John Doe v. Trs. of Ind. Univ.

577 F.Supp.3d 896

John DOE, Plaintiff,

v.TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-02903-JRS-MJD

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

Signed January 3, 2022

Andrew T. Miltenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Janine L. Peress, Pro Hac Vice, Philip A. Byler, Pro Hac Vice, Nesenoff & Miltenberg, LLP, New York, NY, Jonathan Charles Little, Saeed & Little LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Wayne Parker, Jr., Kayla D. Moody-Grant, Tracy Nicole Betz, Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO PROCEED UNDER A PSEUDONYM

Mark J. Dinsmore, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Seek Leave to Proceed Under a Pseudonym. [Dkt. 3.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint.

Plaintiff began his studies at Indiana University Bloomington ("the University") in the Fall of 2018 with an anticipated graduation date of Spring 2023. [Dkt. 1 at 5.] At the time of the incident giving rise to this litigation, Plaintiff was a 21-year-old junior, was President of the Pi Lambda Phi fraternity, and lived in an off-campus fraternity house known as "the Den" with four of his fraternity brothers. [Dkt. 1 at 7.] Plaintiff "thrived academically" and, after interning "at a big four accounting firm," he was "offered a full-time employment position, which is contingent on [Plaintiff] receiving his degree in good academic standing and a background check." [Dkt. 1 at 7-8.]

Throughout 2020 and 2021, COVID-19 regulations and restrictions were imposed nationwide, and were often modified due to the rapidly evolving pandemic. The University, Monroe County, and the City of Bloomington all executed various regulations in response, including placing limits on the number of people allowed to gather at a time. When the University resumed in-person learning for the 2020-2021 schoolyear, it required students returning to campus to execute a Student Commitment Form, wherein "students agreed to practice good personal hygiene, wear a face mask in public, practice physical distancing and adhere to other guidelines and requirements." [Dkt. 1 at 12.] The sanctions for non-compliance, per the University's website, "included a hold on accounts, fines or fees and a temporary exclusion from on-campus class attendance and physical presence on campus with a required switch to all online classes." [Dkt. 1 at 12.]

As described by Plaintiff, the weekend of April 22-23 "is well known nationally as the biggest party weekend for Indiana University." [Dkt. 1 at 15.] It is undisputed that, on April 23, 2021, "Plaintiff and his roommates hosted a fraternity party at their off-campus residence." [Dkt. 16 at 3; Dkt. 1 at 1.] While Defendants assert that Plaintiff's party involved "approximately 100 attendees" in violation of the Monroe County COVID restrictions and the University's Student Commitment Form, [Dkt. 16 at 2], Plaintiff maintains that "[t]he outdoor social gathering did not exceed fifty (50) people at any given time and did not extend indoors," which "was within Monroe County Health Department's guidelines, as stated on April 7, 2021." [Dkt. 1 at 16.] He further argues that "it was unclear whether the City of Bloomington's former restrictions were still in effect." [Dkt. 1 at 16.] The Bloomington Police Department and, later, the Indiana University Police Department both responded to noise complaints at the gathering. [Dkt. 1 at 16; Dkt. 16 at 3.]

On April 27, 2021, upon learning of Plaintiff's alleged violation of COVID protocols, the University "investigated Plaintiff's actions and ultimately suspended Plaintiff for one year, concluding that Plaintiff's behavior was considered dangerous and disruptive to the university community and constituted a serious threat of harm to himself and others on campus." [Dkt. 16 at 3.] The University additionally relayed their findings to the Pi Lambda Phi fraternity headquarters, and Plaintiff was subsequently suspended from the organization indefinitely. [Dkt. 1 at 18-19.] Plaintiff's co-hosting roommates and fraternity brothers were not issued the same sanction; they were instead "banned from campus for the remainder of the Spring 2021 semester but were allowed to complete their coursework virtually and have no ongoing disciplinary sanctions affecting the Fall 2021 to Spring 2022 semester." [Dkt. 1 at 31.] Although Plaintiff was granted "a formal review by the hearing commission on the grounds that the summary suspension was inappropriate given the facts and circumstances and wholly disproportionate as compared to his three similarly situated co-hosting housemates," his appeal was unsuccessful. [Dkt. 1 at 22.]

