Jenkins v. Nat'l R.R. Corp.

ALBERT JENKINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-2414 (RDM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 14, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Albert Jenkins and Jody Johnson, proceeding pro se, bring this damages suit against the National Railroad Corporation ("Amtrak") for allegedly discriminatory and tortious actions taken against them by Amtrak employees during a train trip. Dkt. 1. Amtrak moves to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint fails to provide fair notice of Plaintiffs' claims and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 8-1 at 3-8. Amtrak also moves to dismiss Johnson's claim on the ground that Jenkins is not a lawyer and cannot bring claims on behalf of other persons or, alternatively, a conflict of interest precludes Jenkins from representing both himself and Johnson. Id. at 8-9. Although advised by the Court of the need to respond to Amtrak's motion and cautioned about the consequences of failing to do so, over six months have passed since Plaintiffs' deadline to respond, and they have yet to file an opposition. See Dkt. 9; Minute Order (Jan. 7, 2020). Despite Plaintiffs' failure to respond, the Court has reviewed the merits of the motion along with the relevant pleadings. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Amtrak's motion and will DISMISS Plaintiffs' complaint but will provide Plaintiffs with the opportunity to file an amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are derived from Plaintiffs' complaint and, for the purposes of Amtrak's motion to dismiss, are taken as true. See McNeil v. Duncan, No 19-694, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57390, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73(1984)).

Plaintiffs suffer from several medical conditions. "Jenkins is a senior citizen who . . . had undergone surgery for varicose veins in his left leg" shortly before the alleged incident and who also "suffers from gout[] and obesity." Dkt. 1 at 2 (Compl. ¶ 8). "Johnson suffers from high blood pressure, obesity, and cognitive mental disabilities." Id. (Compl. ¶ 9). Plaintiffs receive "Disability Discounts from Amtrak because of their medical conditions," which they apparently used to book "Business Class/Reserve Thruway seats" from Wilson, North Carolina, to Washington, D.C. See id. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-11). Their complaint focuses on an incident that allegedly occurred during that trip. Id. (Compl. ¶ 12).

According to the complaint, "[s]hortly after the train left Wilson, [North Carolina]," Plaintiffs were "ordered to leave their seats" by an Amtrak employee who "insisted that they were not in the correct seats." Id. at 3 (Compl. ¶ 13). The Amtrak employee then took them "to a private area away from other passengers and interrogated [them] for approximately 25 minutes." Id. Plaintiffs were eventually "informed that there had been a staff error, that they were originally in the proper seats, and that [they] could . . . return to [their seats]." Id. Perhaps to make up for the inconvenience caused by the incident, an Amtrak employee offered Plaintiffs "discounted tickets," but Plaintiffs "refused" the offer. Id.

On August 9, 2019, Plaintiffs brought suit, seeking $250,000 in compensatory damages as well as punitive damages for the pain, "humiliation[,] and embarrassment" that they allegedly suffered due to the incident. Id. at 3-4 (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15,18). On November 6, 2019, Amtrak moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint does not provide fair notice of Plaintiffs' claims and, in any event, fails to state a claim. Dkt. 8-1 at 3-8. Amtrak also moves to dismiss Johnson's claim on the ground that Jenkins is not a lawyer and cannot bring claims on behalf of other persons and that, even if Jenkins could do so, a conflict of interest would preclude Jenkins from acting on behalf of Johnson. Id. at 8-9.

On November 8, 2019, the Court issued a Fox/Neal order advising Plaintiffs of the pending motion to dismiss, explaining their obligation to respond to the motion, cautioning them that the failure to respond might result in the Court treating the motion as conceded or in dismissal, and directing Plaintiffs to respond to the motion on or before December 6, 2019. Dkt. 9. On January 6, 2019, a month after Plaintiffs' response was due, Amtrak filed a supplemental brief, arguing that the Court should dismiss the case for failure to prosecute because Plaintiffs had not filed a response. Dkt. 10. The next day, the Court issued an order advising Plaintiffs that the deadline to respond to Amtrak's motion to dismiss had passed and directing them to "inform the Court whether they intend[ed] to pursue th[e] case." Minute Order (Jan. 7, 2020). The Court, once more, cautioned Plaintiffs that failure to comply with the order "may result in the Court treating the motion to dismiss as conceded" and also warned them that failure to respond could result in the case being dismissed "for failure to prosecute." Id. To date, Plaintiffs have not notified the Court whether they intend to pursue the case or taken any other action in the case.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Although pleadings by pro se litigants are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), they must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the Court's jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." Shipman v. Amtrak, No. 19-cv-04, 2019 WL 4889246, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). The Rule is designed to "give the defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Rule 12(b)(6), in turn, is designed to "test[] the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, the complaint must contain "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me allegation." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In assessing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider only "the facts contained within the four corners of the complaint," Nat'l Postal Prof'l Nurses v. U.S. Postal Serv., 461 F. Supp.2d 24, 28 (D.D.C. 2006), along with "any documents attached to or incorporated into the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record," United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 798 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D.D.C. 2011).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court starts with Plaintiffs' failure to file an opposition brief, which Amtrak contends warrants dismissal. See Dkt. 10 at 2. Local Rule 7(b) permits a court to "treat . . . as conceded" a motion not met with a timely opposing memorandum of points and authorities. Local Civ. R. 7(b). In recent years, the D.C. Circuit has "raised concerns . . . about the use of Local Civil Rule 7(b) to grant an unopposed motion[] to dismiss." Chandler v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 16-cv-0709, 2017 WL 318627, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2017) (citing Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the District of Columbia, 819 F.3d 476, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Although the D.C. Circuit has "upheld district courts' application of Local Rule 7(b) to grant unopposed motions to dismiss complaints with prejudice under Federal Rule 12(b)(6)," it has expressed "concerns about that precedent," noted "the tension between Local Rule 7(b) and Federal Rule 12(b)(6)," and observed that "most circuits that have considered the application of similar local rules in this context prohibit district courts from granting a motion to dismiss solely because the plaintiff failed to respond." Cohen, 819 F.3d at 480-81. Most importantly, the Court of Appeals has stressed that dismissal under Local Rule 7(b) runs counter to the "weighty preference in favor or deciding cases on their merits."¹ See id. at 483. In light of these concerns, and in anabundance of caution, the Court will address the merits of the pending motion rather than grant it as conceded.

Plaintiffs' complaint fails to satisfy Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). At less than four pages in substance, no one can fault Plaintiffs' complaint for being "unnecessarily lengthy." Jiggetts v. District of Columbia, 319 F.R.D. 408, 414 (D.D.C. 2017). But what the complaint features in brevity, it lacks in clarity. Under the "Legal Claims" sub-heading, for example, the complaint asserts only that relief is sought because of Amtrak's "continuing, ongoing tort, done purposefully and knowingly" and that Amtrak's employees exhibited "deliberate and wanton negligence." Dkt. 1 at 4 (Compl. ¶ 18). Plaintiffs do not identify any duty sounding in tort, and the complaint's factual allegations do little to clarify the legal basis for Plaintiffs' claims. Elsewhere, Plaintiffs gesture at asserting claims under federal statutory law,...