Jenkins v. Corizon Health Inc.

JEMME J. JENKINS, Individually, and JULIANNE GLISSON,Administrator of the Estate of Jimmie L. Alexander, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. CORIZON HEALTH INC., a Delaware Corporation; GUY AUGUSTIN, M.D.;VICTORIA NEILSER, LPN.; KEVIN TODD, Corporal; MARK DAMBACH, LPN.;CARL MILTON, Sergeant; WANDA WILLIAMS, Lieutenant;DESMOND BRYANT, Corporal; CHATHAM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;JOHN WILCHER, Sheriff of Chatham County; and JOHN DOES 1-5; Defendants.

CASE NO. CV418-099

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA SAVANNAH DIVISION

August 6, 2020

ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Daubert Motion to Exclude and Limit the Testimony of William A. Reese, M.D., as amended (Docs. 74, 87) and Daubert Motion to Limit the Testimony of Charles Lewinstein, M.D. (Doc. 86). For the following reasons, Plaintiffs' Daubert Motion to Exclude and Limit the Testimony of William A. Reese, M.D., as amended (Docs. 74, 87) is GRANTED IN PART, DISMISSED AS MOOT IN PART, and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' Daubert Motion to Limit the Testimony of Charles Lewinstein, M.D. (Doc. 86) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On May 22, 2016, around 8:30 p.m., Jimmie Alexander, Sr. ("Alexander"), a pretrial detainee at Chatham County Detention Center ("CCDC") began to experience pain in his right hip and leg. (Doc. 96 at ¶ 15; Doc. 145 at ¶ 15.) Alexander was evaluated by Defendant Mark Dambach, a licensed practical nurse ("LPN"), and Dambach noted that Alexander complained of sudden onset of right leg pain, that Alexander had a weak thread pedal pulse in his right foot, and that his blood pressure was elevated. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 17-19; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 17-19.) Dambach informed Defendant Guy Augustin, M.D., of Alexander's symptoms and Alexander was prescribed medications to treat the pain and lower his blood pressure. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 26-29; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 26-29.) However, later that evening, Alexander crawled into the middle of Unit 6D floor, vomiting on the floor at some point. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 38-39; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 38-39.) Dambach responded and checked Alexander's vitals, but did not otherwise check Alexander's right leg. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 41-43; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 41-43; Doc. 48 at 131.) Alexander was moved to a cell in Receiving and Discharge ("R&D") for observation during the night. (Doc. 48 at 133-34.)

Augustin arrived at CCDC the next day, May 23, at 7:30 a.m. and spoke with other medical providers at morning conference, and left CCDC around 8:30 a.m. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 73-75; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 73-75.) Augustin returned later that day and examined Alexander atapproximately 3:00 p.m. on Monday, May 23, 2016. (Doc. 96 at ¶ 84; Doc. 145 at ¶ 84.) During his examination, Augustin noted the absence of a pulse on the top of the foot and that Alexander's right lower limb was cool to the touch. (Doc. 45 at 163.) Augustin ordered Alexander to be taken to the hospital. (Id. at 165-66.)

Alexander arrived at the Memorial Health University Medical Center ("Memorial") emergency room at 5:38 p.m. on May 23. (Doc. 96 at ¶ 97; Doc. 145 at ¶ 97.) It was ultimately determined by Dr. Bhandari, a vascular interventional radiologist, that surgery would be needed to address the extensive blood clot that had been found in Alexander's right leg. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 100-01; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 100-01.) Dr. Avino, a vascular surgeon, began a thrombectomy on Alexander at 10:05 p.m. on May 23, 2016 and Alexander was transferred from the operating room to the post-anesthesia care unit ("PACU") for recovery at 11:52 p.m. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 103, 104, 106; Doc. 145 at ¶¶ 103, 104, 106). At 7:07 p.m. on May 23, prior to the thrombectomy, Alexander's potassium level was recorded at 5.1 mmol/L. (Doc. 77, Attach. 1 at 87.) At 4:37 a.m. on May 24, 2016, after surgery, Alexander's potassium level was recorded at 7.3 mmol/L. (Id. at 91.) Alexander's potassium level was reported to Dr. Moon, the chief resident working that night, and Dr. Moon and his team went to the PACU and found Alexander in cardiac arrest. (Doc. 96 at ¶¶ 113-14; Doc. 77, Attach. 1 at 12-13.) Alexander could not be revived and was declared dead by Dr. Moonon May 24, 2016 at approximately 5:13 a.m. (Doc. 96 at ¶ 116; Doc. 90, Attach. 3 at 1.)

