Joers v. City of Phila.

190 A.3d 797

Debra JOERS and Ralph D'Abruzzo, II

v.CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Yvette Leduc

Appeal of: City of Philadelphia

No. 1659 C.D. 2017

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: June 7, 2018

Decided: July 19, 2018

Reargument Denied September 4, 2018

Jennifer MacNaughton, Senior Attorney, Philadelphia, for appellant.

George J. Badey, III, Philadelphia, for appellees.

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE JAMES GARDNER COLINS

This is an appeal filed by the City of Philadelphia (City) from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) entering judgment against the City following a jury verdict against it and its employee, Police Officer Yvette Leduc (Officer Leduc) in a personal injury automobile accident case brought by Debra Joers and her husband Ralph D'Abruzzo, II (collectively, Plaintiffs). The appeal does not challenge the jury's verdict against Officer Leduc or the amount of damages awarded by the jury. The issues in this appeal involve only the City's vicarious liability for the accident. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm on the ground that the City was bound by deemed admissions that Officer Leduc was acting in the scope of her employment at the time of the accident where it failed to respond to requests for admissions until three months after the discovery deadline and approximately one month before trial.

At approximately 7:45 a.m. on September 30, 2015, Plaintiff Joers was struck and injured by Officer Leduc's vehicle when Joers was crossing an intersection in Center City Philadelphia. (5/15/17 Trial Transcript (N.T.) at 75-83, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 138-140.) At the time of the accident, Officer Leduc was driving her personal car from her house to a criminal court hearing at which she was required to appear and testify in her capacity as a police officer and was in uniform and carrying her service weapon. (Id. at 161-65, R.R. at 160-161; 5/16/17 N.T. at 60-61, 69, R.R. at 184-185, 187.) Plaintiff Joers suffered fractures of her left arm and left leg in the accident that required surgery, hospitalization and rehabilitation.

On February 29, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the City and Officer Leduc alleging that Officer Leduc was negligent and that the City was liable for her actions on the ground that she was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The City denied the averments of Plaintiffs' complaint. The trial court's case management order required that all discovery be completed by January 2, 2017 and that the case be ready for trial by May 1, 2017. (Docket Entries, R.R. at 32.)

On September 7, 2016, Plaintiffs served on the City a set of requests for admissions pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. No. 4014 (the Request for Admissions) seeking admissions concerning the accident, Officer Leduc's employment with the City, and Plaintiff Joers' injuries and damages. Among the items that Plaintiffs requested that the City admit were the following:

6. During the week of Sunday, September 27, 2015 through Saturday October 3, 2015, Leduc's regularly scheduled shift was 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.

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17. Police officers employed by the City are acting within the scope of their employment when they are traveling to court to provide testimony in criminal matters pursuant to subpoena.

* * *27. At the time Leduc struck Plaintiff Deborah Joers on Wednesday, September 30, 2015, Leduc was being compensated for her time by the City.

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30. If Leduc had not been on her way to the Criminal Justice Center on Wednesday, September 30, 2015 at approximately 7:45 a.m., she would have been working as a patrol officer at the 39th District of the Philadelphia Police Department.

31. On Wednesday, September 30, 2015, Leduc's hours of work were 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.

32. At the time Leduc struck Plaintiff Deborah Joers on Wednesday, September 30, 2015, Leduc was acting within the course and scope of her employment with the City.

33. On Wednesday, September 30, 2015, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Leduc was acting in the course and scope of her employment.

34. On Wednesday, September 30, 2015, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Leduc was not pursuing an activity unreleated [sic] to her employment.

35. On Wednesday, September 30, 2015, at approximately 7:45 a.m., Leduc was acting in furtherance of the City's interests by traveling to the Criminal Justice Center to provide testimony in a criminal matter.

(R.R. at 98-101.) The City did not serve any answers, objections, or response of any kind to the Request for Admissions within 30 days or at any time before the January 2, 2017 discovery deadline.

