Jimenez v. Wolf

ROLANDO JIMENEZ, Plaintiff, v. CHAD WOLF, Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-2055 (CRC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 29, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Rolando Jimenez brings a plethora of claims alleging discrimination and retaliation by his employer, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), a component of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). Jimenez is no stranger to this Court. Previously, he brought employment discrimination claims based on complaints he made to USCIS's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office in 2012, 2015, and 2017. The Court dismissed some of those claims for failure to exhaust and to state a claim, Jimenez v. McAleenan ("Jimenez I MJP"), 395 F. Supp. 3d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2019) (resolving the government's motion for judgment on the pleadings), and granted summary judgment to the government on the majority of Jimenez's other claims, Jimenez v. Wolf ("Jimenez I MSJ"), No. 17-cv-2731, Slip Op. at 1 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2020). Here, Jimenez brings claims arising out of agency EEO complaints in 2013 and 2014, which are very similar to the claims brought in Jimenez I. Because these claims suffer from many of the same flaws identified in Jimenez I, the Court will grant judgment to the government, as explained further below.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Mr. Jimenez, who was born and raised in the Dominican Republic and identifies as Hispanic, has worked for USCIS and its predecessor agency since 1996. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. He is currently a GS-14 Immigration Officer with USCIS's Immigrant Investor Program Office in Washington, D.C. DSOMF ¶ 2 n.1.

Jimenez has lodged numerous complaints with USCIS's EEO office over the years. As noted above, this Court previously dismissed or granted summary judgment to the government with respect to claims arising out of EEO complaints Jimenez made in 2012, 2015, and 2017. See Jimenez I MJP, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 27; Jimenez I MSJ, Slip Op. at 1. This case raises similar claims, but arises out of events described in Jimenez's 2013 and 2014 EEO complaints. For ease of discussion, DHS has helpfully numbered these events one through sixteen and Jimenez has adopted this numbering convention for purposes of his opposition. The Court will follow suit.

In his 2013 complaint, Jimenez alleged that DHS retaliated against him on the basis of his prior EEO activity and subjected him to a retaliatory hostile work environment. He alleged that DHS retaliated against him by: adding a memorandum to his personnel file that incorrectly stated that his Performance Plan and Appraisal ("PPA") for Fiscal Year ("FY") 2012 would be delayed (Event 1); denying him a bonus for his performance during the 2012 Fiscal Year (Event 2); failing to select him for seven vacant positions within the agency for which he applied (Events 3-9); retaining one of his colleagues as an acting manager, thereby denying Jimenez the opportunity to serve in a temporary GS-15 level position (Event 11); and giving him a performance appraisal of "Achieved Expectations" (Event 12). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-36, 46-48; see also Def.'s Ex. 2, 2013 Issue Acceptance Letters at 1-2. He further alleged that he was subjectedto a retaliatory hostile work environment when management: (a) failed to provide him with a mid-cycle review for his FY 2013 PPA; (b) asked him on one occasion to leave his worksite immediately after his shift ended; (c) failed to provide him with an applicable policy supporting that request; and (d) chastised him once for emailing upper management (collectively, Event 10). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-45; see also Def.'s Ex. 2, 2013 Issue Acceptance Letters at 2.

In his 2014 EEO complaint, Jimenez brought claims of retaliation and discrimination on the basis of national origin due to DHS's failure to select him for four vacancies (Events 13-16). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50-63; Def.'s Ex. 7, 2014 Issue Acceptance Letters at 1. Given the large number of claims, the specific facts relating to each claim will be discussed in context below.

Jimenez's federal complaint advances four counts based on these sixteen events: race discrimination (Count 1); retaliation (Count 2); hostile work environment (Count 3); and national origin discrimination (Count 4). Because each count asserts that it incorporates all the preceding paragraphs into each claim, the Court construes Jimenez's complaint as alleging that each of the sixteen events were motivated by all four impermissible bases. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64, 68, 72, 76.

B. Procedural Background

Jimenez's 2013 and 2014 EEO complaints followed parallel paths at the agency level. First, DHS conducted full administrative investigations. Thereafter, Jimenez requested a hearing before Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative judges ("AJs"), and the parties engaged in discovery, including multiple depositions and written discovery requests and responses, as part of that litigation. See Def.'s Ex. 8, EEOC Order on Initial Conf. & Deadlines. After the conclusion of discovery, DHS moved for summary judgment in each case, which was granted by the administrative judges in full. Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ("SOMF") ¶¶ 6, 12-13. DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties ("CRCL") then issued final agencydecisions implementing the administrative judges' decisions in their entirety. Id. ¶¶ 7, 14. Jimenez appealed both final agency decisions, and the EEOC Office of Federal Operations affirmed the decisions in full. Id. ¶¶ 8, 15.

Jimenez then filed suit in this Court and later amended his complaint. Prior to answering (and before any discovery had taken place), DHS moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, for summary judgment under Rule 56. That motion is now ripe.

II. Legal Standards

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim satisfies this standard "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must "assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)" and "must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged." Aktieselskabet AF 21 November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court need not, however, accept a plaintiff's legal conclusion as true, even if "couched as a factual allegation." Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Further, a plaintiff cannot defeat a motion to dismiss by relying on "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

When considering a motion to dismiss a court may consider a document that is central to the plaintiff's claims without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See Doe 2 v. Trump, 319 F. Supp.3d 539, 541 (D.D.C. 2018). A court is similarly permitted to consider documents of which it could take judicial notice. Therefore, because a "plaintiff's EEOC charge and the agency's determination are both public records," Williams v. Chu, 641 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35 (D.D.C. 2009), a court "may consider a plaintiff's EEOC documents" in evaluating a motion to dismiss, Deppner v. Spectrum Health Care Res., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 176, 184 (D.D.C. 2018).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

The Court laid out the relevant summary judgment standards in Jimenez I MSJ, Slip Op. at 5-6. That discussion follows verbatim:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment must "show[] that the materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a factual dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Additionally, for a factual dispute to count as "genuine," the nonmoving party must establish more than "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [its] position," id. at 252, and cannot rest on "mere allegations" or conclusory statements, see Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 633 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court is only required to consider thematerials explicitly cited by the parties, but may on its own accord consider "other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts must generally "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [non-moving] party." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, the court "may not make credibility determinations or otherwise weigh the evidence." Johnson v. Perez , 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Thus, "a party may oppose summary judgment with sworn testimony, and . . . that party's own sworn testimony can alone defeat summary judgment." United States v. Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Dollars ($17,900.00) in U.S. Currency, 859 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, there exist "narrow circumstances under which courts may 'lawfully put aside testimony [because it] is so undermined as to be...