Jenkins v. Food Serv. Adm'r

Steve Jenkins, Plaintiff, v. Food Service Administrator and Cook Supervisor, Defendants.

C. A. No. 1:21-557-HMH-SVH

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

August 27, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge

In this case, a Muslim prisoner was accidentally served pork while on institutional lockdown during Ramadan in 2019 and has sued arguing his rights have been violated.

Steve Jenkins (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), asserting violations of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and the policies of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated while he was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Estill, South Carolina (“FCI-Estill”), and he asserts his claims against Michael Potts, Food Service Administrator (“Defendant”), and an unknown Cook Supervisor.

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 23].^[1] Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the summary judgment procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendant's motion. [ECF No. 24]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF No. 33], it is ripe for disposition. Also before the court is Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint and to compel discovery. [ECF Nos. 31, 34].

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned denies Plaintiff's motion to amend and to compel discovery and recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment. I. Factual and Procedural Background

The parties agree on the relevant facts. Plaintiff was housed at FCI-Estill from November 10, 2015, to August 20, 2019. [ECF No. 23-2]. Plaintiff has been designated as a Muslim inmate since 2015. [ECF No. 23-3].

Ramadan is month of fasting in which Muslims abstain from food and water from dawn until sundown. [ECF No. 23-4]. During the relevant time frame, Ramadan was observed at FCI-Estill from sundown, Sunday, May 5, 2019, until June 6, 2019. Id. Inmates observing Ramadan during this timeframe would generally receive the breakfast meal in a bag and then fast without food or water until sundown. Id. Inmates would then report to Chapel at 8:00 p.m. and be escorted to the inmate dining room to receive the lunch and dinner meals in a takeout container to be consumed in their respective housing units. Id. In order to participate in the religious meal during Ramadan, inmates must register with Religious Service Department to request the special religious meal. Id. Plaintiff was registered to participate in the Ramadan meals in May 2019. Id.

At that time, however, FCI-Estill was on modified operations, also known as “lockdown, ” from May 24, 2019, through June 10, 2019. [ECF No. 23-1 ¶ 11]. During this time, all FCI-Estill inmates received satellite meal service in the housing units, as they were not allowed to go to the inmate dining room. Id. Inmates participating in Ramadan received the lunch and dinner satellite meals in their respective housing units after sundown to break their fasting. Id.

In his role as Food Service Administrator, Defendant ordered beef sausage for an inmate holiday meal to celebrate Memorial Day on May 27, 2019. Id. ¶ 12. The beef sausage was not on the National Menu or served specifically for Ramadan; it was purchased for the Memorial Day holiday meal as a substitute in compliance with BOP and FCI-Estill policies. Id.^[2]

Defendant ordered the beef sausage to be served as a no-pork entrée with the impression and belief that the product was all beef. Id. Due to the FCI-Estill modified operations and satellite feeding, the beef sausage was utilized for the lunch meal on May 28, 2019, instead of the evening meal on Memorial Day, Monday, May 27, 2019. Id. ¶ 13. Inmates could self-select a no-pork or a no-flesh entrée in advance of the satellite meal served in the housing units. Id. Inmates participating in Ramadan meals received the lunch and dinner meals on May 28, 2019, in the housing unit to break their fasting. Id. In addition, a soy patty was available as the alternate no-flesh entrée. Id. Defendant did not personally prepare the beef sausage in his role as Food Service Administrator. Id. ¶ 14. Defendant supervises the cook supervisors and inmate food service workers prepare the food items to be served to inmates during each meal. Id.

On June 17, 2019, it was brought to the attention of other Food Service Department staff that the all-beef sausage was made with a pork casing. Id. ¶ 15. Upon discovery, Defendant directed Food Service staff to discontinue use of the beef sausage and substituted a different no-pork entrée according to Food Service Policy. Id.

II. Discussion

A. Standard on Summary Judgment

The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.

Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the [PLRA], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005). However, “an administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850 (2018).

The BOP has a three-tiered formal administrative grievance process although there is also an informal resolution process. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10 et seq. An inmate may complain about any aspect of his confinement by first seeking to informally resolve the complaint at the institution level. 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. If the matter cannot be resolved informally, the inmate may file a formal written complaint to the warden within 20 calendar days after the date upon which the basis for the request occurred. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. The matter will be investigated, and a written response provided to the inmate. See Id. If dissatisfied...