Jefferson v. Lias

21 F.4th 74

Devin JEFFERSON, Appellant

v.Officer George LIAS; City of Elizabeth

No. 20-2526

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: May 20, 2021

Filed: December 16, 2021

Daniel Ginzburg [ARGUED], Unit 736, 151 Highway 516, Old Bridge, NJ 08857, Counsel for Appellant Devin Jefferson

Daniel Antonelli [ARGUED], Antonelli Kantor, 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1000, Livingston, NJ 07083, Counsel for Appellee George Lias

Robert F. Varady [ARGUED], LaCorte Bundy Varady & Kinsella, 989 Bonnel Court, Union, NJ 07083, Counsel for Appellee City of Elizabeth

Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves claims arising out of a police shooting that occurred during the course of a car chase. Appellant Devin Jefferson challenges the District Court's grant of summary judgment against his Fourth Amendment excessive force and Monell failure-to-train claims, brought against Appellees Officer George Lias and the City of Elizabeth, respectively. The District Court determined that Officer Lias was entitled to qualified immunity, and moreover that Jefferson suffered no constitutional injury, leaving no basis for his Monell claim. For reasons we will explain below, we will reverse the District Court's order with respect to both claims and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I.

A. Background

The events in question took place on January 15, 2014, as Jefferson was driving home from a concert venue in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Officer Timothy Staffer of the Elizabeth Police Department, on patrol in his cruiser that night, took notice of Jefferson traveling at a high speed with his car alarm blaring. Jefferson, playing music loudly in his car, was apparently oblivious to the alarm. Officer Staffer, suspecting the vehicle may have been stolen, turned to follow Jefferson and activated his siren and overhead lights in an attempt to pull over the vehicle. As it so happened, Jefferson was approaching the end of a five-year probation term and was driving with an open container of alcohol in the car. Fearing a probation violation, Jefferson did not pull over for Officer Staffer, and a car chase ensued.

Officer Lias, also on duty that night, eventually joined the pursuit of Jefferson after hearing radio dispatches concerning the activity. At the time Lias joined the pursuit, he was only aware of the information that had been communicated over the radio, namely that Jefferson was driving a possibly stolen vehicle, the vehicle's license plate number, and the direction it was headed. Although other officers during the pursuit "observed Mr. Jefferson traveling at high speeds, running red lights, ignoring police signals to pull over, and driving in close proximity to other vehicles," Lias did not personally witness Jefferson running red lights or weaving in and out of traffic. Lias Br. 5.

Near the end of the pursuit, Jefferson was traveling northbound on Jefferson Avenue when he made a right turn on Mary Street, hitting a fire hydrant. Officers then surrounded Jefferson's vehicle on both left and right sides. To evade the officers, Jefferson reversed, first striking a police vehicle before backing up onto the intersection of Jefferson Avenue and Mary Street, attempting to turn back onto Jefferson Avenue from the direction he had arrived. Lias arrived at the scene in his vehicle as Jefferson was in the process of completing his maneuver in the intersection. He had not personally witnessed Jefferson striking either the fire hydrant or the police vehicle.

Both parties characterize the following moments, which culminated in Lias shooting Jefferson, in different terms. According to Jefferson, as he finished reversing from Mary Street and began to proceed forward onto Jefferson Avenue, "Lias exited from the front passenger door of his vehicle, maneuvered around the hood of his car toward Plaintiff's vehicle, and settled into a shooting position. Officer Lias discharged his firearm at Plaintiff as Plaintiff's vehicle passed in front of him ... Prior to shooting, Officer Lias did not see any police officers attempt to escape Plaintiff's vehicle path." Appellant Br. at 5. In Officer Lias' telling, "[i]n the last split second as Mr. Jefferson was passing Officer Lias's police car, Officer Lias discharged his firearm once at Mr. Jefferson's vehicle because he testified that he feared for his own safety and others around him, including other officers and Officer Banos who he did not know where he was at the time but knew he was in the area." Lias Br. at 6. The record contains video footage depicting the shooting obtained from a utility pole.

Jefferson was struck in his left forearm, fracturing the bones there. After he was hit, Jefferson continued to drive away and checked himself into the hospital. Jefferson was eventually indicted in New Jersey State Court for second-degree eluding, and ultimately pled guilty to the charge.

II. DISCUSSION ¹

On February 4, 2015, Jefferson initiated an action bringing two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims: one against Officer Lias for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and the other against the City of Elizabeth under a Monell failure to train theory of liability.² After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted on June 30, 2020, in favor of Appellees. The District Court held that Officer Lias's use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances, but even assuming it was not, that he was shielded from liability by qualified immunity because his actions did not violate clearly established law. Further, because it found there was no underlying constitutional violation, the District Court determined that Jefferson's Monell claim against the City of Elizabeth failed as a matter of law. We will begin our analysis with a discussion of the standards governing excessive use-of-force claims.

A. Officer Lias's use of force was not "reasonable" as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment

Claims of excessive force against law enforcement officers brought by persons outside of police custody are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). "To prevail on a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable under the circumstances." El v. City of Pittsburgh , 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey , 637 F.3d 177, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2011) ). Jefferson's shooting undoubtedly constituted a seizure. Torres v. Madrid , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 989, 999, 209 L.Ed.2d 190 (2021) (officers seized fleeing suspect by shooting and hitting her, although she eluded capture). The relevant inquiry thus is whether Lias's use of force was reasonable under the circumstances.

Determining whether force used in a given instance is reasonable "requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. The inquiry is an objective one, however, and "the question is whether the officers' actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation."

Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. In Tennessee v. Garner , the Supreme Court held that deadly force is not justified in circumstances where a fleeing suspect "poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others." 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).

As this Court noted, additional

[f]actors to consider in making a determination of reasonableness include ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he actively is resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

Rivas v. City of Passaic , 365 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ). Other relevant factors are "the physical injury to the plaintiff, the possibility that the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with whom the police officers must contend at one time." El , 975 F.3d at 336 (quotation and citation omitted). Because the inquiry is so fact-dependent, we have held that "[t]he reasonableness of the use of force is normally an issue for the jury." Rivas , 365 F.3d at 198 (citing Abraham v. Raso , 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir. 1999) ); see also Lytle v. Bexar Cty. , 560 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting in "cases where the officer's conduct is less clear and an assessment of reasonableness mandates a number of factual inferences, the case falls within the province of a jury").

In its opinion, the District Court did not explicitly discuss any of the factors articulated in Garner or Graham. Nor did it discuss our precedent interpreting and applying Graham 's "reasonableness" standard. Without making reference to those decisions, the Court, at the end of its qualified immunity analysis, determined that Officer Lias's use of force was reasonable, depicting the circumstances involved in the following manner:

Plaintiff was engaged in a high-speed car chase with the police. Officer Lias saw Plaintiff's vehicle driving recklessly, reversing into an intersection, and then driving towards Officer Lias and his police cruiser. Officer Lias testified that when he saw the oncoming vehicle he feared for his safety, the safety of his partner, and

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