Jimenez-Pantaleon v. Aucancela

221 A.D.3d 676

197 N.Y.S.3d 601 (Mem)

Alisa JIMENEZ–PANTALEON, appellant,

v.Angel G. AUCANCELA, et al., respondents.

2022–07437

Index No. 520010/21

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—June 9, 2023

November 8, 2023

Chopra & Nocerino, LLP (Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York, NY [Brian J. Isaac and Jillian Rosen ], of counsel), for appellant.

Silverman Shin & Byrne PLLC, New York, NY (Michael Byrne, Patrick S. Costello, and Wayne Stanton of counsel), for respondents.

COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., LARA J. GENOVESI, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Richard Velasquez, J.), dated July 6, 2022. The order denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability without prejudice to renew upon completion of party depositions.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.

In August 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in June 2021, when the vehicle that she was operating was struck in the rear by the defendants’ vehicle. In an order dated July 6, 2022, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability with leave to renew upon completion of party depositions. The plaintiff appeals.

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Thompson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.3d 815, 817, 175 N.Y.S.3d 66 ; Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d 771, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683 ). "A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" ( Nsiah–Ababio v. Hunter, 78 A.D.3d 672, 672, 913 N.Y.S.2d 659 ; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a] ; Balgobin v. McKenzie, 213 A.D.3d 893, 182 N.Y.S.3d 669 ). "Stops by a lead vehicle which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows" ( Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d at 772, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683 ; see Buchanan v. Keller, 169 A.D.3d 989, 991–992, 95 N.Y.S.3d 252 ). "Moreover, an assertion that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle" ( Perez v. Persad, 183 A.D.3d at 772, 123 N.Y.S.3d 683 ; see McRae v. City of New York, 208 A.D.3d 775, 776, 174 N.Y.S.3d 418 ). "A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative fault to establish her or his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability" ( Xin Fang Xia v. Saft, 177 A.D.3d 823, 825, 113 N.Y.S.3d 249 ; see Rodriguez v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.3d 312, 76 N.Y.S.3d 898, 101 N.E.3d 366 ).

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a...