. , Humphrey v. Cady , 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) ; State ex rel. B.S.L. v. Lee , 115 Wis. 2d 615, 621, 340 N.W.2d 568 (Ct. App. 1983). "Although protecting people from harm [resulting from untreated mental health issues] is important, so is due process," which the time limits are "intended to provide." Ryan E.M. , 252 Wis. 2d 490, ¶11.

¶12 In recognition of the significant liberty interest at stake when an individual is detained, this court has determined that a circuit court loses competency if the final commitment hearing is not held within the statutory time limits, provided that the delay is caused by the county. State ex rel. Lockman v. Gerhardstein, 107 Wis. 2d 325, 328, 320 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1982). On the other hand, we have also determined that a final commitment hearing may be extended past the statutory time limits if the delay is caused by the conduct or manipulation of the detained subject. Milwaukee Cnty. v. Edward S. , 2001 WI App 169, ¶9, 247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 241. Our cases do not address under what circumstances, if any, the court may continue a probable cause hearing that has already commenced past the seven-day time limit provided in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(a).

¶13 With these principles in mind, I turn to S.M.S.’s argument. S.M.S. contends that the time limits for concluding a probable cause hearing are mandatory, and that the court lost competency when it adjourned the hearing after the seventh day of S.M.S.’s detention. Therefore, S.M.S. contends that the commitment proceeding should have been dismissed due to the court's loss of competency.

¶14 I conclude that, based on the specific circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not lose competency when it adjourned the hearing to the eighth day of S.M.S.’s detention. My reasoning is based on the same rationale that this court found persuasive in Edward S. Here, as in Edward S. , the...