In their complaint, Plaintiffs pursue counts of negligence, professional negligence, wrongful death, and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, among other things, due to the alleged inadequate medical attention Alexander received at CCDC. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have retained experts to testify on a variety of subjects. At issue in this order is the testimony of William A. Reese, M.D. (Doc. 74), as amended (Doc. 87), and Charles Lewinstein, M.D. (Doc. 86).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The admission of expert testimony is controlled by Federal Rule of Evidence 702:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

The trial judge is assigned "the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). "As the Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Daubert, Rule 702 compelsdistrict courts to perform the critical gatekeeping function concerning the admissibility of expert scientific evidence." United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). This gatekeeping function equally applies to the admissibility of expert technical evidence. Id.; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-49, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174-75, 143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that district courts fulfill that function by engaging in a three-part inquiry, considering whether

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as to be determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific . . . expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260.

When a court considers the reliability of a particular expert's opinion, it considers, to the extent possible, (1) whether the expert's theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois, UK, Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002)).These factors "do not constitute a definitive checklist or test." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S. Ct. at 1175 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, the applicability of these factors "depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue." Id. The same criteria that are used to assess the reliability of a scientific opinion may be used to evaluate the reliability of non-scientific, experience-based testimony. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262.

ANALYSIS

I. PLAINTIFFS' DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE AND LIMIT THE TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. REESE, M.D.

According to William A. Reese, M.D.'s ("Dr. Reese") expert report, he is a Board-certified Emergency Medicine physician who has sub-specialized in emergency medical systems with over thirty years of experience directing and overseeing emergency medical personnel. (Doc. 74, Attach. 28 at 1.) Dr. Reese additionally has over twenty years of experience in correctional medicine as a treating physician and a Medical Director. (Id.) Dr. Reese's opinions go to the standard of care for the staff employed by Defendant Corizon. Specifically, Dr. Reese opines that:

1. Dr. Augustin was not indifferent to the medical needs of Mr. Alexander.

2. Dr. Augustin met the standard of care (with a reasonable degree of medical certainty).

3. The Medical Staff and Correctional Staff were not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Alexander's medical needs.

4. From the point of view as a Jail Medical Director who has worked with correctional nurses for over 20 years, I feel the nurses met the standard of care with respect to Mr. Alexander.

5. The death of Mr. Alexander attributed to acidosis and hyperkalemia induced dysrhythmia was not caused by and cannot be attributed to care given by Dr. Augustin, Nurse Dambach, Nurse Neisler, the jail medical or correctional staff.

6. Corizon Health, Inc., as the employer for Dr. Augustin, Nurse Dambach and Nurse Neisler, is not a responsible party in the death of Mr. Alexander.

(Doc. 74, Attach. 28 at 7 (numbering added).) Plaintiffs have moved to exclude numerous opinions by Dr. Reese on various grounds. Defendants Corizon Health, Inc., Guy Augustin, M.D., Mark Dambach, LPN, and Victoria Neisler, LPN (the "Corizon Defendants") have responded in opposition (Doc. 100). Defendant Chatham County Commissioners (Doc. 113) and Defendants Kevin Todd, Carl Milton, Wanda Williams, Desmond Bryant, John Wilcher, and John Does 1-5 (the "Sheriff Defendants") (Doc. 115) have adopted Corizon Defendants' brief in opposition.¹

A. Dr. Reese's Opinions on Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiffs first argue that Dr. Reese's opinions that "Dr. Augustin was not indifferent to the medical needs of Mr. Alexander" and "[t]he Medical Staff and Correctional Staff were not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Alexander's medical...