On December 20, 2016, prior to the discovery deadline, Plaintiffs took Officer Leduc's deposition. In her deposition, Officer Leduc testified that her regular hours were 7:00 a.m. to 3:15 p.m. when she worked in the police district to which she was assigned, but that her scheduled work hours for September 30, 2015 were 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. or 4:15 p.m. because she was testifying in court. (Leduc Dep. at 34, 40-43, 52, 80-81, R.R. at 57-59, 61, 68-69.) Officer Leduc testified that she was in uniform and carrying her service weapon, but that she was driving her own car and was not being paid by the City for her time traveling to court. (Id. at 14-16, 28, 44-45, R.R. at 52, 55, 59-60.) Officer Leduc also testified that she believed that she was acting within the scope of her employment because she was traveling to court to give testimony at the time of the accident and was in uniform and could be required to take police action. (Id. at 42-45, 65-69, R.R. at 59, 65-66.)

On March 6, 2017, the City filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the undisputed facts established that Officer Leduc was not acting in the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. (Trial Court Record Item (R. Item) 25.) Plaintiffs, in their response filed on March 24, 2017, argued that the motion should be denied both because the City's failure to respond to the Request for Admissions established as a matter of law that Officer Leduc was acting within the scope of her employment and because Officer Leduc's testimony was sufficient to show that she was acting within the scope of her employment. (R. Item 26, Plaintiffs' Answer to City Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶ 6, 19 and Memorandum of Law at 1, 7-10.)

On April 5, 2017, three months after the discovery deadline and less than one month before the case was to be ready for trial, the City served a response to the Request for Admissions in which it admitted some of the requests and denied other requests. (R.R. at 105-109.) In that response, the City answered Requests Nos. 6, 17, 27, and 30-35 as follows:

6. Denied. See City of Philadelphia Police Department Listing of DARS ^{[1 ]} for September of 2015 and deposition testimony of Leduc discussing same. Leduc was off on September 27 and 28, was scheduled to be on duty 7:am-3:15 pm on September 29 and was scheduled to be on duty 8:am to 4:15 pm on September 30, 2015.

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17. Denied.

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27. Denied. At the time of the accident, Yvette Leduc was not within scheduled work hours and was not being compensated.

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30. Denied. On September 30, 2015, Leduc was not scheduled to begin work until 8:00 am. It is unknown what she would have been doing before that time.

31. Denied. Denied. See City of Philadelphia Police Department Listing of DARS, which indicates that Leduc's scheduled hours for September 30, 2015 were 8am to 4:15pm.

32. Denied.

33. Denied.

34. Denied as stated. Leduc was traveling from home to work, in her personally owned vehicle.

35. Denied. Leduc was traveling to work. Travelling from home to work is not acting in furtherance of an employer's interests, pursuant to well established "coming and going rule".

(R.R. at 106-108.) On April 7, 2017, the City filed a reply brief in support of its summary judgment motion attaching a copy of its belated response to the Request for Admissions. (R. Item 27.) On April 18, 2017, the trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the ground that "[t]here are multiple issues of fact present for a jury to consider, including and not limited to the special circumstances of Defendant Leduc's employment responsibilities." (Docket Entries, R.R. at 35-36.)

On May 1, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine in which they asserted that they had relied on the City's admission of the requests for admissions and would be prejudiced if the City were permitted to withdraw those admissions months after the discovery deadline and a month before the case was to go into the trial pool and requested that the items in the Request for Admissions be deemed admitted. (R. Item 31, Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine ¶¶ 22, 24-26, 28, 30 and Memorandum of Law at 9-10.) On May 11, 2017, the City timely filed a response opposing Plaintiffs' motion in limine. (R. Item 32.) A jury trial was held from May 15, 2017 to May 17, 2017. On May 15, 2017, before the start of trial, the trial court heard argument on Plaintiffs' motion in limine. In response to the trial court's inquiry, the City stated that the reason for its failure to timely respond to the Request for Admissions was that it "fell through the cracks." (5/15/17 N.T. at 19-22, R.R. at 124-125.) Following argument, the trial court ruled that the Requests for Admissions at issue were deemed admitted and that based on these admissions, Officer Leduc was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. (Id. at 29-31, R.R. at 127.)

At trial, Plaintiffs read in evidence Requests Nos. 30, 34 and 35 and other items in the Request for Admissions that are not at issue here. (5/16/17 N.T. at 18-24, R.R. at 174-175.) Plaintiffs and the City read into evidence Officer Leduc's deposition testimony concerning the accident, the fact that she was on her way to testify in court and was in uniform and carrying her service weapon,...