Jefferson v. Williams

1

ROBERT JEFFERSON, Petitioner, v. E. WILLIAMS, Respondent.

No. 20-cv-595-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

November 2, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID W. DUGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Now before the Court is Petitioner Robert G. Jefferson's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1).

Background ^[1]

On August 5, 1998, a jury found Petitioner guilty on 25 counts of a Third Superseding Indictment, including for the murders of Londwea Brown and five young children, running a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE"), drug conspiracy, various drug charges, and as a felon in possession of a firearm. See Jefferson v. United States, Nos. CR 97-276(2), Civ. 01-1821, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25370, *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2002) (order denying Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion). Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment on the CCE and murder counts. Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478 at *1 (order denying Petitioner's Motion for Sentence Reduction). Petitioner was also convicted of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), for which he was sentenced to 10-years. Jefferson, 2021 WL 2143478, at *3. His convictions and sentence were affirmed. Jefferson 215 F.3d at 823.

Here, Petitioner only challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Doc. 1). Petitioner does not challenge the remaining counts of his conviction. Petitioner invokes Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019), as the basis for his collateral attack, and argues that the Government failed to prove that he knew he belonged to the category of persons (those with a prior felony conviction) who were prohibited from possessing a firearm, at the time he possessed a firearm (Doc. 1). Petitioner argues generally that he is entitled to relief because his charging indictment and corresponding jury instructions did not specify a “status” element (Doc. 1, p. 10). Respondent answered the Petition (Doc. 10), to which Petitioner replied (Doc. 12). Respondent also filed supplemental authority (Doc. 13), to which Petitioner responded (Doc. 14).

Discussion

Typically, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing; they may only challenge the execution of a sentence. Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is usually limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). A prisoner may only challenge his federal conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in very limited circumstances, such as the “saving clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002).

Section 2255 relief is inadequate “when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Therefore, before relief under § 2241 becomes available, Petitioner must demonstrate the inability of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to cure the alleged defect in their conviction because of a structural problem inherent in § 2255. See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (Petitioner must show “something more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion” before the saving clause is satisfied). Following Davenport and its progeny, the Seventh Circuit has developed a three-part test for determining whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective so to trigger the saving clause:

1. The federal prisoner must seek relief based on a decision of statutory interpretation (as opposed to a decision of constitutional interpretation, which the inmate could raise in a second or successive § 2255 motion);

2. The statutory rule of law in question must apply retroactively to cases on collateral review and could not have been invoked in a first § 2255 motion; and

3. A failure to afford the prisoner collateral relief would amount to an error “grave enough” to constitute “a miscarriage of justice.”

Worman v. Entzel, 953 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016) and Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)); see also Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019).

Petitioner asserts a claim based on the 2019 Rehaif opinion, in which the Supreme Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 204 L.Ed.2d 594; United States v. Williams, 946 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2020) (defendant's conviction for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition was based on his status of being illegally or unlawfully in the United States; reversing/remanding because the Government had not been required to prove at trial that defendant knew he was unlawfully in the country). The opinion abrogated nationwide precedent in all eleven circuit courts of appeal which had held that knowledge was not an element that the prosecution must prove to obtain a conviction, including in the Eighth Circuit where Petitioner was convicted. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 615 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that in a § 922(g) prosecution the Government was not required to prove that the defendant knew of his disabling status).

Petitioner claims that the Government failed to prove that he knew he belonged to the category of persons (those with a prior felony conviction) who were prohibited from possessing a firearm, at the time he possessed a firearm (Doc. 1). Respondent concedes that Petitioner's Rehaif claim satisfies the first and second prongs of the Seventh Circuit's “saving clause” test - Rehaif is a statutory interpretation case, and it sets forth a new substantive rule narrowing the scope of Section 922(g), which applies retroactively (Doc. 10, pp. 19-20). Further, this new substantive rule was previously unavailable to Petitioner because it would have been futile to raise his claim in his first Section 2255 motion^[2] under binding pre-Rehaif precedent (Id.). However, Respondent asserts that Petitioner cannot meet the third Davenport factor - a showing that an error in his conviction amounts to a miscarriage of justice - because he was not convicted of a crime for which he was actually innocent (Doc. 10, p. 21).^[3] On this issue, the Court agrees.

Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner's indictment did not allege that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm (Doc. 10, p. 5). This was consistent with pre-Rehaif controlling precedent. However, the Government avers that it would have been implausible for Petitioner to not know he was a prohibited person because of his prior state court felony conviction, and the term of imprisonment he served for that felony conviction. See, e.g., Williams, 946 F.3d 968 (Finding that defendant “cannot plausibly argue that he did not know his conviction had a maximum punishment exceeding a year” where he spent twelve years of his life in prison).

Following the Rehaif decision, the Seventh Circuit has clarified that district courts can, and should, consider other evidence in the criminal record to determine whether the evidence establishes the knowledge element set forth in Rehaif. See, e.g., United States v. Maez, 960 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2020); Williams, 946 F.3d at 973-74; United States v. Dowthard, 948 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2020). Post-Rehaif, the Government does not have “to prove that the defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Knowledge of the relevant status is enough.” Santiago v. Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 707 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Maez, 960 F.3d 949); United States v. Cook, 970 F.3d 866, 880 (7th Cir. 2020). Further, to establish “actual innocence” here, Petitioner “must show that no reasonable juror would find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that . . . his prior conviction[] was for a crime that carried a potential sentence of more than one year in prison.” Santiago, 36 F.4th at 707.

State Felony Conviction

On May 31, 1994, Petitioner pled guilty to a Minnesota felony charge for witness tampering (Doc. 10-1, pp. 4-6, 41) (citing State of Minnesota v. Robert G. Jefferson 62-K2-94-670). In this case, Petitioner was originally charged with witness tampering and assault, and the charging complaint provided that the maximum punishments for these charges were five years, and seven years, respectively (Doc. 10-1, pp. 4-6). Petitioner pleaded guilty to the witness tampering charge on May 31, 1994 (Doc. 10-1, p. 41). The assault charge was ultimately dismissed.

In a signed statement made before his change of plea hearing Petitioner confirmed that he understood that pleading to the charge of witness tampering was a felony and carried a maximum sentence of 5 years (Doc. 10-1, p. 23 at ¶ 19.b) (“I have been told by my attorney and I understand: b. That the maximum penalty that the court could impose for this crime (taking into consideration any prior conviction or...