On November 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Complaint as John Doe, alleging that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. [Dkt. 1.] He argues that,

after receiving notice of an alleged violation of the Covid-19 regulations against Plaintiff, Indiana University wrongfully (i) failed to notify Plaintiff of the alleged violations; (ii) sanctioned him by summary suspension prior to providing formal notice; (iii) charged him with misconduct; (iv) presumed him guilty; (v) found him guilty and imposed a disproportionate sanction to three other students who co-hosted the social gathering; and (vi) did not provide him with any hearing or oversight to review the fairness of the sanctions.

[Dkt. 1 at 31-32.] Plaintiff contemporaneously filed a sealed Notice of Intention to Seek Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonym, [Dkt. 2], and the instant Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym, [Dkt. 3].

II. Applicable Standards

The "presumption in favor of open proceedings where the parties are identified" is both powerful and longstanding. Doe v. Indiana Black Expo , 923 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring the caption of a complaint to "name all the parties"); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 (requiring that all civil actions "be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest"). As a result, "[t]he use of fictitious names is disfavored." Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United , 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997). The "unusual practice" of allowing a party to litigate under a pseudonym may be appropriate, however, "in exceptional cases where the party has a privacy right so substantial as to outweigh the ‘customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.’ " Indiana Black Expo , 923 F. Supp. at 139 (quoting Doe v. Frank , 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992) ).

"The decision whether to allow a party to proceed pseudonymously is within the discretion of the court." Doe v. Purdue Univ. , 321 F.R.D. 339, 341 (N.D. Ind. 2017) ; K.F.P. v. Dane County , 110 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997). The court therefore "has an independent duty to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify such a departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts." Blue Cross & Blue Shield United , 112 F.3d at 872. To be sure, there is no "mechanical legal test" that dictates when a party may proceed anonymously, and courts "should carefully review all the circumstances of the given case." Indiana Black Expo , 923 F. Supp. at 140. When deciding whether to grant anonymity, courts consider a number of factors, including, but not limited to:

(1) whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental activity or an individual's actions; (2) whether the plaintiff's action requires disclosure of information of the utmost intimacy; (3) whether the action requires disclosure of the plaintiff's intention to engage in illegal conduct; (4) whether identification would put the plaintiff at risk of suffering physical or mental injury; (5) whether the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to proceed anonymously; and (6) the public interest in guaranteeing open access to proceedings without denying litigants access to the justice system.

Doe v. City of Indianapolis, Ind. , 2012 WL 639537, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2012) (quoting EW v. New York Blood Center , 213 F.R.D. 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ); see also Indiana Black Expo , 923 F. Supp. at 140 (quoting Doe v. Shakur , 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ). Importantly, this list of factors is non-exhaustive. Anonymity may also be granted where the plaintiff is a minor, a victim of rape or torture, or otherwise "a likely target of retaliation by people who would learn [his] identity only from a judicial opinion or other court filing." Doe v. City of Chicago , 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004). Although courts will consider a variety of factors, it is the movant who ultimately "bears the burden of proof to show that some combination of these factors outweighs the ordinary presumption of judicial openness, justifying the exercise of the Court's discretion." Doe v. Cook County , 542 F.Supp.3d 779, 785 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2021).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff asks to proceed under a pseudonym "due to the nature of the allegations" in his Complaint and because he "is justifiably concerned about the potential irreparable harm that could further prevent him from proceeding with his future endeavors." [Dkt. 3 at 1.] Defendants object, arguing that this case does not present the kind of "exceptional circumstances" that justify anonymity. [Dkt. 16 at 1.]

To determine whether Plaintiff's case constitutes an exceptional circumstance in which pseudonym treatment is warranted, the Court will consider the following relevant factors: (A) whether Plaintiff is challenging governmental activity or an individual's actions; (B) whether Plaintiff's action requires disclosing information of the utmost intimacy; (C) whether Plaintiff's identification would place him at risk of suffering harm; (D) whether Defendants would be prejudiced by Plaintiff's continued anonymity; (E) the public's interest in guaranteeing open access to...