Jenkins v. Chase Bank United States, N.A., 14-CV-5685 (SJF)(AKT)

JARRETT R. JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK USA, N.A., Defendant.

14-CV-5685 (SJF)(AKT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 19, 2015

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, J.

On September 29, 2014, pro se plaintiff Jarrett R. Jenkins ("plaintiff" or "Jenkins") commenced the instant action against Chase Bank USA, N.A. ("defendant" or "Chase") alleging violations of: (1) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; and (2) the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. [Docket Entry No. 1 ("Complaint" or "Compl.")]. Plaintiff has subsequently amended his Complaint twice. [Docket Entry Nos. 13 ("Amended Complaint" or "Am. Compl."), 18 ("Second Amended Complaint" or "Second Am. Compl.")]. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Docket Entry No. 21 ("Motion to Dismiss")], which plaintiff opposes. [Docket Entry No. 25 ("Pl. Opp.")]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND¹

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that in October 2012, plaintiff obtained his credit report from three credit reporting agencies - Equifax, Transunion and Experian - and found that Chase had "entered into the Plaintiff's [Equifax/Transunion/Experian] credit report[s] claiming two alleged but non-existent debts owed to them" on two accounts, one beginning with the digits 5542 and one beginning with the digits 4254. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15, 18. The Complaint and Amended Complaint allege that defendant Chase had been engaged in this activity of furnishing information about plaintiff's alleged non-existent debts to Equifax, Transunion, and Experian "from at least September 2000." Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15, 18; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 15, 18.

Plaintiff alleges that he disputed the accuracy and correctness of the Chase tradelines with Equifax on or about December 26, 2012 (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 13), that he received a copy of the results of the Equifax reinvestigations on or about January 22, 2013 indicating that both the tradelines were "verified" (id. ¶ 14), and that the tradelines continued to be reported on his Equifax credit report until May 22, 2013. Id., Ex. 1.² Plaintiff alleges that he disputed the accuracy and correctness of the Chase tradelines with Transunion on or about December 26, 2012 (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16) and that on or about January 25, 2013 he received a copy of the results of the Transunion investigations indicating that both tradelines had been deleted. Id. ¶ 17, Ex. 2. Plaintiff alleges that he disputed the accuracy and correctness of the Chase tradelines with Experian on or about December 26, 2012 (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 19),³ that on or about February 8, 2013, he received a copy of the results of the Experian reinvestigations indicating that the accounts were verified as belonging to plaintiff and were updated, and that the tradelines continued to be reported on plaintiff's Experian credit report until the date the Second Amended Complaint was filed. Id. ¶ 20, Ex. 3. Plaintiff has attached to the Second Amended Complaint excerpts from the investigations/reinvestigations by Equifax, Transunion and Experian. See Exs. 1-3. Plaintiff alleges that on or about January 2, 2013, he sent Chase multiple letters requesting a validation of the alleged debts on the 4254 account and the 5542 account (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-24), which are attached to the Second Amended Complaint (Exs. 4a-4d), but that to date, Chase has "failed to provide any 'general ledger' accounting or proper validation of the alleged debts claimed to be owed by plaintiff." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant: (1) violated Section 1692d(5) of the FDCPA by "engaging in conduct of which the natural result was the abuse and harassment of the Plaintiff by inputting false, derogatory and inaccurate information in Plaintiff's Experian credit report and updating and certifying said report from October 2013 to present day" (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 29.a.); (2) violated Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by "falsely representing the character and amount of the alleged debts in the Plaintiff's Experian credit report from October 2013 to present day" (id. ¶ 29.b.); (3) violated Section 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by "communicating to Experian credit information which they knew or should have known to be false from October 2013 to present day" and that defendant "knew or should have known the information they were communicating to Experian was false because the Plaintiff never had any kind of relationship, business or otherwise with Defendant of their predecessor(s)" (id. ¶ 29.c.); (4) violated Section 1692f(1) of the FDCPA by "using the Plaintiff's Experian credit report as a means to collect on the alleged but non-existent debts" and that defendant's behavior "was unfair and unconscionable" because defendant "never produced [the] agreements [creating the debts] or brought forth any legal or lawful obligation that was owed by Plaintiff after the Plaintiff requested such proof" (id. ¶ 29.d); and (5) violated Section 1692g(b) of the FDCPA "by not ceasing collection activity in the Plaintiff's Experian credit report from October 2013 to present day[,] [e]ven after receiving the Plaintiff's multiple requests for validation from on or about January 2, 2013 to present." Id. ¶ 29.e. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of defendant's violations of the FDCPA, he "suffered actual damages in the forms of emotional distress and the denial of credit from Cash Call." Id. ¶ 30; Exs. 5-6.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant violated the FCRA by: (1) "failing to conduct an investigation after receiving notice that Plaintiff disputed the information the Defendant had provided to Equifax and Experian" in violation of Section 1681s-2(b)(1)(A) (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 35); (2) "failing to review all relevant information provided by Equifax and Experian pursuant to § 1681i" in violation of Section 1681s-2(b)(1)(B) (id. ¶ 36); (3) "reporting inaccurate, incomplete, false, and misleading results of the investigation, if any to Equifax and Experian" in violation of Section 1681s-2(b)(1)(c) (id. ¶ 37); and (4) "by failing to notify Equifax and Experian that the reporting of the Defendant tradelines was inaccurate, incomplete, false and misleading" in violation of Section 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that defendant's behavior, which occurred from January 22, 2013 to the date of the Second Amended Complaint (id. ¶¶ 33-34) "demonstrates a willful and knowing disregard for the law or in the alternative negligence of the law." Id. ¶¶ 33-34. As a result of the alleged FCRA violation, plaintiff alleges he "suffered actual damages in the forms of emotional distress and the denial of credit from Cash Call." Id. ¶ 39; Exs. 5-6.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that a plaintiff plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The pleading of specific facts is not required; rather a complaint need only give the defendant "fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plausibility standard requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In deciding a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must liberally construe the claims, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., L.P., 737 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2013). However, this tenet "is inapplicable to legal conclusions," and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Wilson v. Dantas, 746 F.3d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 2014). "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010). Further, the Court must hold submissions by a pro se litigant "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" (Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980)) and construe such submissions liberally and "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 133 (2d Cir. 2008) ("courts are...to construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and motions liberally").

B. FDCPA Claim

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's FDCPA claim on the grounds that defendant, "as Plaintiff's former creditor, is not a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA." [Docket Entry No. 22 (Memorandum of...